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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the American tax system, a person's taxable income for any 
year is intended to reflect three factors: the taxpayer's economic in-
come; the extent to which the taxpayer has earned tax benefits by en-
gaging in tax-favored behavior; and the extent to which Congress 
believed that the imposition of tax might impose an undue hardship on 
the taxpayer. 
If this system were a pure income tax system, each person's taxable 
income would simply mirror her economic income for the year. To 
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the extent that the system attempts to encourage people to change 
their behavior in certain ways, one might expect a person's taxable 
income to reflect the extent to which she has so changed her behavior. 
Finally, to the extent that the system attempts to avoid imposing a 
hardship on taxpayers in certain given statuses (i.e., poverty, cash-
poor, etc.), one might expect taxable income to reflect also the extent 
to which the taxpayer enjoys (or suffers, as the case may be) that status 
at the end of the year. 
Unfortunately, however, none of the above factors is easily subject 
to year-end measurement. 1 Because of perceived difficulties in directly 
measuring these accepted indicia of tax liability, the system has never 
attempted to engage in such measurements. Instead, the system looks 
to discrete and identifiable events (transactions) that have occurred 
during the year and that reflect, albeit often indirectly, the factor(s) 
intended to be measured. 2 
By so doing, the system avoids the need to make precise measure-
ments of the relevant factors, instead relying on a series of objective 
binary determinations to establish a person's taxable income. Rather 
than measuring, for example, a person's net worth or change in behav-
ior, the system simply measures whether or not the person has en-
gaged in certain specific tax-significant transactions, and bases taxable 
income on those determinations. 
While it is true that engaging in these tax-significant trans;ictions 
will often reflect the existence of one or more of the relevant factors 
(i.e., economic income, behavior change, or status) sought to be mea-
sured by reference to that transaction, it is also true that engaging in 
any particular transaction is nothing more than a reflection. Like 
Plato's shadows on the cave wall, what appears in the reflection is not 
always identical to what actually exists. Measuring taxable income by 
reference to transactions has two major potential sources of inaccu-
racy: (I) at times, neither the actions necessary to consummate the 
transaction nor the consequences flowing from the transaction will ac-
curately reflect the particular factor(s) believed to be measured by ref-
erence to that transaction;3 and (2) whether or not a taxpayer has 
engaged in a particular transaction is a question which must be an-
swered either "yes" or "no," but the indicia of tax liability intended to 
be measured by reference to that transaction exist in varying degrees 
that cannot be accurately reflected by any purely bipolar 
1. See infra Part I.A. l. 
2. See infra Part I.B.1. 
3. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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characterization. 4 
As a result of the indirect way in which we measure the intended 
indicia of taxable income, some inaccuracy in the measurement of eco-
nomic income and in the distribution of tax benefits is inevitable. In a 
system such as ours, where every well-advised taxpayer has both the 
time to examine and the motivation to exploit these inaccuracies, the 
extent of inaccuracy could soon move from the inevitable to the intol-
erable. What would normally be minor discrepancies between the 
existence of a particular factor and the occurrence of some transaction 
that generally reflects that factor become unacceptably magnified, es-
pecially in a system where every taxpayer is attempting to exploit 
those discrepancies in order to maximize profits while minimizing tax-
able income and other unfavorable factors. 
This article assumes that the use of transactions to measure taxable 
income, and the resultant mismeasurement and opportunities for 
abuse, will remain an inevitable part of our income tax system. 5 Given 
that assumption, this article proceeds to show that, if nothing else, the 
system's own need for self-preservation requires it to be able to re-
spond to the problems suggested above in a meaningful way. Because 
any legislative response to these abuses will necessarily be ex post in 
nature, exclusive reliance on legislative responses is likely to result in 
the best-advised taxpayers always staying a year or two ahead of Con-
gress and, thereby, avoiding taxes indefinitely. This article explores 
what the judicial and administrative approaches to these mismeasure-
ment problems have been, examines the problems inherent in that ap-
proach, and suggests an alternative that is more equitable, more 
intellectually honest, and more workable. 
In the past, courts and the Internal Revenue Service have re-
sponded to the predictable taxpayer attempts to exploit the system's 
weaknesses by informing taxpayers that tax minimization is only to be 
expected, but that tax avoidance is unacceptable. Never, however, are 
taxpayers told what distinguishes the two. While much of the judicial 
analysis purports to rest on the distinction between tax avoidance and 
business purpose, the truth is that the well-advised taxpayer will al-
ways take into consideration both the economic and the tax aspects of 
any business decision. Further, when a taxpayer is found to have en-
gaged in tax avoidance, he is then told that his problem is not tax 
4. See infra Part II.A. 
S. But see, e.g., Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal/or Accrual Taxation, 134 
U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1986) (suggesting, implicitly, that reliance on transactions is not always 
necessary). 
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avoidance, but it is only that he did not really do what he did, 6 or that 
the Internal Revenue Code does not really say what it says. 7 Essen-
tially, the judicial and administrative responses to the mismeasure-
ment problems that inhere in the system consist of a series of fictions 
that simply do not withstand scrutiny. 
This article suggests that there will always be some divergence be-
tween taxable income as determined by reference to transactions and 
taxable income that would result from a completely accurate measure-
ment of the factors that are intended to be reflected therein. This di-
vergence increases unnecessarily and unacceptably when taxpayers are 
either permitted to act or required to report in a way that intentionally 
exaggerates the mismeasurement. In order to prevent abuse of the sys-
tem, taxpayers who act in a way that is intended to exaggerate the 
mismeasurement of any particular attribute, position, or status (in-
cluding economic income) should be deprived of the benefit that is 
intended to accompany that attribute, position, or status. 
In addition, because measuring particular tax-significant factors 
that exist along a continuum by reference only to bipolar alternatives 
is an administrative tool that almost always results in mismeasurement 
of the factor in question, the system ought to be more receptive to 
nonpolar measurements when the accuracy or revenue gained by that 
alternative outweighs the extra administrative burden that it might en-
tail. Finally, the article explains that the existence of taxpayer abuse is 
itself a question not of bipolar extremes, but of placement somewhere 
along a continuum between purity (i.e., acceptable tax planning) and 
evil (i.e., tax avoidance). As a result, courts cannot and, therefore, 
should not try to do more than attempt to place the taxpayer's behav-
ior at its appropriate point along that continuum. Such an approach 
would result not only in a more accurate distribution of tax benefits 
and burdens, but also in a system that was both ·more equitable and 
more intellectually honest than the system that currently exists. 
This article first will explain our system of "transaction taxation" 
and will further explore the problems caused by the transactional fo-
cus of our tax system. It then will consider the current judicial re-
sponses to these problems and examine their inadequacies. Finally, it 
will set forth and explore the alternative responses suggested above in 
more detail. 
6. This is the implication of the step transaction doctrine. See infra Parts II.A.4 & II.B.2. 
7. This is a result of application of the business purpose test. See infra Parts II.A.3 & II.B. I. 
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A. The Structure of the Federal Income Tax 
1. Economic Income 
[Vol. 87:365 
At least one of the goals of any income tax system is the accurate 
measurement of income. Fortunately (and surprisingly, in light of the 
usual disagreement over almost every aspect of both theory and prac-
tice prevalent among today's economists), most economists agree, at 
least theoretically, on what income is. The Haig-Simons approach, 
generally accepted today, defines income for any year as the sum of 
{l) the market value of what the taxpayer consumed during the year, 
plus (2) the change in the value of the taxpayer's property rights be-
tween the beginning and end of the period in question. 8 Because the 
Haig-Simons approach links income to changes in the taxpayer's net 
worth during the taxable year, accurate measurement of income for 
any year requires a complete accounting of the taxpayer's net worth at 
both the beginning and the end of the year in question. 9 
Because neither the value of annual consumption nor the annual 
changes in value of all of a taxpayer's property are easily measurable, 10 
a more feasible method of accounting for, as opposed to merely defin-
ing, income has generally involved focusing on the source of property 
rather than on its use or its change in value. Under this approach, 
income could be viewed as a combination of wages, interest, dividends, 
and other amounts which a person either receives or becomes entitled 
to receive. 11 
The appeal of this focus on receipts rather than on valuation lies 
8. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION so (1938). This definition does not itself sug-
gest how the "value" of rights can be determined. While most commentators conclude that 
market value is the appropriate definition of value, property can have value to a particular tax-
payer that exceeds (or is less than) its market value. See Strnad, Taxation of Income from Capi-
tal: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1092 (1985). 
9. For example, if Taxpayer's only asset is a home worth $150,000 on January 1 and worth 
$180,000 on December 31, Taxpayer has $30,000 of income for the year. 
10. See Shakow, supra note 5, at 1113. 
11. This definition is not identical (or even close) to the definition of income that appears in 
the Code. Indeed, the Code eschews even an attempt at a definition of "income," setting forth 
instead definitions of "Gross Income," "Adjusted Gross Income," and "Taxable Income." See 
l.R.C. §§ 61, 62, 63 (1982). Of these, the concept of adjusted gross income most closely approxi-
mates "net income," but the use of the term "approximates" in the previous phrase is similar to 
its use in the following sentence: "Of all birds, the ostrich most closely approximates an ele-
phant." 
The Haig-Simons definition also differs substantially from that offered by the Supreme Court 
in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) ("Income may be defined as the gain derived 
from capital, from labor, or from both combined .... "). To the extent that the Court's state-
ment attempts to define income rather than explain what it is that our system {which we choose 
to label as an "income tax") taxes, it is inaccurate. The fact is that "[t]he income tax laws do not 
profess to embody perfect economic theory," Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929). Mr. 
Justice Holmes' statement to that effect reflected much more than mere disagreement with the 
Eisner majority. 
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less in its accuracy than in its administrative practicality.12 It is easier 
to value property on a single occasion (when it is received, or when the 
taxpayer's rights become fixed) than it would be to do so annually. 13 
In addition, a one-time valuation upon receipt of property generally 
simplifies the process of valuation. Most receipts (other than gifts, 
which are tax-free in any event14) are the result of the taxpayer's trans-
fer of property or services with a value equal to that of the property 
received. Valuation of property on receipt, therefore, is a simple task 
if either the value received or the value provided by the taxpayer con-
sists of cash or of some other asset having a readily determinable mar-
ket value. 15 Chances of a straightforward and simple valuation are 
thus doubled. 16 
Because the federal tax system is, by dint of both constitutional 
12. In addition to its administrative attractiveness, an income tax that focuses on receipts 
seems to be more politically attractive than a system that requires annual valuation and taxation 
of consumption and savings. If a taxpayer receives cash or property during the year, it seems 
only fair to the average citizen that the government should take its share of that receipt, espe-
cially when the receipt consists of cash. On the other hand, the imposition of a tax on someone 
who has "received" nothing and who has done nothing other than use (consume) her own prop-
erty, or hold property which has increased in value, might well prove to be beyond the tolerance 
of the general public. The entire realization concept is often explained by reference to the fact 
that as long as a taxpayer retains a specific property, he has only that property and no cash with 
which to pay any tax. 
Whether the system ought to tax unrealized appreciation is another question, to which many 
answers have been suggested. See, e.g., Wetzler, Capital Gains and Losses. in COMPREHENSlVE 
INCOME TAXATION 115-62 (J. Pechman ed. 1977), and articles cited therein; Slawson, Taxing as 
Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 16 YALE L.J. 623 (1967); Powell, In-
come from Corporate Dividends, 35 HARV. L. REV. 362, 376 (1922). These opinions range from 
advocating that all unrealized appreciation should be taxed annually, e.g., J. SNEED, THE CON-
FIGURATIONS OF GROSS INCOME 71 (1967); to suggestions that annual inventorying of all goods 
may be desirable but is impractical, e.g .• U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC 
TAX REFORM 81 (1977); to suggestions that annual inventory accounting should be imposed 
where it is practical, such as with publicly traded stocks, see Slawson, supra, at 644-47; to argu-
ments that the realization requirement is constitutionally mandated, see Roehner & Roehner, 
Realization: Administrative Convenience or Constitutional Requirement?, 8 TAX L. REV. 173 
(1953); to arguments that even realized gains should not be taxed, see Wallich, Taxation of Capi-
tal Gains in the Light of Recent Economic Developments, 18 NATL. TAX J. 133 (1965). 
13. See generally Shakow, supra note 5, at 1113. 
14. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1982). 
15. In fact, the values of the exchanged properties may not always be equal. See Philadelphia 
Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (unequal properties 
exchanged). See generally Kohl, The Identification Theory of Basis, 40 TAX L. REV. 623, 640 
(1985) (citing and discussing cases of unequal exchange). Section 1060 requires asset by asset 
valuation, in any event, on the purchase of a business. See I.R.C. § 1060 (1982). 
16. Basing the incidence of taxation on receipts does have some particular complicating fac-
tors, such as the need to determine when property is received and who has received it. Doctrines 
such as that of "constructive receipt," see Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (as amended in 1979), have 
grown in response to predictable taxpayer efforts to take advantage of questions raised by the 
"receipt" requirement. Cases in which problems relating to the definition of "receipt" have 
arisen include Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (employer's payment 
of employee's taxes held income to employee), and United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 
l (1931) (cancellation of indebtedness held gross income to former obliger). 
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mandate17 and congressional intent, 18 an income tax, the utility of re-
ceipts accounting is dependent on its ability to reflect income accu-
rately. On the surface, pure source accounting19 and economic income 
may appear fully compatible. ~f A earns and receives $100 cash in 
year one, she will spend (consume) part and save the rest, so that the 
$100 receipt will mirror the sum of consumption plus increased net 
worth. If B earns nothing but spends $100 on consumption, receipts 
(of zero) again mirror economic income ($100 consumption minus 
$100 decrease in net worth). Finally, if C spends $100 on an invest-
ment that becomes worthless, the expenditure of $100 equals the $100 
decrease in net worth. 
This correlation between receipts and economic income does not 
always hold true. To the extent that property held by the taxpayer 
increases or decreases in value, there is a change in the taxpayer's net 
worth and, therefore, in income, which, if the system is to remain ac-
curate, must be reflected by a corresponding receipt or payment. 
Under our system, these changes in value are generally accounted for 
at the time of each asset's disposition.20 Instead of allowing taxpayers 
to deduct the full value of any assets they transfer and requiring them 
to include in income all value received in addition to amounts con-
sumed after or upon receipt (thus taxing as net income only those re-
ceipts which themselves increase the taxpayer's wealth, e.g., wages and 
bargain purchases), our system essentially allows taxpayers who trans-
fer assets to deduct only that amount which has been previously ac-
counted for by having been included in income upon (or in the case of 
accrued original issue discount,21 after) receipt of the transferred asset 
and which was not deducted (e.g., as depreciation) while the taxpayer 
held the asset.22 By allowing a deduction on payment only for 
amounts previously taxed (and not already deducted), and including 
in income the entire amount received in the exchange, the system ac-
counts for the appreciation or decline in value of any particular asset 
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 restricts other direct taxes. The sixteenth amendment grants 
the power to lay and collect income taxes. 
18. I.R.C. § 61 (1982). 
19. Le., including all receipts in income and deducting all.payments. 
20. Certain predictable elements of a change in an asset's value, such as increases in value 
due to the accrual of original issue discount, I.R.C. §§ 1272-74 (Supp. IV 1986), and deprecia-
tion, I.R.C. § 168 (1982), are accounted for prior to disposition of the asset. But these element~ 
rarely correlate exactly with the asset's overall change in value, which will be accounted for only 
at disposition. 
21. I.R.C. § 1272 (Supp. IV 1986). 
22. The basis (the amount allowed to be "deducted" on the disposition) of depreciable prop-
erty will be adjusted for amounts previously deducted as depreciation. See I.R.C. § 1016 (1982). 
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at the time of the asset's exchange. 23 
2. Taxpayer Behavior and Status 
a. Nonincentive tax benefits. Measuring economic income in an 
administrable manner is obviously not the only goal of our income tax 
system. Because it represents the most comprehensive forum for inter-
action between taxpayers and the government, the system also serves 
as a useful tool for the implementation of economic and social policies. 
To the extent that the government seeks to assist taxpayers of a 
certain status, it may decide that the most efficient type of assistance it 
can offer is a simple cash payment. Because tax payments and refunds 
are the way in which cash is most often transferred between taxpayers 
and the government, the economic equivalent of a cash payment from 
the government to a taxpayer can be most easily accomplished by sim-
ply reducing the amount of tax collected from that taxpayer. While 
taxpayers thought to be in need of governmental aid may be identified 
purely by reference to some status that exists independently of any 
particular event or transaction,24 more often these persons are identi-
fied instead by reference to specific transactions and events that have 
occurred during the year. While it is often the case that having exper-
ienced some particular event or transaction is itself the very status that 
was the initial trigger for legislative generosity,25 more frequently that 
trigger is a status that is different from, but usually related to, the 
transaction that gives rise to the tax benefit. Typical of these provi-
23. This account is theoretically, but not technically, accurate. The system does not gener-
ally allow a deduction on the transfer of an asset for the full amount taxed upon receipt of that 
asset; nor does it require inclusion of the full value received. Instead, the system provides the 
taxpayer with a "basis" in each asset, which represents the amount taxed, and not yet deducted, 
see I.R.C. § 1016 (1982), upon receipt of the asset. I.R.C. § 1011 (1982). Upon the sale or 
exchange of the transferred asset, the taxpayer's basis in the asset offsets her amount realized, 
and the tax is imposed only to the extent that the amount realized exceeds the taxpayer's ad-
justed basis, see I.R.C. § lOOl(a)-(b) (1982). If the taxpayer's basis in the transferred asset ex-
ceeds her amount realized, the difference is a deductible loss (subject to various other limitations, 
see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 165, 267, 1011, 1041 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The net result is the same as if 
the taxpayer had deducted her basis in the transferred asset and included as income the full 
amount realized. With respect to certain payments that generate deductions without correspond-
ing receipts (e.g., certain charitable contributions, I.R.C. § 170(a)-(e)(l)(A) (1982)), deduction of 
basis is technically, as well as theoretically, inaccurate. For additional in-depth discussion of the 
role of "basis" in our system, see Kohl, supra note 15. 
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 22 (Supp. IV 1986), which gives a tax credit to the elderly and the 
permanently and totally disabled, independent of any particular events that have occurred during 
the year. 
25. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 165(c) (Supp. IV 1986), which allows a deduction for certain casualty 
losses. Apparently, the status of having experienced loss in a casualty is exactly what Congress 
sought to benefit in the first place, so that reference to such an event in the section defining the 
benefit is unavoidable. See also I.R.C. § 213 (1982), which allows a deduction for certain medi-
cal expenses paid during the year. To obtain a medical expense deduction, the taxpayer must 
both incur and pay medical expenses. 
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sions is the exemption from taxation of damages received on account 
of personal injury.26 While the receipt of damage payments does not 
itself make the taxpayer worthy of assistance from the government, 
the taxpayer who receives those payments will have suffered personal 
injury, and the system can use the exemption of those payments to 
assist those who have been injured.27 
b. Tax incentives. In addition to measuring income and provid-
ing help to certain persons thought to be in need, the tax system is also 
used by the government to motivate certain desired behavior changes. 
To the extent that the government seeks to encourage taxpayers to 
save more, to spend more, to invest more in certain ways, or otherwise 
to change their behavior, it may simply decide to give a cash reward to 
persons who are willing to change their behavior. As suggested above, 
reducing the amount of tax due, or increasing the refund due the tax-
payer, is a simple way of accomplishing this cash transfer. 
Ideally, these payments ought to be made only to those who actu-
ally change their behavior in the intended ways. To the extent that 
payment is made to one who does not engage in the desired conduct, 
the payment is misdirected. To the extent that payment is made to 
one who would have engaged in the desired behavior even absent that 
payment, the payment is simply wasted.28 Unfortunately, measuring 
the extent to which a person has changed her behavior in response to 
some potential tax benefit would be impossible, or would at the least 
require sophisticated psychological testing beyond the current capabil-
ities of the Internal Revenue Service. 
Rather than attempting to make these impossible measurements, 
the system conditions tax incentive benefits on the taxpayer's engaging 
in certain tax-favored transactions. Instead of trying to determine 
whether a person has changed his savings habits in response to a spe-
cific incentive, the government grants tax benefits, such as deferral or 
exemption of tax, to individuals who make certain expenditures that 
26. I.R.C. § 104 (1982). 
27. Some might suggest that damages for personal injury are exempted not because the recip-
ient is in need of governmental assistance but because the payment itself does nothing more than 
make the taxpayer whole for damages she has suffered (and therefore could not be income in any 
event). That the Code exempts damage payments would similarly justify exempting payments 
such as wages, which make the taxpayer "whole" for lost time and expanded efforts. More to the 
point, if A loses a kidney in an accident and receives $50,000, she has no more or less economic 
income than B, who sells a kidney for $50,000. Nonetheless, B. but not A. will be taxed on her 
receipt. The different tax treatment reflects something other than mere economic income. 
28. The statement in the text assumes that the provision at issue is a pure tax incentive and 
neither a pure nonincentive tax benefit nor a combined benefit-incentive provision. See infra Part 
I.A.2.c. 
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are normally indicative of increased savings. 29 Instead of analyzing 
whether a taxpayer is making productive use of certain assets, the sys-
tem simply gives accelerated depreciation deductions to those who 
place such assets in service. 30 As a result of these and other similar 
kinds of provisions, tax incentives are distributed in a manageable and 
efficient manner. 
c. Combinations of incentive and nonincentive benefits. One un-
fortunate aspect of any income tax system is that it will necessarily be 
perceived as penalizing those occurrences which result in tax liability 
on the part of the taxpayer. To the extent that the event that precipi-
tates liability is the accrual of income, however, any systematic deter-
rent to such accrual caused by its accompanying tax liability will be 
more than offset by the economic incentive to such activity resulting 
from the activity's own inherent financial productivity.31 Unfortu-
nately, in our system, taxation often is imposed on transactions which 
do not produce income, and it is often not imposed on the actual ac-
crual of income. While exchanges generally precipitate imposition of 
tax, very few arm's-length exchanges ever generate income. To illus-
trate, if A transfers Property 1, worth $100, and receives in exchange 
Property 2, also worth $100, the exchange produces no economic in-
come for A. Both before and after the exchange, she has property 
worth $100. Nonetheless, the exchange probably will have tax conse-
quences. If A had previously purchased Property 1 for $60, the ex-
change would generate taxable income of $40; but, far from being 
income generated by the exchange, the income is that which accrued 
and went untaxed prior to the exchange. The exchange itself generates 
only tax liability, not income. 32 On the other hand, A's continued pos-
29. Examples of these provisions are l.R.C. § 101 (1982), which exempts from taxation all 
gains on the collection of life insurance proceeds, and I.R.C. § 72 (1982), which defers from tax 
the "build-up" in value of most annuity contracts. Compare with the latter provision I.R.C. 
§·1272 (1982), which requires current inclusion of original issue discount income. 
30. I.R.C. § 168 (1982). 
31. Tax scholars and economists have long debated whether, and to what extent, imposition 
of tax liability on income received for personal services, even if accurately imposed, diminishes 
the worker's incentive. The service provider who values her time at $7 per hour and receives $10 
per hour for her services will theoretically be dissuaded from doing work she would perform in a 
tax-free world when her marginal combined state, federal, and local tax bracket exceeds 30% 
(thereby resulting in after-tax income ofless than $7 per hour). Whether the theory has practical 
consequences is debatable. See w. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
405-27 (1976). 
In any event, this article is concerned primarily with income from property rather than from 
services. Regardless of whether or not a taxpayer may be deterred from working by a decreased 
after-tax return, no taxpayer will be deterred by taxation from having property produce income. 
Assuming the person's combined marginal rate is Jess than 100%, the choice between some after-
tax return and no after-tax return (i.e., because of no income) appears to be a simple one. 
32. Indeed, one can easily imagine an exchange actually reducing real income but nonethe-
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session of Property 1 while it increased in value from $60 to $100 gen-
erated only income, and no tax liability. To the extent that tax is 
imposed at the time of actions which do not themselves generate in-
come at least equal to the tax liability which they cause, the system 
simply deters such actions. 33 
By and large, Congress has chosen simply to accept the system's 
negative impact with respect to most exchanges. It has deviated from 
the general transaction-tax approach only occasionally, usually by ex-
empting from taxation certain limited types of economically desirable 
exchanges thought not to work any real change in the substance of the 
taxpayer's economic position in any event.34 In such situations Con-
gress has generally seen fit to require the transferee to accede to the 
transferor's basis in the asset35 or to require the transferor to attach 
less generating tax liability. If, in the example in the text, Property 2 is actually worth only $97, 
the exchange itself will decrease A's net worth (and, correspondingly, her real income) by $3. 
Because the exchange triggers tax on A's pre-exchange gain, however, A will be taxed on $37 of 
income at that time. 
33. This is not to suggest that A would decide not to acquire the property in the first place, 
but only that she might later decide to hold that property rather than to sell it. In order to be 
worthwhile in an after-tax world, the exchange would have to generate real income at least equal 
to the excess of the cost of present taxation over the present cost of the future tax which would be 
predicted to be imposed upon some later exchange. 
34. Examples of these "economically neutral" exchanges are the organization and reorgani-
zation of corporations, l.R.C. §§ 351, 368 (1982). The shareholder's exchange of assets for stock 
(in the case of organizations) is not taxed because "the new property [received in these ex-
changes] is substantially a continuation of the old investment still unliquidated; and, in the case 
of reorganizations ... the new corporate structure, and the new property are substantially con-
tinuations of the old .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1 (c)(1960). See also B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS~ 14.01 (5th ed. 1987); 
S. LIND, S. SCHWARZ, D. LATHROPE & J. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDA· 
MENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 58 (1985); I.R.C. § 103l(a) (1982) (granting nonrecogni-
tion to exchanges where the property received is of "like kind" to the asset transferred). 
At the foundation of these nonrecognition provisions, which rely on no change in substance, 
lies the implicit assumption that there is some legitimate basis for the imposition of taxation only 
when the taxpayer is changing the "substance" of her investment; and this assumption itself 
seems premised on the proposition that the imposition of taxation upon the exchange of particu-
lar assets rests not on administrative considerations but on real "substantive" economic notions 
of income. 
These nonrecognition provisions are also frequently justified because taxing the formation or 
reorganization of corporations would penalize economically productive and efficient actions. 
See, e.g .• s. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 95A INTERNAL REVENUE 
AC'fS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRA· 
TIVE DOCUMENTS (B. Reams ed. 1979); see also G.K. Manufacturing v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 389 
(1935); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes and 
Realism, 71 HARV. L. REV. 254 (1957); Dane, The Case/or Nonrecognition of Gain in Reorgani· 
zation Exchanges, 36 TAXES 244 (1958). While the enactment and retention of these provisions 
was motivated in part (and perhaps even primarily) by a desire to refrain from interfering with 
economically sound business judgments, it is significant that there are many situations where the 
taxation of exchanges blatantly interferes with economically motivated decisions, see, e.g., text at 
notes 37-38 infra, but nonrecognition is offered only where there is no change in the "substance" 
of the taxpayer's investment. 
35. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 362, 1015 (1982). 
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that basis to some other asset, 36 thereby simply deferring taxation of 
the gain previously accrued to the transferred asset (as well as chang-
ing the person to be taxed on that gain). 37 
While these provisions are neither pure benefit provisions nor pure 
incentive provisions, they have aspects of both of the kinds_ of provi-
sions discussed above. They are not typical benefit provisions because 
the persons who are assisted by them are not thought to need govern-
mental assistance. They are not typical incentive provisions because 
the tax-favored exchanges are not rewarded any more than is a tax-
payer's failure to engage in any exchange at all. Rather than being 
intended to encourage the particular transaction at issue, these provi-
sions are intended only to remove the punishment that the tax system 
would otherwise impose on such exchanges. 
Nonetheless, these provisions function at times like benefit provi-
sions, at other times like incentive provisions, and at still other times 
like a combination of the two. Because most exchanges are taxed, the 
exemption from tax of certain kinds of exchanges benefits persons who 
I 
engage in those exchanges, as compared to those who engage in other 
kinds of exchanges. 38 Similarly, while deferral of taxation provides no 
incentive to make any particular exchange when the sole alternative is 
retention of the asset, to the taxpayer who intends to exchange that 
asset in any event, the tax deferral provisions may act as an incentive 
36. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1034 (1982). 
37. This statement admittedly ignores some of the significant economic effects of transferred 
basis provisions. Theoretically, the net value of property received by the corporation in any 
transferred basis exchange is equal to the fair market value of the property minus the present 
value of the cost of any future tax liability built into the property due to a below-market-value 
transferred basis. Assuming an arms'-length exchange between well represented parties, the 
transferor will receive stock in an amount which takes into account the built-in future tax liabil-
ity assumed by the transferee. As a result, this future tax burden will be effectively borne by the 
transferor, to whom the "income" actually accrued. 
This analysis is not quite complete, however, for several reasons: (1) the transferee's tax liabil-
ity is deferred (perhaps permanently if the property is not depreciable and if the transferee does 
not intend to sell the property); (2) the eventual tax will probably be imposed on a person in a 
different tax bracket; (3) at least in tax-free incorporations, the later tax will be doubled because 
the lower basis is taken by both the transferee (in the property) and the transferor (in the stock 
received in the exchange). It may be that the effect of (3) will negate the effects of (I) and (2). If 
so, the result is only by chance. In addition, if that is the result, it would defeat a major purpose 
of the statute - to avoid discouraging otherwise good business decisions by imposition of tax. 
Unless the present value of the future tax burden imposed under nonrecognition provisions is less 
than taxes triggered by present recognition, the nonrecognition provisions are of only limited 
utility. They may prevent current cash flow problems that might result from current taxation, 
but they do so only at the same cost to the taxpayer as any market rate bank loan. See Levin, 
The Case for a Stepped-Up Basis to the Transferee in Certain Reorganizations, 11 TAX L. REv. 
511 (1962) (suggesting that transferred basis provisions in corporate reorganizations are gener-
ally misguided and ineffective). 
38. This exemption does not provide a benefit when the taxpayer is compared to the person 
who simply makes no exchange. 
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to the would-be transferor to e'l.gage in one of those favored 
exchanges. 
B. Problems with the Tax Structure 
While our system's reliance on transactions is generally useful and 
often accurate, it is not without problems. Among the major problems 
that arise are (1) difficulties in characterizing specific transactions, 
(2) inaccuracy in the system's measurement of economic income and 
other tax-relevant statuses, and (3) the system's unintended normative 
impact. These are discussed below. 
1. Difficulties of Characterization 
Any system which bases taxation on exchanges and which treats 
different exchanges differently must, of course, set forth objective cri-
teria by which to distinguish among the different transactions. Char-
acterization of an exchange as a specific type of transaction depends on 
determining. what asset is exchanged for what other asset and then 
ascertaining the presence of whatever other factors the Code uses to 
define the transaction in question. Unfortunately, neither of these de-
terminations can always be readily made. 
Theoretically, an "exchange" of assets between A and B exists only 
if A transfers property to B, B transfers property to A, A's transfer 
caused B's action, and B's transfer caused A's action. Practically, even 
simple linear causation (i.e., that A's transfer could cause B's action) 
more often than not does not exist, and finding the type of mutual and 
reciprocal causation required to define an exchange precisely is 
impossible. 39 
39. The concept of reciprocity should be familiar to students of contract Jaw. If a contract is 
challenged, it may be necessary to establish some sort of reciprocity to uphold the purported 
agreement against the challenging party. In tax law the question is generally not whether a 
particular agreed-upon exchange will be upheld against one of the parties, because the transac-
tion has already been completed. All that is at issue is a determination, from an ex post view-
point, of whether a particular transfer made by one party caused, and was in turn caused by, a 
particular transfer by the other party to the exchange. 
It is quite possible that there simply was no reciprocal agreement or exchange, but that each 
party was independently motivated. To illustrate, assume that A transfers a car to B and B 
transfers a truck to A. We may say that A's promise is the "consideration" for B's truck and vice 
versa, and that A and B have formed a binding contract. We cannot, however, state with any 
degree of precision that A's transfer of the car to B is the action that "capsed" B's transfer of the 
truck to A. B's action might have been caused primarily by B's frustration with her truck, by 
some subconscious attraction to A, by a previously made vow to dispose of her truck in a transac-
tion with the first person to come along on a particular day, or by any combinations of hundreds 
of possible causes. Each of these causal factors may be a "but for" cause for B's action, while 
none is the exclusive cause (Tort scholars long ago realized that the discovery of linear causation 
is impossible, simply because it does not exist. See w. PROSSER & R. KEETON, PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984).). One might suggest that A's transfer is the "legal" 
cause, but that is true only in a contract action, as opposed to a tort action. Unfortu;mtely, resort 
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Even when the existence of a particular exchange is clear, the ap-
propriate characterization of that exchange as a particular transaction 
may not be. Characterization may depend on numerous other facts 
and relationships which simply may not be readily observable. 40 
Other times, characterization depends on facts which are not merely 
difficult to observe, but impossible to determine. Whether the rela-
tionship between some person and some property constitutes "owner-
ship" or "tenancy"; whether an instrument represents "debt" or 
"equity"; whether property is held "primarily" for sale to customers 
in the ordinary course of business; and whether or not a transfer is 
to contract Jaw to define exchanges is often inappropriate when the parties are not dealing at 
arm's length in any event. 
The difficulty of establishing relationships between exchanges may become apparent from 
simply listing some of the different tests for determining whether actions should be viewed to-
gether. One statutory test is time: e.g., I.R.C. § 246(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) (tests of 45 and 90 
days for relating purchase and sale of stock to a purpose to take advantage of § 243 dividend 
received deductions); I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1982) (IO-year period of abstinence from involve-
ment in corporation by distributee for waiver of family attribution); I.R.C. § 302(e)(l)(A) (1982) 
(partial liquidation pursuant to a plan completed within two years); I.R.C. § 302(e)(3)(A) (1982) 
(qualified tl'llde or business must be active and not purchased within five years); I.R.C. 
§ 332(b)(2)-(3) (1982) (liquidation of subsidiary must be within a year if no plan is adopted; 
within three years from year of adoption if plan is adopted). 
Another test is "plan": I.R.C. §§ 332, 337 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (liquidation); I.R.C. 
§ 302(e) (1982) (partial liquidation); I.R.C. §§ 354, 368 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (reorganization); 
I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(D) (1982) (series of redemptions). 
A third test is "immediately after": I.R.C. § 351 (1982) (incorporation); I.R.C. 
§ 355(b)(l)(A) (1982) (reorganization); I.R.C. § 368 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (reorganization). 
Still another statutory test is "principal purpose": I.R.C. § 269 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) 
(acquisitions made to evade or avoid tax); I.R.C. § 269A (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (personal 
service corporations formed or availed of for tax avoidance purpose); I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B) 
(1982) (waiver of family attribution); I.R.C. § 306(b)(4) (1982) (redemption of§ 306 stock). 
Other tests include "view": I.R.C. § 341 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (collapsible corporations); 
"purpose": I.R.C. § 357(b) (1982) (assumption ofliability for tax avoidance purpose); common 
control: I.R.C. § 532 (1982) (accumulated earnings tax); and merely "related": I.R.C. 
§ 707(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986) (contribution to and allocation by partnership). 
40. Indeed, the kinds of information required to differentiate among transactions are legion. 
In addition to depending on the value and class of assets received, tax consequences may depend 
on the use to which the exchanged asset was put by the taxpayer, e.g., I.R.C. § 121 (1982), or the 
taxpayer's intended use of the asset received, l.R.C. §§ 1031, 1033 (1982). Other tax conse-
quences depend on the length of time the taxpayer had used the exchanged asset. For example, 
the amount of the investment tax credit required to be recaptured by a taxpayer under I.R.C. 
§ 47 (1982) depends on the length oftime the taxpayer has held the property for which the credit 
was originally granted. See I.R.C. § 47(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). The tax consequences of other 
exchanges may depend on the person to whom or from whom the property is transferred. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267, 351, 1041 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (all of which defer (or in the case of§ 267, 
disallow) gain or loss on exchanges made between certain related parties). Sections 162, 165, 
174, 195, and numerous other provisions condition deductibility of payments on the taxpayer's 
purpose for making them (i.e., whether they are for business, investment, consumption, research, 
etc.). In other situations, the kind of asset received, such as installment obligations, I.R.C. § 453 
(1982), or like-kind exchanges, I.R.C. § 1031 (1982), governs the tax consequences. And finally, 
some tax benefits hinge on facts completely independent from any actions or intentions on the 
part of either the taxpayer or the person with whom the taxpayer makes the exchange. For 
example, § 354 and § 361 give tax-free status to certain exchanges occurring within the context 
of statutory reorganizations; and whether or not a particular exchange is part of a reorganization 
under § 368 may depend on factors beyond a taxpayer's control or knowledge. 
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made out of "detached, disinterested generosity" are examples of the 
kinds of questions which must be answered before exchanges can be 
characterized as some particular kind of transaction. Answering these 
questions often requires judgments that often may be well reasoned 
and well founded in actual analysis, but which are just as often neces-
sarily imprecise. 
2. Mismeasurement 
a. Economic income. Because our system accounts for actual 
changes in the ·value of any asset only when a taxpayer sells or ex-
changes that asset (certain predictable elements of value, such as ac-
crued interest or depreciation, are accounted for on an anriual basis, 
but these elements rarely correlate exactly with actual value), the sys-
tem accurately measures income41 for a specific year only if all of the 
taxpayer's noncash assets are sold or exchanged by the end of that 
year. To the extent that the taxpayer holds assets which have changed 
in value during the year and which are not sold, a cortesponding 
change in the taxpayer's net worth is simply not accounted for. 
Indeed, it is possible for our system to misstate income to a greater 
degree than would a system that simply ignores any change in value of 
a taxpayer's assets. For example, if Taxpayer purchases two assets on 
January 1, for $1,000 each, and Asset One becomes worth $1,600 
while Asset Two becomes worth $50, Taxpayer's net worth has de-
creased by $350 - from $2,000 to $1,650. Under our system, if Tax-
payer sells both assets, taxable income will also be minus $350 - a 
$600 gain on Asset One and a $950 loss on Asset Two. However, if 
Taxpayer sells only Asset One, taxable income will overstate economic 
income by $950; and if she sells only Asset Two, taxable income will 
understate real income by $600. Merely failing to impose any tax on 
Taxpayer would come closer to mirroring the actual results in either 
of these situations than does our current system. 
Much of the mismeasurement caused by a transaction (or asset) 
focus may be only temporary. In the above example, if Taxpayer sells 
only one asset in a given year, income for that year will be misstated 
by the amount of untaxed gain or loss in the retained asset. However, 
if Taxpayer later sells the remaining asset, income will be misstated in 
the opposite direction, and by the same amount, 42 in the year of sale. 
The final result will present an accurate picture of net income for the 
41. Economic income is the real change in the taxpayer's net worth. 
42. This assumes no change in value of the retained asset during the interim. 
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entire period beginning with the acquisition of both assets and ending 
with the final sale. 
Unfortunately, while the apparently transitory nature of income 
misstatement43 may slightly alleviate the degree of mismeasurement, it 
is far from a cure for that mismeasurement. Taxation is imposed on 
an annual basis. To the extent a person is undertaxed44 in one year, 
that person retains the "unpaid" tax for that year. The compound 
return on that unpaid tax accrues to the taxpayer until the year in 
which the previously "unpaid" tax is paid. Payment of the original 
unpaid tax at a later date fails to account adequately for the return· 
which has accrued between the year of "unpaid" tax and the year of 
actual payment.45 Similarly, collection of "too much" tax in one year 
and "too little" tax in a subsequent year fails to account adequately for 
the deprivation of investment potential during the interim. Essen-
tially, deferral of a payment is equivalent to reduction of that pay-
ment; and it is no more accurate to state that the system measures 
43. A problem with the proposition that the system eventually corrects its current misstate-
ment of income is that even over the course of a lifetime many appreciated assets are never sold. 
If a taxpayer dies without having sold an asset, the effect on her net worth of the change in value 
of that asset will simply never be accounted for, and income will have been permanently 
misstated. 
44. Le., taxed on a taxable income that is less than her economic income. 
45. For example, assume thatA purchases stock for $100,000 in 1986, and the stock surges in 
value to $1,000,000 by the end of the year. After 1986, the stock increases in value by 10% each 
year for the next 30 years, at which time A sells the stock. If A is taxed on his accumulation 
during 1986 at a 30% rate, his tax will be $300,000, leaving an investment of $700,000. If A is 
taxed on the 10% annual growth at the.same 30% rate during each of the next 30 years, he will 
be left with $5,327,000, which represents a 7% annual return (compounded annually) on his 
initial (post-1986) $700,000 investment. On the other hand, if A is not taxed until he sells his 
stock, he will have $1,000,000 worth of stock at the end of 1986, which will grow at an annual 
rate of 10%, and will be worth $17,400,000 at the end of 30 years. If A's gain is then taxed at a 
30% rate, A will be left with $12,180,000, or almost two and a third times the amount he would 
have under a system of annual taxation. 
To put it another way, if A were taxed at a 30% rate on his $900,000 accrued gain in 1986, he 
would have $630,000 of that amount left to invest, which, invested tax free at 10%, would earn 
$63,000 during 1987, leaving A with $693,000 at the end of 1987. If, instead, tax on the $900,000 
were deferred for one year, A would be left with the full $900,000 accumulation at the end of 
1986, yielding, at the same 10%, $90,000 during 1987. If A \vere then taxed at a 30% rate on his 
full $990,000 gain, he would be left with the same $693,000. The effect of deferral of tax on the 
1986 gain for one year is thus to give A the equivalent of a tax-free 10% return on this untaxed 
gain. Each year A remains untaxed on his 1986 gain is another year of effective exemption from 
tax of the 10% yield on that gain. In addition, each year A's further appreciation goes untaxed 
represents a year in which that compounded yield is also effectively made tax-exempt. Thus, 
deferral of taxation is itself equivalent to misstatement of income. Note that timing would not be 
important if the delay in collection was equally imposed on all taxes. The loss of n;venue result-
ing from the time value of the delay could be counteracted by increased rates, and the total 
revenue collected would be the same as if there had been no delay. See W. ANDREWS, BASIC 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 115-18 (3d ed. 1985); Davies, Income-Plus-Wealth: In Search ofa 
Betta Tax Base, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 849 (1984); see also C. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 25-26 
(1969). 
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income, albeit not annually, than it is to state that the system measures 
annually, albeit not income. 
b. Taxpayer behavior and status. Unfortunately, the system is 
no more able to measure other tax-significant statuses adequately by 
reference to particular exchanges than it is able to measure economic 
income by that kind of reference. For example, while the lack of cash 
receipts may well indicate a lack of cash, 46 some persons who receive 
no cash in a particular year may nonetheless possess significant liquid 
assets, and others who have significant cash receipts may have spent 
those amounts even before receipt. Similarly, while the purchase of 
life insurance or annuity contracts may well indicate increased savings 
as a result of tax incentives, it may simply reflect a preexisting desire 
to make those investments even absent any tax incentives, or it may 
not indicate any increase in savings at all (i.e., because the acquisitions 
are accompanied by the taxpayer's incurring liabilities equal in 
amount to the value of the newly acquired investment). 
In a like vein, the fact that the specific statutory requirements of 
any particular nonrecognition provision may be met by some exchange 
does not always indicate that the status intended to be insured by 
those requirements (e.g., absence of a change in the "substance" of any 
specific investment) will have been met. Like the definitional elements 
of other transactions, those requirements are often merely reflective of, 
rather than identical to, the real statuses intended to be measured. 
3. The System's Unintended Normative Impact 
Some mismeasurement of economic income and taxpayer status is 
a necessary corollary to the system's transactional focus; and the very 
existence of the system is testimony to the fact that considerations of 
administrative convenience, economic efficiency, and social policy sim-
ply outweigh the virtues of absolute accuracy. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the system's inaccuracy generates another problem which is 
often in direct conflict with those very same goals. Simply put, the 
system unintentionally motivates taxpayers to act in unproductive, 
often counterproductive, ways in order to secure tax benefits. 
To the extent that it seeks merely to measure economic income, the 
tax law has an essentially non-normative intent. In drafting many of 
the Code's major provisions, legislators were attempting not to dis-
courage people from acting in economically productive ways but sim-
ply to measure the extent of that economic productivity (i.e., economic 
46. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 453 (1982) (defers taxation in certain cases until cash is received). 
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income) in an administratively feasible manrier. Nor, like most private 
law, is the tax law concerned with influencing relationships among pri-
vate individuals. Instead, the Code is designed to allow those charged 
with enforcing its provisions to look to relationships among taxpayers 
only as a means of measuring the economic rights of the individuals 
involved. 
Unfortunately, the Code tends to act both as a normative indicator 
for individuals generally and as a prescription of ways for individuals 
to conduct their affairs inter se. As suggested above, because taxation 
is generally imposed on exchanges, taxpayers are unintentionally en-
couraged to avoid making exchanges in which they might otherwise 
engage; since some exchanges are taxed less than others (or not at all), 
taxpayers who make exchanges may be encouraged to make those par-
ticular tax-free exchanges. Unfortunately, because those tax-free ex-
changes are not always defined by reference to the actual statuses 
which they are intended to benefit, taxpayers can often mirror the eco-
nomic consequences of a single taxable transaction by instead engag-
ing in a series of tax-free transactions, so that the incentive towards 
these tax-free transactions becomes substantial. · 
Because they may tend to mismeasure the status upon which in-
centives are intended to be based, intended incentive provisions may 
also have unintended effects, by encouraging taxpayers to engage in 
one or more transactions that will generate tax savings without result-
ing either from or in the actual status actually intended to be en.: 
couraged. As suggested above, taxpayers who borrow funds in order 
to engage in transactions that are rewarded as indicators of increased 
savings are among those who achieve a tax benefit without coming any 
closer to achieving the status intended to be rewarded. 
C. Summary 
All of the above problems flow from the same basic systemic flaws: 
the tax system is intended to measure economic income and other tax-
payer behavior or status, but for administrative purposes it instead 
bases tax consequences on transactions. Taxpayers can have economic 
income without transactions; and most transactions do not themselves 
generate economic income. Most transactions represent the realiza-
tion of accrued income; but for social, economic, or equitable reasons, 
many of these are not taxed. Because o:' perceived needs for adminis-
trable laws, tax-favored transactions are defined by reference to partic-
ular objective and verifiable facts rathe~ than to the general social or 
economic goals that they are designed to further. But the objective 
facts referred to in the statute are often not coterminous with the so-
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cial and economic goals that they are intended to implement. As a 
result, taxpayers can arrange their affairs so that the objective statu-
tory requirements are met but the underlying economic or social 
objectives are not. In many other cases, the facts referred to in statu-
tory definitions (i.e., the question of what is exchanged for what) are 
simply not ascertainable. Often the truth is that the actual facts are 
different shades of grey in a system that acknowledges only black or 
white. 
II. SYSTEMIC REsPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS 
The basic structure of our tax system appears to be here to stay, 
and the problems of mismeasurement, unintended motivation of tax-
payers, and some imprecision in the definition of transactions are all, 
to some extent, inherent in that structure. These problems are, in very 
real ways, interdependent and mutually compounding: a system that 
accurately measured economic income and other significant statuses 
would not unintentionally influence taxpayer behavior; a system that 
relied on transactions that could be described only with some minimal 
imprecision would not be subjected to manipulation if different char-
acterizations did not dramatically alter taxable income; and a transac-
tion-based system that was not full of taxpayers seeking both to act 
and to characterize their actions in ways that minimize tax liability 
would provide a more trustworthy measurement of each person's taxa-
ble income. Clearly, it is the compounding of these different problems 
that makes them as significant as they are; as a result, current tax 
jurisprudence uniformly addresses each of these issues in conjunction 
with one another. This article will examine that jurisprudential ap-
proach and suggest an alternative. 
Essentially, this article suggests that even though the three 
problems raised above are mutually compounding in effect, they are at 
their sources entirely separate problems. Current judicial approaches 
to the problems have failed to acknowledge that they are indeed sepa-
rate and, as a result, they have never satisfactorily been able to address 
any of them. In addition, because courts have been unable to segregate 
the issues that arise, they have been uniformly unable to devise reme-
dies that tend to deal with those issues. Problems actually generated 
by inherent imprecision have been "solved" not by acknowledging, but 
by denying, that imprecision, and problems of taxpayer motivation 
have been "solved" by asserting that the problem was not motivation 
but imprecision. 
This article suggests that only when these problems are segregated 
as separate issues can they be addressed in a meaningful way. To seg-
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regate these issues ultimately requires acknowledgement that any 
transaction-based system is flawed - it is necessarily inaccurate, im-
precise, and improperly normative; but to acknowledge these inherent 
flaws is the only way to begin to address them. 
A. Current Doctrines 
Essentially, while many doctrines have grown around both unclear 
characterization of actions and tax-motivated behavior, these doc-
trines have never really been very clearly articulated or classified. In-
stead, the Internal Revenue Service and the courts are more likely 
simply to cite, rather than explain, one or more of these doctrines to 
justify withholding various tax benefits. When more than one doctrine 
is cited, a court may view them as alternative justifications for its deci-
sion, or as merely alternative names for a single rationale. Against 
such a background, the summary that follows necessarily will not' con-
form with all of the different uses of the relevant terms which have 
been adopted. However, it should provide insight into the scope and 
variety of rationales and will explain generally how each "works." 
1. Sham Transaction 
The "sham transaction" label has long been a popular one; and its 
popularity in part appears to stem from its flexibility. At one time or 
another it has been used to describe actions that fit into all of the cate-
gories that follow.47 Simply for the sake of categorization, it is used 
here to connote its most narrow legal construction and the one that 
most closely resembles its general usage outside of tax. So defined, a 
"sham transaction" is one that never occurred. 48 If tax consequences 
depend on representations regarding changes in legal rights and if 
those changes simply did not occur, the reported "transaction" is a 
sham. Since most "shams," in this sense of the word, are nothing less 
than tax fraud, they (as opposed to what penalties should be imposed 
for them) are not often seriously litigated,49 and will not be discussed 
in depth herein. 
47. E.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 
365 (1960); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184, 207 (1983), modified, 752 
F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985). See infra text accompanying notes 58-62, 279. 
48. This connotation is significantly narrower than that often used by the experts. See B. 
BITIKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS~ 4.3.3 (1981). 
49. The most widely known example of this kind of "sham" is the case of Goodstein v. 
Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959), ajfg. 30 T.C. 1178 (1958). In that case, the pur-
ported (and reported) transaction was as follows: Goodstein borrowed $10,000,000 from Lender. 
Goodstein transferred this money, plus $15,000 of his own funds, to Broker. Broker took a 
$15,000 commission and used the remaining $10,000,000 to buy bonds from Seller. The bonds 
were pledged with Lender to secure Goodstein's $10,000,000 obligation. Goodstein then bor-
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2. Substance Versus Form 
As with "sham," references to substance versus form have been 
parts of a wide range of cases and have been imbued with numerous 
different meanings. Because of the flexibility which courts have shown 
in applying this expression, it cannot seriously be contended that there 
is a single "correct" application of the doctrine. The assignment of the 
words to the transactions that follow is admittedly for the purpose of 
identifying and labelling a specific kind of approach taken by some 
courts rather than for the purpose of either fully describing all the 
situations in which courts have applied the "substance versus form" 
terminology, or suggesting that one of those applications is more "cor-
rect'' than the others. That said, the substance versus form doctrine 
will be used here to describe the situation where (1) there is no factual 
dispute as to the significant legal and economic interactions and rela-
tionships (i.e., the rights and liabilities of the parties) involved;50 and 
(2) there are at least two alternative tax transactions which can de-
scribe those interactions. Examples of this type of substance versus 
form question are less common than might be expected, in part be-
cause it is fairly rare that the significant legal and economic relation-
ships upon which characteri2::ation depends are clearly established. 
Typical of these are the debt-equity problem51 and questions regarding 
rowed more from Lender to pay the (deductible) interest owed to Lender on the first loan. When 
it was time for repayment to Lender, Lender would merely foreclose on the pledged bonds. The 
tax consequences to Goodstein were substantial current interest deductions and complete defer-
ral of income accruing on the pledged bonds. The "legal" transaction was quite different. Bro-
ker actually purchased the bonds from Seller out of its own funds. Goodstein paid $15,000 to 
Broker. Lender, which had no funds, asked Broker to sell the pledged bonds. One half hour 
after Broker had purchased the bonds from Seller, it sold them back at the same price. It was 
over the next year and a half that Goodstein purported to pay deductible "interest" to Lender. 
The Tax Court determined that Goodstein was entitled to no deduction because the series of 
transactions was pursuant to a preconceived plan that lacked economic substance and should be 
ignored for tax purposes. 30 T.C. at 1188. For further development of this "economic sub-
stance" concept, see infra Part Il.A.2. On appeal, the First Circuit did not comment upon the 
asserted lack of economic substance and instead decided that the legal relationship that existed 
between Goodstein and Lender was not that of borrower and lender, so that payments from one 
to the other could not be interest. See 267 F.2d at 131. It is just this lack of a purported legal 
relationship that defines what is here referred to as a "sham." 
50. Or, if there was a factual dispute as to these rights and liabilities, the questions of fact 
have been resolved. 
51. With respect to the debt-equity issue, generally, if an instrument denominated as "debt" 
in fact represents an investment in the corporation, in the sense that the return on, and of, the 
investment is dependent on corporate success, that instrument will be classified as "equity" for 
tax purposes. The determinant of tax liability is thus not the "form" of the instrument, but the 
"substance" of the legal rights created therein. As noted, the problem arises from the fact that 
the "substance" of the instrument is neither exactly like debt nor exactly like equity, but has 
some elements of each. Unlike "sham" cases, where the taxpayer misrepresents the facts of the 
relevant legal and economic rights and liabilities, the facts may be apparent; and the "substance 
versus form" question is merely what tax term best describes those facts. See, e.g., United States 
v. Snyder Bros., 367 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 956 (1967) (20-year deben-
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whether certain kinds of property transactions are sales, leases, or sim-
ply mortgages. 
3. Business Purpose 
Like the sham and substance versus form approaches, considera-
tions of "business purpose," .or a taxpayer's lack thereof, have ap-
peared in numerous cases and for numerous reasons;52 and the 
business purpose test is indeed often seen as a synonym for sham or 
substance versus form. 
As used here, and as most commonly used by members of the tax 
bar, the test means something quite different from these other doc-
trines: certain transactions defined in the Code carry with them a re-
quirement not specifically mentioned therein, and that requirement is 
that the exchanges be engaged in for some legitimate business pur-
pose. 53 As commonly used, the business purpose doctrine is nothing 
more than a nonstatutory element of the · definition of certain 
transactions. 54 
4. Step Transaction Doctrine 
Each of the above doctrines, when applied to a given exchange, 
may change the tax consequences sought by the taxpayer entering into 
that exchange. None of the doctrines can be applied without first de-
tures which were held pro rata by shareholders and were subordinated to other debt were found 
to be "equity"). This kind of substance versus form issue is not at the heart of all debt-equity 
controversies. Indeed, many debt-equity cases involve essentially factual determinations, such as 
whether the shareholder/creditor actually intends to enforce repayment. See, e.g., Lyon, Federal 
Income Taxation, ANN. SUR. AM. LAW 123, 142 (1957). Such cases are significant, but are not 
of the kind here referred to as "substance versus form." 
52. For a general history of the beginnings of the business purpose requirement, see Spear, 
"Corporate Business Purpose" in Reorganization, 3 TAX L. REV. 225 (1947); Michaelson, "Busi-
ness Purpose" and Tax Free Reorganization, 61 YALE L.J. 14 (1952). 
53. The most widely used example of this concept originates in corporate reorganizations 
where the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have often held that exchanges seemingly 
meeting the reorganization definitions of § 368(a) are not reorganizations because they lack a 
"business purpose." See infra text at note 59. The same reasoning has been applied to classify 
purported "dividends" as nondividends, Basic Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740 (Ct. CJ. 1977); 
purportedly deductible interest as noninterest, Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); and to several other kinds of transactions. See infra 
text at notes 63-65. 
54. This article deals, in part, with the use of this extrastatutory business purpose require-
ment. There are, in addition, several Code sections that specifically refer to business purpose or 
an equivalent state of mind, e.g., l.R.C. § 269 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (corporate acquisitions 
made to avoid taxes); I.R.C. § 357 (1982) (assumption of liabilities in transfers pursuant to 
§§ 351, 361, 371, or 374 must not have tax avoidance purpose); I.R.C. § 531 (1982) (accumu-
lated earnings tax on corporations formed or availed of to avoid tax on shareholders); I.R.C. 
§ 302(c)(2)(B) (1982) (restricting waivers of family attribution, for purposes of determining tax 
consequences of redemptions, to certain transfers not having tax avoidance as a principal 
purpose). 
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termining the exchange(s) to which its application is to be made. In 
other words, an essential prerequisite to characterizing taxpayer ac-
tions is a description of the specific actions to be characterized. The 
step transaction doctrine is the tool by which the courts determine 
what actions make up a single transaction. Sometimes explicitly, and 
sometimes by implication, this doctrine permeates the tax field and has 
aptly been described as "a successful cultural imperialist, on which the 
sun never sets."55 Often courts specifically describe their holdings as 
applications of the doctrine,56 but just as significantly, many courts 
which do not view themselves as applying the doctrine base their deci-
sions on an assumption that the actions to be characterized (e.g., for 
purposes of applying the substance versus form doctrine) are not the 
actions isolated for characterization by the taxpayer. 57 Because the 
step transaction doctrine determines only what actions are to be 
looked at together to determine the "substance" of the transaction, its 
application is necessarily (but, again, not always explicitly) followed 
by application of the substance versus form doctrine, in that courts 
must determine the appropriate tax characterization of the redefined 
exchanges. 
B. Problems with the Responses 
Rather than counteract the problems caused by the system's trans-
action-base4 focus, the above doctrines have been consistently applied 
in a manner which is so colored by that focus that they might be said 
to have exacerbated rather than solved the system's problems. Despite 
some appearance of reasonableness and consistency, none of the doc-
trines has any coherent application. What follows is an in-depth anal-
ysis of the history and application of these doctrines. 
55. B. BITIKER, supra note 48, ~ 4.3.5. The step transaction doctrine has only recently made 
its way into the English law, see W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commrs., 1982 App. Cas. 
300. Introduction of the doctrine has met with mixed reactions. See Bartlett, The Constitution-
ality of the Ramsay Principle, 1985 BRIT. TAX REv. 338. 
56. Many of the thousands of these cases are described in Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions 
in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXN. 247 (1954); Note, Step Transac-
tions, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv. 60 (1969); Hobbet, The Step Transaction Doctrine and Its Effect on 
Corporate Transactions, 19 TuL. TAX INST. 102 (1970). 
57. E.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). In Knetsch, the taxpayer purport-
edly borrowed money to purchase an annuity. He pledged the annuity as security for the loan 
and consistently borrowed against any appreciation in the annuity. In holding that the "sub-
stance" was not a loan, the Court referred to the "transaction" as the entire series of events 
rather than the borrowing alone; but nowhere does it appear that the Court considered itself to 
be l).Ctually applying the step transaction doctrine. 
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1. Business Purpose 
The business purpose test originated in Gregory v. Helvering. 58 Ms. 
Gregory owned all the stock of United Mortgage Company, which in 
turn owned, inter alia, 1,000 shares of Monitor Securities Corporation. 
Gregory sought to have the Monitor shares sold and to have the pro-
ceeds of the sale inure to her personal account. To accomplish these 
results with a minimum of tax liability, Gregory caused United Mort-
gage to transfer the Monitor shares to a newly formed subsidiary 
(Averill) which was distributed to Gregory and then immediately liq-
uidated, leaving Gregory in possession of the Monitor shares, which 
she then sold. Gregory contended that the formation of Averill and 
the subsequent distribution of the Averill stock to her was a tax-free 
reorganization, and that the only tax-significant transaction was the 
liquidation of Averill, which resulted in a relatively small capital gains 
tax to Gregory. 
Despite the fact that the transfer of Averill appeared to meet the 
statutory language defining a reorganization, 59 the Court held that the 
distribution of Averill was not a reorganization, and that Gregory 
should be taxed as if she had instead received a dividend taxable at the 
substantially higher ordinary income rates. The Court explained that 
the reorganization provision, which speaks of a transfer of assets by 
one corporation to another, refers only to a transfer made " 'in pursu-
ance of a plan of reorganization' of corporate business; and not a 
transfer of assets by one corporation to another in pursuance of a plan 
having no relation to the business of either .... " 60 It went on to state 
that the transaction which had occurred was "[s]imply an operation 
having no business or corporate purpose" and as such "the transaction 
upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute."61 The appar-
ent instruction to be gained from the Court's language is that a trans-
action which has no business or corporate purpose is not a 
''reorganization.''62 
58. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
59. The pertinent statutory language the Gregory court relied upon defined a tax-free reor-
ganization to include "a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corpora-
tion if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of 
the corporation to which the assets are transferred. . . ." 293 U.S. at 468 (quoting 
§ l 12(g)(l)(i)(B) of the Revenue Act of 1928). 
60. 293 U.S. at 469 (citations omitted). 
61. 293 U.S. at 469. 
62. Some commentators have suggested that, in fact, the Court's opinion means only that 
corporations must carry on some business to be recognized as corporations for tax purposes. 
E.g., Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 16 Mice. L. REv. 733, 739 n.21 (1978). This view would seem to be 
dispelled by the Court's assertion in Gregory that "No doubt, a new and valid corporation was 
created." 293 U.S. at 469. Most of the commentators are of the opinion that Gregory "lays down 
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The same business purpose test has been integrated by the Treas-
ury not only as a requirement of other corporate reorganization provi-
sions, 63 but also as a requirement to achieve tax-free status on the 
formation of corporations;64 and cases have found the business pur-
pose requirement to apply as well to dividends, 65 and to a broad array 
of other kinds of transactions. Indeed, Judge Learned Hand explained 
that Gregory generally has been taken to mean that "in construing 
words of a tax statute which describes [any] commercial or industrial 
transaction we are to understand them to refer to transactions entered 
upon for commercial or industrial purposes and not to include trans-
actions entered upon for no other motive but to escape taxation."66 
Indeed, Gregory has been broadened even further, and a form of the 
test which purported to require business reasons for commercial trans-
actions has been applied to admittedly noncommercial transactions. 67 
Before further exploring what the doctrine does mean, it is impor-
tant to emphasize what it does not mean. In order to avoid application 
of the doctrine, a taxpayer need not show that the transaction engaged 
in is one which she would have entered into in a tax-free world. 68 In-
a general principle of tax law that in order to fit within a particular provision of the statute a 
transaction must comply not only with the letter of the section, but must have a business pur-
pose, (other than a desire to avoid taxes) .•.. " B. BITIKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 34, ~ 14.51 
at 14-170. 
63. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-l(b) (as amended in 1980), which describes reorganizations as 
relating to "readjustments ..• required by business exigencies"; and Treas. Reg.§ 1.368-l(c) (as 
amended in 1980), which excludes from its definition of a plan of reorganization "a mere device 
that puts on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character 
.•• the object ..• of which is the consummation of a preconceived plan having no business or 
corporate purpose ..•. " 
64. See Rev. Proc. 73-10, 1973-lC.B. 760, 762. 
65. See Basic Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
66. Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949), 
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950). 
67. E.g., Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 
(1967). In Goldstein, the taxpayer borrowed funds at 4% interest, prepaid the interest, and in-
vested the same funds at less than 2%, solely to lower her taxes for the year in which she prepaid 
the interest, The court held the business purpose test sufficient to deny the sought·after interest 
deduction "when it objectively appears that a taxpayer has borrowed funds in order to engage in 
a transaction that has no substance or purpose aside from the taxpayer's desire to obtain the tax 
benefit of an interest deduction .••. " 364 F.2d at 741-42. 
68. It is only appropriate to note some of the well-known comments that courts seem to 
recite in almost every case decided against the would-be tax·avoiding citizen: 
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, 
because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one 
[sic] may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to 
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to 
increase one's taxes. 
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd., 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's 
affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, 
for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced 
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deed, if such were the case, it is likely that very few tax-free exchanges 
could satisfy the test, because many of these exchanges have both sub-
stantive and technical requirements which few transactions would 
meet without intentional advance planning. For example, a fairly sim-
ple and straightforward transaction which might not be entered into in 
a tax-free world could be the kinrl of reorganization defined in section 
368(a)(l)(B). That section grants nonrecognition to shareholders of a 
company (T) who exchange their shares for shares of an acquiring 
company (P) if immediately after the exchange P has more than 80% 
control of T and if in the exchange P acquires the T stock solely for P 
voting stock. Assume that (1) P, a publicly held company, offers cash 
to the T shareholders in exchange for all of the stock and that, tax 
consequences aside, the T shareholders would prefer cash to P stock; 
(2) nonetheless, simply in order to avoid the imposition of tax on the 
exchange, the T shareholders decide to sell to P only if P acquires the 
T stock solely for P voting stock. The transaction will qualify as a tax-
free "B" reorganization despite the fact that it was engineered solely 
for tax savings. 
Rather than applying when the taxpayer structures an exchange in 
a certain way in order to achieve tax benefits, the business purpose 
doctrine has been said to apply only when there is no business reason 
at all for engaging in a particular transaction - "[a] transaction ... 
lacks business purpose if its raison d'etre is tax reduction."69 But de-
spite the wide array of cases which cite to the business purpose doc-
trine for support, there are very few sales, exchanges or other tax-
significant transaction~ which could reasonably be said to exist entirely 
for tax savings; and of those that do exist, none has yet been subjected 
to a "business purpose" analysis. 
The easiest way to avoid taxation of accrued appreciation in prop-
erty is to hold the property. Because simply failing to engage in any 
transaction with respect to an appreciated asset will result in a zero 
rate of tax, 70 it would appear that a transaction might exist solely for 
exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere 
cant. 
Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947). , 
69. Bittker, What Is ''Business Purpose" in Reorganizations?, 8 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXN. 
134, 137 (1950). 
70. Congress is apparently not unaware that taxpayers may avoid realizing gains for the sole 
purpose of tax avoidance; as early as 1913 it enacted legislation which at times makes realization 
mandatory. Additionally, the accumulated earnings tax applies only to certain corporations 
"formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders 
... by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed." 
I.R.C. § 532(a) (1982). Essentially, if shareholders control a corporation that has earnings and 
profits above and beyond those needed for the conduct of business, those shareholders must 
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tax purposes only if that transaction produces a rate of tax which is 
less than zero. The most obvious single transaction that produces a 
rate of tax below zero is the sale of property which has declined in 
value. If A has investment property with a basis of $100 and a value of 
$10, sale of that property will result in a $90 tax deduction, while 
retention of the property will produce no tax consequences. A might 
sell the property solely in order to recognize that $90 loss; and indeed 
A might be so tempted even at a price below market value, because the 
tax savings would likely outweigh the economic loss. 71 Nonetheless, 
no one has ever suggested that the business purpose doctrine should be 
applied so as to convert that sale into a "nonsale."72 
In addition to a sale, purchase of property can, in some circum-
stances, also produce a tax rate below zero. Between 1981 and 1984, 
the combination of accelerated cost recovery and the investment tax 
credit available to the purchaser of equipment could produce tax sav-
ings which, in present value terms, exceeded the tax that would be 
imposed on the income generated by the equipment. The result was, 
in effect, a negative rate of tax on income earned on certain invest-
ments. 73 Despite the fact that taxpayers might purchase property that 
was an admittedly uneconomic investment and that might be expected 
to produce a pretax return of zero or less, never did the Internal Reve-
nue Service or a court assert that such an investment lacked a "busi-
ness purpose" and was therefore not a "purchase" for tax purposes. 74 
Other provisions capable of producing negative tax are referred to 
realize their gains, by having the corporation distribute them as dividends, in order to avoid the 
accumulated earnings tax. By preventing shareholders from deferring realization and its accom-
panying tax burdens solely for tax avoidance purposes in only very limited circumstances, Con-
gress seems to have made it clear that in all other circumstances, holding property and deferring 
realization in order to avoid tax is perfectly acceptable. See Paul, Motive and Intent in Federal 
Tax Law, in SELECTED STUDiES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 255, 277 (1938). 
71. Assuming a marginal tax rate of 30%, the savings would be 30% of $90, or $27. 
72. Nor has anyone suggested how such a "nonsale" might be taxed. But see infra Part 
111.D.2. 
73. See Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 TAX L. REV. 483, 506-07, 540 
(1985). 
74. Often the Internal Revenue Service and courts did attack such investments when the 
property was acquired with borrowed funds and was leased back to the seller. E.g., Estate of 
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); cf. Swift Dodge v. Commissioner, 692 
F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1982) (taxpayer, an automobile dealer, borrowed funds to purchase cars for 
lease; court held arrangement to be a conditional sale). In these cases, however, the courts were 
careful to point out that it was not merely the acquisition of the property, but the combination of 
the borrowing, purchase, and lease, that caused the taxpayer to lose purported tax benefits. In 
any event, the taxpayer who spent $100 cash to buy property which he intended to rent out for 
amounts with a total present value of $99 would, after taxes, have a positive return on his invest-
ment only because of tax savings. That taxpayer's rights to deductions were never questioned on 
"business purpose" grounds. 
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as "rollovers."75 Unlike a like-kind exchange,76 which allows for a 
tax-neutral choice between continuation or conversion of an invest-
ment, 77 these rollover provisions give tax preference to spending the 
receipts on similar property over simply retaining the property re-
ceived. Nonetheless, no court has ever seen fit even to inquire into the 
presence of a business purpose as a condition for receiving the statute's 
benefits. 
In addition to these few exchanges which, by application of a sin-
gle beneficial provision, can produce a negative tax rate, there are sev-
eral exchanges which, because of the application of more than a single 
kind of tax benefit, can offer tax savings sufficient to motivate action 
without any corresponding economic (nontax) benefit. While the act 
of engaging in a tax-free incorporation does not reduce the taxpayer's 
taxes, the effect is to allow continued operation of a business, but in a 
form which can be subject to lower rates of tax. As a result, the incor-
poration may well be entered into for no reason other than to reduce 
taxes.78 Nonetheless, the courts have not seen fit to require a taxpayer 
to demonstrate that he had a business purpose or a profit motive in 
order to receive nonrecognition for an incorporation transaction. 79 
75. See I.R.C. §§ 1033, 1034 (1982). These provisions work generally as follows: Assume 
that Taxpayer owns an apartment building with a basis of zero and a value of $1,000,000. The 
building is destroyed by fire in 1987 and Taxpayer receives $1,000,000 in insurance proceeds in 
the same year. If Taxpayer retains her $1,000,000 during 1987 and 1988, she will be taxed on 
$1,000,000, the excess of her amount realized over her basis in the building. However, if Tax-
payer invests her $1,000,000 in another apartment building during 1987 or 1988, she will not be 
taxed on that money. 
76. E.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (1982). 
77. Because the tax consequences of both are identical- no tax. 
78. Compare I.R.C. § ll(b) (1982) with I.R.C. § 1 (1982). 
79_. Rev. Proc. 73-10, 1973-1 C.B. 760, 762, purports to require an explanation of the busi-
ness reasons for incorporating in order to receive a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service to 
the effect that the incorporation transaction will qualify for nonrecognition under § 351. The 
author is unaware of any case in which a ruling has been denied on that basis (excepting certain 
step transactions, see infra Part II.B.2), and almost any asserted nondescript "business purpose" 
will do. See Gunn, supra note 62, at 744. Even were the Internal Revenue Service to contest the 
application of§ 351 to incorporations undertaken solely to achieve lower tax rates, it would be 
bound to fail. The Supreme Court stated over 30 years ago that a corporation will be respected 
as a separate entity (and, presumably, the incorporation will be respected as a transaction gov-
erned by § 351) if there is either a business purpose for organizing the corporation or if the 
incorporation is followed by the carrying on of any business. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943). 
Along similar lines, a corporation with substantial earnings (the "profit" company) might 
acquire (or cause itself to be acquired by) a corporation with substantial net operating loss carry-
overs (the "loss" company) in either a taxable or a tax-free reorganization. Prior to 1987, the 
acquisition might have proven beneficial after taxes even ifthe loss company could be expected to 
continue to lose money from its business operations. Within limits, after the acquisition, the 
profit company could use the loss company's pre-acquisition net operating losses to offset its own 
post-acquisition income. Prior to 1987, the limitations on the use of pre-acquisition net operating 
losses were both substantial and complex. Their specifics are not germane to this article, but for 
the curious, they are well described in B. BITIKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 34, at ch. 16. The 
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It would appear from the above that business purpose is generally 
not a requirement for the tax characterization of many commercial 
transactions described in the Code. In fact, in many situations, to 
hold otherwise might lead to results which could be not just unwar-
ranted, but completely absurd. For example, one of the reasons for 
the enactment of what is now section 351, which grants nonrec'Jgni-
tion to individuals who form a corporation, was to "increase the reve-
nue by preventing taxpayers from taking colorable losses in wash sales 
and other fictitious exchanges."80 Prior to section 351's existence one 
could imagine two taxpayers, each of whom owned depreciated prop-
erty of equal value. They could arguably simply transfer their proper-
ties to a new corporation81 in exchange for one half of the shares of 
that corporation. 82 A taxable sale or exchange would have occurred, 
and each taxpayer would enjoy a deductible loss on the transfer of his 
depreciated property to the newly formed company. 
Section 351 was enacted partially to combat this technique by pro-
viding that on such exchanges no gain or loss is recognized to the 
contributing shareholder(s). To read a business purpose requirement 
into the section would be to prevent taxpayers from deducting realized 
losses on the formation of a corporation only when they had some 
business purpose for establishing that corporation, and to allow the 
deduction of such losses only where the taxpayers incorporated for the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 added new l.R.C. § 382 to these limitations. The implications and 
effects of that section are set forth ins. LIND, s. SCHWARZ, D. LATHROPE & J. ROSENBERG, 
supra note 34, at 520, 525-39. New§ 384, enacted in 1987, also limits the ability of an acquiring 
corporation to use its pre-acquisition losses to shelter "built in gains" of an acquired corporation. 
I.R.C. § 384 (West Supp. 1988). Because the loss company had no income, these losses would 
otherwise be unusable, so that the acquisition could be used to breathe life into what were often 
substantial amounts of otherwise useless deductions. 
Congress was well aware of this possible reason for combining profit and loss corporations. 
Indeed, in response to these attempts it enacted, inter alia, § 269. That section applies to acquisi-
tions of the stock or assets of one corporation by another for "the principal purpose ••• [of] 
securing the benefit of a deduction ... which such ... corporation would not otherwise enjoy 
.... " I.R.C. § 269(a) (1982). When it applies, § 269 acts to disallow the desired deduction. 
Even where the section has applied, however, no one has suggested that the lack of business 
purpose for the combination of the profit and loss corporations could make the acquisition itself a 
taxable event (assuming it would otherwise qualify as a tax-free reorganization). Instead, appli-
cation of§ 269 to cases where there was no purpose to the combination other than to generate a 
use for the net operating losses seems to make clear that it is§ 269, and not any kind of business 
purpose test applicable to reorganizations, that provides the appropriate tool to combat this kind 
of tax avoid~ce. E.g., Scroll, Inc. v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1971) (§ 269 applied 
to disallow postmerger tax benefits, but merger was still not taxable). 
80. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 11-12 (1921). 
81. Alternatively, they could transfer their property to an existing corporation of which they 
were already equal shareholders. The transfer to a pre-existing corporation would serve to defeat 
any possible contention that the very existence of the corporation as a separate entity should be 
disregarded. 
82. The text suggests two equal shareholders so that the loss disallowance provision of§ 267 
will not apply. 
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sole purpose of deducting the losses (because in such a case, the tax-
payers would have no "business purpose" for incorporating and would 
therefore fail to satisfy that implicit requirement for the application of 
section 351). 
A similarly counter-ffi,tuitive result could arise from across-the-
board application of the business purpose test in the very area in which 
the test was born - corporate reorganizations. In Survaunt v. Com-
missioner, 83 the taxpayer was a 50% shareholder of a corporation. 
Several steps were taken in order for the shareholders to pay off cer-
tain personal obligations: (1) the corporation was liquidated; (2) a 
new corporation, owned by the same shareholders in the same propor-
tions, was formed; (3) the shareholders each contributed to the new 
corporation all but $30,000 worth of the assets received upon liquida-
tion of the old corporation; and (4) the shareholders sold to the new 
corporation the remaining $30,000 worth of the assets received on liq-
uidation of the old company. 
The Internal Revenue Service argued that the entire series of 
events constituted a reorganization, with the result, under the provi-
sions applicable to corporate reorganizations, that the shareholder 
should be taxed as if he had received a $30,000 dividend. 84 The share-
holder's response was that the entire transaction had no business pur-
pose and was instead motivated by his own desire to receive $30,000 
from his corporation without incurring any tax liability.85 
Since Gregory v. Helvering 86 appeared to make it clear that one of 
the essential elements of classification as a corporate reorganization 
was a business purpose, it was claimed that the transaction at issue, 
lacking that essential purpose, could not be so characterized. The 
court rejected this contention, 87 holding that the only relevant ques-
83. 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947), modifying 5 T.C. 665 (1945). 
84. 162 F.2d at 755. 
85. The taxpayer asserted that (1) the liquidation was tax-free to the old corporation and 
resulted in a capital loss to the shareholder (because his basis in the stock surrendered exceeded 
his amount realized); (2) the formation of the new corporation was tax-free; (3) the contribution 
of property to the new corporation was tax-free to all parties; and ( 4) the sale of $30,000 worth of 
property to the new corporation, though a taxable sale, resulted in no gain because the share-
holder's basis in the assets sold equaled his amount realized. 162 F.2d at 756. 
86. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
87. Survaunt, 162 F.2d at 757. One commentator has suggested that "[b]usiness purpose or 
the absence thereof is too readily manufactured in corporate counsel's office to be available as a 
basis for reclassification of transactions to avoid unpleasant tax consequences," so that the doc-
trine "is a weapon only for the taxing sovereign, a sword that cuts only one way." Fuller, Busi-
ness Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TuL. 
L. REv. 355, 365 (19~3). This approach suggests that the issue is merely one of proof, and that 
some sort of unstated but irrebuttable presumption exists to the effect that whenever business 
purpose is raised as an issue by the taxpayer, the taxpayer is unable to carry his burden. No 
court has ever adopted this approach and while perhaps consistent with some uses of the doc-
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tion raised by Gregory was what was done rather than why anything 
was done, and that what was done in this case qualified as a 
reorganization. 
The net result of these cases is that a doctrine which originated as 
an implicit requirement of statutory provisions describing corporate 
reorganizations has in some ways grown well beyond that role, so that 
courts feel comfortable imposing a "business purpose" requirement as 
an adjunct to almost any kind of transaction. On the other hand, the 
same requirement is at other times dysfunctional, and disregarded, in 
the characterization of transactions including the very ones (corporate 
reorganizations) that gave birth to the doctrine. As a result, the doc-
trine is often not applied to so-called commercial transactions totally 
lacking in business purpose, 88 yet it is not only alive but also growing 
trine, this interpretation does not explain the Internal Revenue Service's own failure to apply the 
test to a large number of transactions that clearly lack any business purpose. See supra text at 
notes 79-84. Moreover, in cases like Survaunt, even stipulated facts could not change the court's 
determination that the business purpose test was inapplicable. 
88. Professor Gunn has suggested that the business purpose test "is sensible to the extent that 
it means, as it seems to have meant in Gregory, that corporations must actually carry on business 
activities to be recognized as corporations under the reorganization provisions." Gunn, supra 
note 62, at 739. Such interpretation, if confined ti) the reorganization provisions, seems some-
what more consistent with the actual usage of the business purpose test than does a broader view 
of the scope of the doctrine. It could explain why the courts do not appear to apply the test to 
the incorporation provisions (le., because they are not reorganizations) and could explain the 
result in Survaunt - the transaction was a reorganization because the new corporation which 
was formed did survive and carry on business, so it could be recognized as having a "business 
purpose." 
This interpretation of· the business purpose doctrine, however, achieves its consistency by 
viewing the doctrine in an essentially different light than do most scholars and courts. If the 
business purpose test is a requirement that a corporation carry on some business or, presumably, 
be created for the purpose of carrying on some business, see Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943), then Judge Hand's explanation that the test ascribes some commer-
cial or industrial purpose to commercial transactions that are described in the Code is a 
fundamental misconception of the doctrine's function. Rather than viewing the doctrine as a 
nonstatutory requirement of certain "transactions," Professor Gunn would view it as nothing 
more than part of the tax definition of a corporation - a corporation is an entity with certain 
definite characteristics, one of which is either the carrying on of business or the existence of some 
purpose to carry on business in the mind(s) of those organizing the purported corporation. The 
inevitable result of so limiting the doctrine's role is to rule out the relevance of a taxpayer's state 
of mind (unless specifically referred to in the Code, see supra note 39) for all purposes other than 
to breathe life (or death} into a "corporation" which does no actual business. This is simply not 
something that anyone other than Professor Gunn has been willing to do. 
In any event, a seemingly undeniable implication of this characterization is that Ms. Gregory 
was denied her tax benefits not because the transaction was engaged in for no business purpose, 
but only because she did it the wrong way. Presumably, when her wholly owned corporation 
formed and distributed Averill, the distribution could not have been a reorganization because 
Averill, which was immediately liquidated by Ms. Gregory, had no business purpose, carried on 
no business, and therefore could not be recognized as a corporation for tax purposes. When so 
viewed, the "distribution" must have been of the shares of Monitor stock outside of corporate 
solution, and it was therefore not a reorganization. Had she been well advised after the adoption 
of the "business purpose" test suggested by Professor Gunn, Ms. Gregory might have simply 
kept Averill intact and sold the Averill stock instead of liquidating Averill and selling the Moni-
tor stock received in that liquidation. Because Averill would have continued in existence in the 
hands of the purchaser, Averill would presumably qualify as a corporation, and the transaction 
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in a wide array of different kinds of cases. 
would have qualified as a reorganization. Because Gregory's gain on the sale of Averill would 
have been capital gain, she would have achieved her hoped-for tax benefits. 
One might argue, in support of a limited business purpose test, that it could apply to disallow 
Ms. Gregory her tax breaks even in the above scenario; but any potential arguments to support 
application of a limited business purpose test to this fact pattern do more to raise questions than 
to provide answers. First, one might suggest that even if not immediately liquidated by Ms. 
Gregory, Averill would not be a corporation (and the transaction therefore not a tax-free reor-
ganization) because it still carried on no business and was formed without an intention to carry 
on business. If by this it were meant that merely holding stock (the Monitor shares), collecting 
dividends, and, presumably, eventually selling the Monitor shares and buying other shares was 
not the carrying on of business, but was merely investment, then the clear implication would be 
that mere investment companies do not carry on business and are therefore not corporations .. 
This is patently false. Indeed, the Code explicitly contemplates the existence of "mere holding or 
investment compan[ies]." Section 533(b) states that the fact that a corporation is a mere holding 
or investment company is evidence of the kind of tax avoidance purpose which may lead to 
imposition of the accumulated earnings tax on the corporation. See I.R.C. § 533(b) (1982). This 
necessarily implies the existence, for tax purposes, of that corporation. 
One might alternatively argue that investment companies are corporations for tax purposes 
only if they invest extensively; but could it really by contended that if Mr. Rich and Mr. Poor 
each forms a holding company to which each transfers all of his investments ($10,000,000 for 
Mr. Rich, $10,000 for Mr. Poor), Mr. Rich's corporation will be respected and Mr. Poor's will 
not? Such is doubtful, but it would be the inevitable result of conditioning corporate recognition 
on the number and kinds of investments made. 
In any event, if such were the case, Gregory could have transferred to Averill some small 
amount of other business assets (i.e., inventory) which Averill could have sold, thereby engaging 
in actual noninvestment "business." While the amount of business conducted could have been 
quite small compared to the value of the Monitor stock held by Averill, it could easily have 
exceeded the amount of business done by some very small closely held corP<>rations which have 
been consistently recognized for tax purposes. The amount of business might be compared to 
either the incorporated investment assets or to the tax savings generated by the incorporation-
reorganization, and that comparison would be a good indicator of some tax-avoidance motive. 
But if one were to accept that the carrying on of business is enough to establish the tax existence 
of a corporation, and that existence is in tum enough to satisfy the business purpose test, com-
parisons of the amount of business with the amount of tax saved, and the resulting conclusions, 
would be irrelevant. 
One might finally suggest that this reformed version of Gregory would fail to satisfy the nar-
row business purpose test for corporate existence, at least'if Averill were liquidated by the pur-
chaser immediately after its sale by Gregory. To this, one might suggest that (1) Averill might 
not be immediately liquidated (if the purchaser were a corporation, there would be little need for 
Averill to be liquidated because the consolidated return regulations for affiliated corporations 
could provide results similar to those which would result from liquidation of Averill); and (2) if 
Averill were liquidated, it could be made to conduct some small amount of business prior to 
liquidation, as suggested above. 
Indeed, even if Averill were immediately liquidated by the purchaser prior to the conduct of 
any business or investment function (i.e., without so much as the collection of dividends on the 
Monitor stock), disregard of the corporate entity would not necessarily be proper. Since the 
corporation was formed by Gregory, it would appear to satisfy the business purpose test if Greg-
ory believed that the purchaser would continue the corporate existence after the sale. To condi-
tion corporate "existence," and Ms. Gregury s tax liability, on post-sale decisions made by a 
third party seems inappropriate. 
For example, assume that Averill has been formed with a legitimate expectation that it would 
engage in active business. Assume also for purposes of this example that Averill had been 
formed with substantial business assets and had been distributed to Gregory in anticipation of 
conducting that business. Assume that legitimate business reasons existed for separating Averill 
from its parent corporation. If Ms. Gregory had been approached by a purchaser after the distri-
bution, but just before the conduct of business, Gregory's tax liability for the preceding distribu-
tion ought not to depend on whether or not the purchaser decides to liquidate Averill or operate 
it as is. Indeed, Gregory might have no way of knowing the purchaser's plan. To make her 
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This inconsistency and apparent random application of the busi-
ness purpose doctrine is an unavoidable consequence of viewing the 
doctrine as a requirement for classification of a given exchange as a 
specific type of transaction. The doctrine is fundamentally premised 
on an unspoken assumption that at least certain kinds of tax-moti-
vated behavior (as opposed to business-motivated behavior) ought not 
to be rewarded; and it proceeds from that assumption to a conclusion 
that certain transactions require a business purpose. Unfortunately, 
for every tax-motivated taxpayer who would be hindered by classifica-
tion of an exchange as other than some specific kind of transaction, 
there is another taxpayer who would be benefited by that same classifi-
cation. As a result, the doctrine as originally explained must be either 
arbitrarily applied or self-defeating. 
To the extent that there may be consistency in the application of 
the business purpose doctrine in all of the situations discussed above, it 
simply does not lie in a view of the doctrine as an extra-statutory re-
quirement of certain transactions otherwise defined in the Code, as 
suggested by Judge Hand. 89 Instead, the doctrine seems to have con-
sistent meaning only when seen as a test for application of the step 
transaction doctrine. The results of the cases purporting to deny tax 
benefits because of a lack of a business purpose seem reconcilable if 
one takes the business purpose test to mean that if an action has no 
business purpose, then that action is not entitled to be taxed as a dis-
tinct exchange, but is deemed to be part of a larger transaction. In 
other words, the business purpose test is no part of the definition of 
any commercial transaction described in the Code, but is a part of the 
determination of what facts should be considered as having occurred 
together. Viewed this way, the test, whether or not it is appropriate, at 
least produces results consistent with many of the relevant court 
decisions. 
When the business purpose doctrine as so interpreted is applied to 
Gregory, the absence of business purpose for the formation of Averill 
becomes a reason for treating the formation, distribution, and immedi-
ate liquidation as a single integrated transaction. The substance versus 
form doctrine can then be applied, resulting in treatment of the trans-
action as a taxable distribution. 90 
liability depend on actions she neither anticipated nor even considered is somehow off the mark. 
The only difference between this situation and the reformed Gregory facts, mentioned above, is 
the intent to have Averill carry on a more active business than investments. Since either one 
constitutes enough to assure corporate existence, however, this difference is irrelevant. 
89. Nor as a part of the definition of a corporation, as suggested by Professor Gunn. 
90. All of this is not to suggest that, when so applied, the business purpose test and the 
substance versus form doctrine combine to give sensible results. Many results of this combined 
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Similarly, while the broader business purpose test fails to account 
for apparently contradictory results in simple incorporation transac-
tions and in reorganization cases such as Survaunt, 91 application of the 
business purpose doctrine qua step transaction doctrine generates re-
sults which are, if nothing else, at least consistent. For example, de-
spite a reference in certain rulings to a business purpose as a necessary 
prerequisite to the grant of tax-free status to a corporate formation,92 
courts have declined to apply a business purpose test to a straightfor-
ward incorporation. One might instead suggest that application of the 
business purpose test to·corporate formation followed only by opera-
tion of the corporation could result in viewing the formation and oper-
ation as an integrated series of events; but because application of the 
substance versus form doctrine to that series of events would nonethe-
less result in characterization of the events as nothing other than an 
incorporation followed by the conduct of corporate business, the 
doctrine, though in fact applicable, does not change the tax 
consequences. 93 
In Survaunt, where the taxpayer argued that a liquidation followed 
by an incorporation could not b~ dassified as a reorganization because 
the series of exchanges lacked a business purpose, application of this 
reformulated business purpose test results in the apparently more ap-
propriate conclusion that the liquidation and subsequent reincorpora-
tion should be viewed as part of a single transaction - that 
transaction being, as the court found, a reorganization. 
This view of the role of the business purpose test is consistent with 
approach are logically strained. See infra Part II.B.3. The suggestion made here is only that, 
whether or not they know it, what courts seem to be doing is applying this kind of sequential 
analysis. 
Somewhat at odds with this conclusion are regulations which explain that, regardless of the 
sequence of events, the kind of reorganization attempted in Gregory will not be found to have 
occurred unless carried out for real and substantial nontax reasons common to the business of the 
corporations. See Treas. Reg. § l.355-2(c) (1987). The regulation is essentially an attempt to 
incorporate what Treasury saw as the holding of Gregory. The cases and rulings tend to point 
out the kind of reasons that meet the requirement. See generally B. BIITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra 
note 34, ~ 13.09. What is more significant is that those times when courts or the Internal Reve-
nue Service find a lack of business purpose are when the transaction has the potential to be 
combined with another exchange to form a low-tax road to what would otherwise be a higher 
taxable destination. E.g., Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971) (no "business 
purpose" for distribution because it was part of larger plan which contemplated disposition (as 
bequest) of distributed stock). 
91. See supra text at note 83. 
92. Rev. Proc. 73-10, 1973-1 C.B. 760, 762 (requires a statement of the business reasons for a 
tax-free incorporation as a prerequisite to receipt of a favorable ruling with respect to qualifica-
tion for tax-free incorporation under l.R.C. § 351 (1982)). See supra note 79. 
93. Compare application of the step transaction doctrine to an incorporation followed by a 
stock for stock exchange, where unification of the seemingly separate exchanges does result in 
different tax consequences. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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other facets of its current use as well. Generally, where some pur-
ported transaction is found to have no business purpose, the transac-
tion will be held to be not what it is purported to be. However, the 
business purpose test alone does not purport to provide a way to deter-
mine exactly what the transaction is, as opposed to what it is not. 
Whether a purportedly tax-free exchange is simply characterized as a 
nontax-free exchange or whether it is characterized as some different 
kind of transaction by application of the substance versus form doc-
trine seems not to have been discussed in the cases; but if the business 
purpose doctrine is something other than a version of the test for ap-
plication of the step transaction doctrine, what it is, is, to say the least, 
unclear. 
2. Step Transaction Doctrine 
a. Step transaction tests. While perhaps encompassing some sort 
of business purpose test, the step transaction doctrine at least appears 
to focus on the opposite side of the coin from that given attention by 
the "business purpose" analysis. Rather than a nonstatutory element 
of the definition of certain tax-favored transactions, the step transac-
tion doctrine is one which purports to be applied to certain/acts prior 
to and independent of the application of a specific transactional label 
to those facts. The doctrine is simply a way to determine "what was 
done"; the thing found to have been done then awaits characterization 
through application of a substance versus form analysis. 
Nonetheless, the doctrine can still trace its roots to the same opin-
ion which gave birth to the business purpose test.94 In discussing Ms. 
Gregory's predicament in Gregory v. Helvering, the Court explained 
that it was doing no more than "[p]utting aside ... the question of 
motive in respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the character of the 
proceeding by what actually occurred."95 This determination that 
what actually occurred can be different from what is represented to 
have occurred is the essence of the step transaction doctrine. 
A fairly typical application of the step transaction doctrine can 
serve as an example. Assume that Towns several low basis assets that 
she has been using in an ongoing sole proprietorship, and Publicly 
Held Company seeks to acquire the entire business. If T trades her 
94. Professor Bittker has traced the doctrine's seeds back as far as 1932, three years prior to 
Gregory. B. BITI'KER, supra note 48, ~ 4.3.5, n.74. On the presumption that it is the Supreme 
Court that plants the possibly pre-existing seeds, it is not inappropriate to trace its roots only 
back to Gregory. 
95. 293 U.S. at 469. 
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business to Publicly Held in exchange for either cash or Publicly Held 
stock, the exchange will be fully taxable.96 However, T might be 
tempted to suggest a somewhat more complex, but nonetheless appar-
ently less taxing arrangement. If T exchanges her business for all of 
the shares of newly formed Newco, the transaction would appear to 
qualify as a tax-free incorporation.97 If Publicly Held then acquires all 
of the assets of Newco in exchange for Publicly Held stock, and 
Newco liquidates, distributing the Publicly Held stock to T, that ex-
change would appear to qualify as a tax-free98 reorganization under 
section 368(a)(l)(C).99 If the separate actions are respected, Twill 
have converted a single taxable exchange (assets for Publicly Held 
stock) into two separate nontaxable exchanges. In such a situation, 
the step transaction doctrine will be applied; and the "transaction" 
will be defined as a taxable exchange by T of her business assets for 
Publicly Held stock.100 
The utility of some sort of objective determination of the facts of a 
transaction seems apparent. Nor does this need arise merely from the 
possibility of a transaction in which the documentation retained by the 
taxpayer or submitted to the Internal Revenue Service does not repre-
sent the actual legal rights and liabilities of the parties to the transac-
tion.101 Such cases fall clearly within the confines of the "sham" 
transaction principles. Instead, the step transaction doctrine is applied 
where the written documentation accurately reflects the legal rights 
and liabilities of the sighatories thereto, but those legal rights do not 
fully reflect the underlying economic realities or the expectations of 
the parties. 
The substantial difference which can exist between legal rights and 
economic expectations, and the occasional relative insignificance of 
legal rights when compared to the underlying economics, is apparent 
in situations such as that described above. If, after receiving an offer 
from Publicly Held, T transfers her business to Newco in exchange for 
all of the Newco stock in contemplation of Newco's transfer of those 
same assets to Publicly Held, the transfer of those assets to Newco in 
96. I.R.C. § 1001 (1982). 
97. I.R.C. § 35l(a) (1982). 
98. Both to T, under l.R.C. § 354 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and to Newco, under I.R.C. 
§ 361 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
99. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(C) (1982) (The term reorganization means "the acquisition by one 
corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock .•. of substantially all of the 
properties of another corporation."). 
100. E.g., West Coast Mktg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 32 (1966) (same facts as in 
text); Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73. 
101. Le., because there is a legally binding verbal agreement that supersedes the written 
documentation. 
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exchange for Newco stock clearly has independent legal signifi-
cance.102 There was a legal obligation on the part of T to transfer 
assets, in consideration of which there was a corresponding obligation 
on the part of Newco to transfer stock. The obligations were legally 
interdependent on each other and independent of any other rights or 
obligations of either party. The problem is that where there is an iden-
tity of interest between T and Newco, the very concept oflegally bind-
ing commitments seems irrelevant - if legal commitments exist they 
can be mutually abrogated; and if they do not, T can still just as easily 
see that her goals are accomplished.103 
While the problem caused by focusing on legal commitments is 
most obvious in situations where there is an identity of interests be-
tween the parties, it is by no means limited to such situations. It is not 
within the province of the tax laws to enforce legal agreements made 
among taxpayers, but only to use those agreements to evaluate the 
relationships and exchanges of the taxpayers inter se. Thus, it is argu-
able that legal relationships ought to have significance within the tax 
system only to the extent that they describe relationships or exchanges 
more accurately than do nonlegal descriptions. 
To say that an exchange of assets for stock has independent legal 
consequences is to say nothing more than that if one party fails to 
perform its contractual obligations, the aggrieved party may seek re-
dress in a court of law (or, perhaps, equity) upon proof of the existence 
and breach of the legally binding agreement. Essentially, legal rights 
merely give one party the ability to incur some expenses (i.e., legal fees 
and court costs) in order either to compel the other party to act in 
accordance with the agreement (in those few situations where injunc-
tive relief might be available), or to punish the other party (and reap 
some financial reward for itself) for failing to act accordingly. 
Without demeaning the judicial system, it must be acknowledged 
that in many situations the free marketplace provides the economically 
powerful and astute actor with the same kinds of ability to provoke or 
to prevent actions of others. Especially within the context of ongoing 
economic (and, often, social) relationships, one party can enforce its 
will by the threat of cutting off or somehow altering a relationship that 
has previously proved mutually productive. While such enforcement 
may involve costs to the enforcing party, such as requiring it to seek 
102. This statement assumes that at the time of the incorporation Tis not legally obligated to 
see to it that the assets are transferred, directly or indirectly, to Publicly Held. 
103. It may be that, for certain purposes, fiduciary obligations of directors, and, in some 
cases, controlling shareholders, could be invoked to support an argument that there is less than 
full identity of economic interest between a corporation and its sole shareholder. To the extent 
that there is a divergence in interest, it is negligible. 
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another outlet or source of supply for goods, these costs are not neces-
sarily always greater than the costs involved in prosecuting a legal ac-
tion; and in many situations the actual cost of producing behavioral 
changes by way of economic, rather than judicial, force is nothing 
more than that involved in merely threatening to take, rather than tak-
ing, any action. To the extent that the tax system is attempting to 
measure the relatedness and interdependence of purportedly separate 
exchanges, the economic power of one party over another would ap-
pear no less significant than potential resort to judicial enforcement. 
If reliance on legal relationships is not a prerequisite to accurate 
measurement of actual economic relationships, the question then be-
comes by what means can the interrelationship of purportedly sepa-
rate exchanges be determined? Because the step transaction doctrine 
is neither a method of statutory interpretation nor a nonstatutory re-
quirement of certain Code provisions, but merely a means of determin-
ing the facts to which the Code should be applied, it would seem that 
the method arrived at for determining those facts ought to be of gen-
eral applicability and should not be subject to variation dependent on 
the law to be applied to those facts. 
The courts have generally set forth three different tests for deter-
mining whether several exchanges should be treated as a single trans-
action: (1) the binding commitment test; (2) the end result, or 
intention test; and (3) the interdependence test. 104 Each term is basi-
cally self-descriptive. Under the binding commitment test, different 
actions by a taxpayer are not treated as a single transaction on his part 
unless at the time he takes the first step he is under a binding commit-
ment to proceed with the next step.105 The end result, or intention 
test, links actions together if they are "component parts of a single 
transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of 
reaching the ultimate result." 106 Finally, the interdependence test will 
unify actions for tax purposes if the steps "are so interdependent that 
the legal relations created by one transaction would have been fruitless 
without a completion of the series."107 As will be seen, each of these 
three tests will often lead to the intuitively correct result. But, because 
none of these tests has a valid conceptual foundation, none of them 
104. See generally Paul & Zirnet, Step Transactions, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL 
TAXATION 200 (1938); Mintz & Plumb, supra note 56; Note, Evolution of the Step Transaction 
Doctrine, 11 WASHBURN L.J. 84 (1971); Note, Step Transactions, supra note 56. 
105. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). 
106. King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
107. Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
913 (1981). 
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will always do so.1os 
The first of these tests, which joins actions if they are taken pursu-
ant to a binding commitment, is the most straightforward and the least 
followed. The Supreme Court first applied the test in Commissioner v. 
Gordon. 109 There, a corporation distributed to its shareholders in 
1961 about 57% of the stock of a wholly owned subsidiary. At the 
time, the corporation notified its shareholders that it expected to dis-
tribute the remainder of the subsidiary stock within about three years. 
The remaining 43% of the subsidiary stock was distributed about two 
years later, in 1963. The taxpayer claimed that receipt of his share of 
the initial distribution in 1961 was tax-free because that distribution 
was merely one of a series of steps which, taken together, qualified as a 
nontaxable distribution pursuant to section 355, which grants tax-free 
status to certain distributions of the stock of a subsidiary if the amount 
of stock distributed exceeds 80% of all outstanding shares of the 
subsidiary .110 
If the 1961 and 1963 distributions had been treated as a single 
transaction, that transaction would have qualified for nonrecognition. 
The Court held that the step transaction doctrine did not apply, how-
ever, and that instead there was a taxable distribution in 1961 and a 
second, separate, taxable distribution in 1963. In so holding, the 
Court expressed concern that if it held otherwise, the Internal Reve-
nue Service and the courts could have been required to wait for an 
indefinite period to determine the tax consequences arising out of the 
1961 distribution. It refused to apply the step transaction doctrine 
when to do so would mean that "the essential character of a transac-
tion, and its tax impact, should remain not only undeterminable but 
unfixed for an indefinite and unlimited period in the future, awaiting 
events ·that might or might not happen."111 The Court concluded that 
"[t]his requirement that the character of a transaction be determinable 
does not mean that the entire divestiture must necessarily occur within 
a single tax year. It does, however, mean that if one transaction is to 
be characterized as a 'first step' there must be a binding commitment 
108. One commentator has suggested that all three of these tests can be integrated into a 
single test of "purposive analysis," requiring each court to "first, characterize the parties' intent 
... second, construe the purpose of the relevant Code provision[s]; and third, determine whether 
the parties' intent is consistent with the purpose of the statute." Comment, Redding v. Commis· 
sioner: Step Transaction Doctrine Applied to Distribution of Stock Warrants in a Seclio11 355 
Spin-Off, 35 TAX LAW. 257, 267 (1981). This "test" more than anything else appears to focus on 
statutory interpretation: Are the parties acting in the way Congress wanted? 
109. 391 U.S. 83 (1968). 
110. I.R.C. § 355(a)(l)(D) (1982). 
111. 391 U.S. at 96. 
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to take the later steps."112 
Essentially, because tax must be determined and imposed each 
year, the Internal Revenue Service and courts must be able to judge 
the "substance" of a transaction at the time it occurs. Similarly, be-
cause taxation depends on the occurrence of classifiable and discrete 
events, the "substance" of an event or exchange must exist at the time 
the event occurs. The problem raised in Gordon was that neither the 
Internal Revenue Service nor the trial court was able to know, in the 
year of the first distribution, the "real" relationship between that dis-
tribution and a subsequent transaction. 
The problem caused by uncertainty regarding the relationship 
among several events in a system dependent upon characterizing 
transactions based on the interrelatedness of those events is not new. 
Including the approach taken in Gordon, the Internal Revenue Service 
and the courts have traveled along at least three different avenues in 
addressing it: (1) if we are uncertain of the facts, take our best guess; if 
we are subsequently proven wrong, take steps in that subsequent year 
to redress that previous wrong; 113 (2) if we are unsure of the facts at 
the actual time of the transaction, wait till the facts become clear 
before characterizing the transaction;114 and (3) if we are unsure of the 
112. 391 U.S. at 96. 
113. This approach has its foundation in the Court's opinion in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks 
Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931). There, a taxpayer had lost money under a particular contract during 
four consecutive years, and in the fifth year sued under the contract and recovered his prior 
losses. In holding the recovered damages to be taxable income when received, the Court ex-
plained that transactions must be taxed in the year in which they occur, rather than on comple-
tion of an entire business relationship: 
It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascertainable, and 
payable to the government, at regular intervals ...• While, conceivably, a different system 
might be devised by which the tax could be assessed, wholly or in part, on the basis of the 
finally ascertained results of particular transactions, Congress is not required ... to adopt 
such a system ..•. 
282 U.S. at 365. 
The principle that transactions must be determined as accurately as possible each year and 
that subsequent events are to be accounted for when they occur is also at the heart of the tax 
benefit rule, which specifically allows for such later accounting. See, e.g., Hillsboro-National 
Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). The tax benefit rule applies to deductions later 
proven to have been based on erroneous propositions. A similar rule acts to "undo" income 
which is properly reported when received and later required to be returned by the taxpayer. See 
United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951); see also I.R.C. § 1341 (1982). For an in-depth 
analysis of other ways to undo or change transactions to conform to subsequent events, see Ba-
nolf, Unwinding or Rescinding Transaction: Good Tax Planning or Tax Fraud?, 62 TAXES 942 
(1984). 
114. This was the case with respect to the "open transaction" method of reporting gain on 
installment sales. Where in exchange for property, the taxpayer was to receive a series of pay-
ments of uncertain amount or length, the taxpayer was, in certain situations, allowed to recover 
his basis in the exchanged asset prior to reporting any of the amount realized as gain. See Burnet 
v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); but see Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (open transaction reporting no longer available after amendments to I.R.C. § 453 
absent indication that payments to be received have no currently ascertainable fair market value). 
406 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:365 
facts, rule against the taxpayer. This last approach is the one chosen 
in Gordon. 
The Gordon Court's concern with establishing the taxability of an 
event in the year it occurs rather than waiting to see what happens in 
subsequent years is warranted. Unfortunately, however, this concern 
is fundamentally different from the previously enunciated concerns 
which have given rise to the step transaction doctrine; and the result in 
Gordon is necessarily of limited applicability. 
Whatever else can be said for or against the particular approach to 
the problems of unknown future events which was adopted in Gordon, 
it is clear that the Court was describing a way to deal with cases where 
the facts could not be known at the time of the supposed "transac-
tion." Whether the rule which it adopted gains in administrative con-
venience what it may sacrifice in fairness or accuracy is not as 
significant as the fact that the rule adopted was one of administrative 
and judicial convenience. Rather than propose a method for deter-
mining what the "facts" were, the Court explained that where the facts 
could not be known they should be held against the taxpayer. While 
the Court and scholars have looked at the opinion as a test for applica-
tion of the step transaction doctrine, to the extent that the doctrine 
represents a way of determining what the significant facts were, rather 
than a way of determining what to do when the significant facts are 
unknown, the "binding commitment" test is simply not relevant. 
Indeed, although often failing to explain their grounds for doing 
so, courts, commentators, and the Internal Revenue Service have gen-
erally rejected the use of the binding commitment test. While courts 
and commentators often list it as an alternative formulation for appli-
cation of the step transaction doctrine, 115 after such listing they gener-
ally proceed to explain either that it does not apply to the case at 
hand,116 that it is only one "factor to consider,"117 that it applies only 
to the specific facts of Gordon, 118 or that it applies only when the tax-
payer rather than the Internal Revenue Service is attempting to inte-
grate several steps into a single transaction. In any event, few if any 
individuals subscribe to the binding commitment test as worthy of 
115. E.g., McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 530 (7th Cir. 1982). But 
see McMahon, Defining the "Acquisition" in B Reorganizations Through the Step Transaction 
Doctrine, 67 low AL. REV. 31, 68 (1981) (excluding binding commitment test as even an altema· 
tive test). 
116. See McDonald's Restaurants, 688 F.2d at 531. 
117. Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
913 (1981). 
118. See McMahon, supra note 115, at 70-80. 
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general application.119 
A more commonly applied test for implementation of the step 
transaction doctrine is the "end result" or "intention" test, pursuant 
to which legally independent actions will be linked together if they are 
parts of a single scheme or plan taken for the purpose of reaching a 
given end result. As applied to the taxpayer discussed above, who in-
corporates assets in order to exchange them indirectly, and tax free, 
for stock of Publicly Held Company, this test would treat the legally 
separate exchanges as a single transaction - an exchange of assets for 
Publicly Held stock - because the exchanges were part of a precon-
ceived plan to reach that result. 120 
A problem with this test is that while it provides a ready means to 
support an allegation that two legally independent exchanges are actu-
ally parts of a single, integrated transaction, it provides almost no ba-
sis whatsoever to support an allegation that two actions are ever 
separate. If all that is required to join two separate exchanges together 
is that at the time the first is engaged in, the taxpayer also intends to 
engage in the second, this test could treat as a "transaction" every 
single exchange intended by a taxpayer at the time he engages in any 
other, seemingly unrelated, exchange. For example, imagine that A 
forms a corporation in 1987. At the time, A intends to make the cor-
poration successful and to have it go public in 1990. A also intends to 
purchase Treasury bonds in 1988 and to sell short some stock in an 
unrelated enterprise in 1987. All of these purchases and sales are 
planned to maximize A's profit potential and to minimize his risk; yet 
to suggest that these events are a single "transaction" would be 
absurd. 
One could suggest that all of the above exchanges, though planned 
and intended simultaneously, 121 are not part of a plan to reach a single 
intended result and thus should not be integrated under the end result 
test (i.e., because each exchange has its own independently anticipated 
economic result). To suggest this, however, is to do no more than to 
suggest that there is some other means to determine when a taxpayer's 
plans and intentions are separate and when they are part of a single 
plan. If there is a means to make that determination, then that means, 
rather than the taxpayer's intention or plan, must be the appropriate 
test for application of the step transaction doctrine. No such test has 
119. But see Note, Step Transactions in "A" Reorganizations: A Proposal for a Binding Com-
mitment Test, 56 VA. L. REV. 255 (1970). 
120. See King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 517 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
121. This means that the taxpayer's intentions exist simultaneously, not that the taxpayer 
intends to perform all the actions at the same time. 
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been proposed.122 
122. One author has suggested that focusing on the plans of any single taxpayer is inappro-
priate and that this intention test necessarily rests on the establishment of some sort of mutuality 
of intention - that is, that the transferor and the transferee jointly intend to perform a given 
series of exchanges. McMahon, supra note 115, at 70-80. The question of mutuality of intent 
and of the requirement of transactionally consistent remedies is also discussed in Faber, The Use 
and Misuse of the Plan of Reorganization Concept, 38 TAX L. REV. 515, 528-30 (1983). 
A requirement of mutuality of intention would solve the problem suggested immediately 
above - that all of a taxpayer's intended actions over the entire course of life could be treated as 
a single transaction; but it would also result in treating as separate the few kinds of exchanges 
which both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service, as well as scholars, have long unani-
mously agreed upon as examples of when the step transaction doctrine should be applied to join 
exchanges together. For example, in cases typified by Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 
1954), and Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113, a shareholder has some of his shares of stock 
redeemed by the corporation, and shortly thereafter, as part of the same plan, sells his remaining 
shares. It is universally acknowledged that the redemption and subsequent sale will be treated as 
a single transaction resulting in the complete termination of the shareholder's interest in the 
corporation, and the excess of the taxpayer's amount realized over his stock basis will be treated 
as capital gain. See generally B. Bl'ITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 34, ~ 9.25. Nonetheless, 
especially where the corporation's stock is publicly traded, the redeemed shareholder will likely 
be unable to establish any kind of mutual intention, in that he will not be able to point to any 
person who (at the time of the prior redemption) had an intention to purchase his remaining 
shares subsequently. See also McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947) (Court treated 
as a single transaction husband's brokered sale of publicly traded stock and wife's immediate 
purchase, through a different broker, of an equal number of shares of the same stock; neither 
husband's purchaser nor wife's seller had plans to participate in exchange with either spouse, so 
that mutuality of intention was at least implicitly found to be irrelevant). 
Without explaining exactly what they are doing, some other cases and rulings point to the 
idea that it is not "mutuality" of intention but the likelihood that the taxpayer will be able to 
carry out her plan that is the necessary adjunct of intention. Such a requirement would consis-
tently account for the results in the above situations: where a taxpayer is assured of being able to 
carry out a planned purchase or sale because the asset sought is publicly traded, mutual intent is 
unnecessary; but where such mutual intent is necessary to allow the taxpayer to carry out her 
plans (because those plans require the cooperation of a specific third party), it is a prerequisite to 
integration of otherwise legally independent exchanges. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 
83; Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684 q974), ajfd., 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975). 
Such a "likelihood of success" test in conjunction with intent might also explain other kinds 
of seemingly inconsistent results arising from application of a pure intent test. There are several 
fact patterns, aside from McWilliams, in which a taxpayer transfers (by sale or exchange) a 
specific asset with the intention of reacquiring that asset, and shortly thereafter does reacquire 
the asset. Even in those cases in which the taxpayer has an ongoing relationship with the pur-
chaser (and subsequent reseller) of the asset, the results differ. Sometimes the sale and repur-
chase are treated as an integrated transaction, and sometimes they are separated. Compare Reef 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967) (sale 
and repurchase integrated), and Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
386 U.S. 1022 (1966) (same), with Rev. Rul. 72-354, 1972-2 C.B. 276 (sale and repurchase of 
stock in a stock-for-stock exchange not integrated - acquisition qualifies as valid reorganization 
under§ 368(a)(l)(B)). Fo,r a discussion of Reef and Davant see infra notes 185, 189. The facts of 
Reef and Davant are strikingly similar to those in the ruling; but an overview of the facts would 
reveal that, whatever the legal commitments, the taxpayer in the ruling was, on the whole, some-
what less likely to be able to accomplish his aim than were the taxpayers in either Reef or Da-
vant, and perhaps the taxpayer's ability (or lack of ability) to accomplish his goal can account for 
the different results in the two cases. 
Unfortunately, while a step transaction test combining intent and likelihood can cure some of 
the inconsistencies arising from application of a pure intent test, the combination has its own 
shortcomings. Even such a modified intent test would result in occasional integration of admit-
tedly separate transactions and occasional separation of admittedly integrated ones. Inappropri-
ate integration of independent exchanges would arise when a person was dealing with a 
controlled corporation. For example, if T formed a company with the intention of having it 
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A test which has become more popular than either binding com-
mitment or intent is the "interdependent" test. This test essentially 
converts the business purpose doctrine123 into a test for application of 
the step transaction doctrine. 124 Elsewhere described as asking 
whether "the initial steps would be fruitless in the context of the [tax-
payer's] particular purpose without completing the plan,"125 this test 
incorporates the business purpose doctrine by segregating actions 
where each step was motivated by a business purpose existing in-
dependent of the other contemplated steps, and integrating steps 
where several "unnecessary" steps were taken only in contemplation 
of the others and without any independent business purpose.126 
operate and pay a $1,000 dividend every year, T could assure herself of receipt of that dividend 
beginning in year one. Nonetheless, the company's payment of the dividend would not, without 
more, be treated as a part of the incorporation transaction. The problem here is that the intent 
test generally provides a means to integrate rather than to differentiate transactions. Use of a 
"likelihood" test as a supplement to intent allows one to separate out some exchanges, but the 
implication that all exchanges planned or intended by a taxpayer are a single exchange as long as 
they are all likely to happen is still overbroad. 
On the other hand, the Treasury Regulations themselves at times integrate different planned 
exchanges even absent any indication at the occurrence of the first exchange that the subsequent 
exchanges are likely to occur. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (as amended in 1985) (integrates 
transactions to find a type "B" reorganization, absent any certainty or likelihood that the 
planned transactions will occur; the mere existence of an open offer, or attempt, on the part of 
the taxpayer will be enough to unify the exchanges if that attempt simply proves in the end to be 
successful). 
123. See supra Part 11.B.1. 
124. Under the test as initially proposed by professors Paul and Zimet, a series of actions or 
exchanges is treated as a single transaction if each part of the transaction is undertaken only as 
part of a "general prearranged plan or program." Paul & Zimet, supra note 104, at 245. While 
this statement appears to connote a sort of contractual interdependence - that steps are inte-
grated only where they are legally interdependent - it is not meant to do so. Instead, "[t]he 
question •.. is whether the nominally separate steps of the series are mutually interdependent in 
the sense that while each such separate step might in another context stand independently on its 
own feet and be an integrated transaction, it has no substantial effect upon the rest of the series, 
and all the steps are component parts of another different transaction constituting a whole of 
which each step in question is a part." Id. at 245. 
125. Hobbet, The Step Transaction Doctrine and Its Effect on Corporate Transactions, 19 
TuL. TAX INsr. 102, 111 (1970) (emphasis omitted). 
126. The use of a business purpose test for application of the step transaction doctrine has 
found its way into many different areas. In Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), the 
taxpayer borrowed funds from an insurance company, used those same funds to purchase a de-
ferred annuity contract from that company, and pledged the annuity as security for the loan, 
which was otherwise nonrecourse. Each year as the annuity increased in value, Knetsch bor-
rowed from the issuer against that increased value and used the borrowed funds to pay interest 
on the original loan. The tax result was a substantial current deduction for interest paid, which 
would be offset by income when the annuity was sold or forfeited in payment of the debt. 
Knetsch was out-of-pocket about $15,000, but because of current ordinary deductions and in-
come which was both deferred and taxed at low capital gains rates, the tax savings more than 
made up that cost. 
The Court treated the loans and the annuity purchase as a single transaction and held that 
the "substance" of that transaction was different from the form in which it had been cast. While 
the Court did not acknowledge that it was applying the step transaction doctrine, its decision 
clearly implies that the taxpayer's lack of an independent business purpose provided a basis for 
refusing to segregate the borrowings and the annuity purchase. Only by viewing these actions as 
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Essentially, this test views certain transactions as having at least 
two effects: (1) changing the taxpayer's legal rights and liabilities; and 
(2) changing the taxpayer's tax status. When the purpose of the ex-
change is only to affect the taxpayer's tax status, and the economic 
effects are undone or redone by way of another contemplated ex-
change, the steps will be integrated. 
This interdependence test has been popular in large part because it 
can be used to integrate transactions in the absence of a binding com-
mitment but, unlike the intent test, it provides a basis for segregation 
of intuitively separate actions as well as for integration of intuitively 
connected ones. Applying the test to some of the cases discussed ear-
lier reveals results in line with those reached by courts and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. Indeed, in Gregory the Court apparently did no 
more than apply the step transaction doctrine to integrate the forma-
tion of, a distribution by, and subsequent liquidation of, a corporation 
because none of the transactions had an independent business purpose. 
The act of incorporation was engaged in only as a prelude to the cor-
poration's own undoing by way of liquidation; and, as a result, the 
actions, being self-cancelling, were ignored. 
In another application of the test, if a taxpayer incorporates assets 
in order to operate a business as a corporation, whether or not opera-
tion as a corporation is chosen because of its tax benefits, that incorpo-
ration is recognized as a separate transaction for tax purposes because 
it has a lasting impact on the taxpayer's legal rights. On the other 
hand, if the taxpayer incorporates assets solely for the purpose of be-
ing able to transfer those assets to some other company in a tax-free 
reorganization, the incorporation, having no independent business 
purpose and no lasting effect on the taxpayer's legal rights, is not 
a unified transaction could the Court justify its holding that legally binding loans and purchases 
were other than what they appeared to be. 
Implicit use of the business purpose, or interdependent, test for application of the step trans· 
action doctrine also arises in cases involving sales and leasebacks. Assume that A owns property, 
sells it to B, and leases the property back from B under a net lease for a substantial period of time 
(with or without a purchase option). If the steps are treated as separate, the tax consequences are 
clear: there is a sale by A to B and a lease from B to A. If the steps are integrated, the substance 
of the transaction becomes somewhat less clear: (1) the transaction may still be characterized as 
a sale followed by a lease; (2) it may be treated as a sale by A of a future interest only; or (3) if A 
has a purchase option, the transaction may most closely resemble a mere financing arrangement 
with A's property simply serving to secure a loan from B. See generally Joyce & Del Cotto, The 
AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out 
Income Interests, 31 TAX L. REv. 121 (1976). While the characterization of an integrated ex-
change is a question of substance versus form, see infra Part 11.B.3, the fact of integration is 
prerequisite even to asking the question of substance versus form. Thus, while courts seem to be 
somewhat fuzzy in explaining their approach, it must result from application of the step transac· 
tion doctrine to the purportedly separate sale and lease. 
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treated as separate and the incorporation and purported reorganiza-
tion will be taxed as a single unified exchange. 
This interdependence test, unlike the other tests for application of 
the step transaction doctrine, even has a degree of internal consistency 
and reasonableness: If an action viewed independently achieves some 
purpose, be it a change in economic circumstances or even a tax 
savings, that action is independently motivated and ought to be inde-
pendently taxed. If an action, when viewed independently, serves no 
taxpayer purpose, either that action will not be taken at all, or, if 
taken, it must not be independent. 
Application of this test to nonrecognition exchanges is fairly 
straightforward. Most exchanges, and almost all nonrecognition 
transactions, generate no tax savings.127 A nonrecognition exchange 
merely results in no current taxation of accrued appreciation in the 
exchanged assets, a result identical to that imposed upon simple reten-
tion of the asset. As a result, the tax savings generated by a single 
nonrecognition transaction could never entirely motivate that transac-
tion. The taxpayer must either have some business purpose (i.e., the 
desire to exchange assets), some other tax goal which will be accom-
plished by the nonrecognition exchange, 128 or some tax purpose which 
can be accomplished only by combining the first nonrecognition ex-
change with a second exchange. In the last case, the two (or more) 
exchanges necessary to achieve the single tax purpose will be inte-
grated and treate~ as a single transaction. 
Despite the frequent utility of the interdependent test, its funda-
mental flaw was first noticed by its greatest proponent even at the time 
that the test was initially suggested: "It will not do for all the 
cases."129 Instead, there are a great many cases in which this test will 
not "do" at all; and the problem with the test is not lessened by the 
fact that its failures are balanced: Sometimes exchanges can be unified 
despite the existence of separate business purposes, and other times 
they can be separated despite the lack of such independent purposes. 
There are numerous examples of unified characterization of multi-
ple exchanges having independent purposes. The shareholder who has 
some of her stock redeemed and plans to and does shortly thereafter 
sell the remaining shares will be entitled to treat the two exchanges as 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
128. For example, the taxpayer in a 33% marginal tax bracket might incorporate assets in 
order to take advantage of lower corporate rates on the first $50,000 of the corporation's taxable 
income (assuming the corporation would not be a personal service corporation, see I.R.C. 
§ ll(b)(2) (1982)). 
129. Paul & Zimet, supra note 104, at 252. 
412 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:365 
a single transaction resulting in a complete termination of her stock 
interest (and therefore taxable at capital gains rates). 130 Neither cases 
nor rulings imply that this tax benefit could be denied if it could be 
established that the taxpayer would have redeemed the shares even 
absent a later sale of the remaining stock. As long as that subsequent 
sale is part of a unified "plan," the benefits of integration of the 
planned exchanges are available. 
Similarly, the corporation that acquires stock of another corpora-
tion solely in exchange for its voting stock over a relatively short time, 
such as twelve months, will be entitled to treat all of the stock so ac-
quired as obtained in a single transaction for purposes of qualifying 
the series of exchanges as a tax-free reorganization. 131 Evidence that 
the acquiring company would have made the initial stock acquisitions 
even absent the later acquisitions would show that the series of ex-
changes were not mutually interdependent. It would not, however, 
cause those exchanges to be separated for tax purposes. 
On the other hand are cases in which different exchanges would 
not have been made but for the taxpayer's expectation of undoing 
them, but which are nonetheless treated as separate, despite their in-
terdependency and lack of separate business purpose. The corporation 
that sells stock with the hope of reacquiring that same stock in a sub-
sequent reorganization may be entitled to treat the sale and reacquisi-
tion as separate exchanges even if the sale is made for no purpose other 
than to allow the reacquisition to qualify as a tax-free exchange. 132 
And indeed it appears that the taxpayer who sells stock at a loss only 
in order to be able to deduct that loss and only because he will "undo" 
the sale by a later repurchase of the same stock is entitled to treat the 
sale and repurchase as separate despite the lack of any independent 
motive, so long as he waits long enough before making the repur-
chase.133 Similar separation of interdependent exchanges is allowed 
for taxpayers who sell (or purchase) stock in a liquidating corporation 
solely for the purpose of reducing (or increasing) their stockholdings 
prior to liquidation and solely in order to qualify for favorable treat-
ment on 'that liquidation.134 In all of these cases, mutual interdepen-
130. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 34, 1J 9.06; infra notes 218-19. 
131. Treas. Reg. § l.368-2(c) (as amended in 1962). 
132. Cf Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980). 
133. See l.R.C. § 1091(a) (1982) (disallowing the loss on the first such sale if the repurchase 
is made within 30 days before or after the sale). 
134. See, e.g., George L. Riggs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 474 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 2 
(minority shareholder sold to majority shareholder in order to allow majority shareholder to 
reach 80% ownership and qualify for tax-free liquidation under§ 332); Rev. Rut. 75-521, 1975-2 
C.B. 120 (same). 
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dence of the series of exchanges seems to give way to the fact that the 
taxpayer is taking a "risk" which justifies separation of the 
exchanges.135 
Indeed, it should not be surprising that the business purpose, or 
interdependence, test does not provide a satisfactory measuring rod for 
determining the "true" facts of a series of exchanges. The very enun-
ciation of the test is enough to reveal that its focus lies not on deter-
mining "what" happened, but on determining "why" it happened -
what was the taxpayer's motive for entering into a given exchange? 
While an examination of motive may have relevance for purposes of 
determining how a taxpayer should be treated, it provides no more 
than an explanation of why she did what was done, and cannot logi-
cally be a tool for determining what it was that was done. 
b. Summary of the step transaction tests. None of the three tests 
which are generally used to determine what exchanges ought to be 
treated as unified are capable of doing so: one test is nothing more 
than an allocation of burden of proof; the second is incapable of ever 
separating any concurrently contemplated transactions, no matter 
how separate legally or functionally; and the third examines the tax-
payer's purpose for doing what he did rather than explaining what it 
was that was done. 
The result is compromise: sometimes courts use the binding com-
mitment test; sometimes they use versions of the intent test; and some-
times they use the interdependent/business purpose test. While 
reasoned compromise is certainly worthwhile, there is at least some 
question regarding the reasoning behind this compromise. Acceptable 
grounds for choosing different tests at different times might include: 
(1) different courts take different approaches; (2) different statutes sug-
gest different levels of necessary integration; or (3) different relation-
ships require various tests to determine objective facts. Unfortunately, 
none of these possible bases for differentiating among the different 
test~ offers an adequate explanation of what has been done. 
First of all, the existence of three different tests for application of 
the step transaction doctrine is clearly not the result of mere disagree-
ment among different courts as to which of the tests represents the 
single proper standard. The Supreme Court has led the way by using 
all three of the .tests without ever explicitly overruling one or the 
other; instead, the Court's opinions reflect the unspoken assumption 
135. For further discussion of the concept of "risk" as it relates to step transactions, see 
Rosenberg, The Step Transaction Doctrine in Corporate Tax, 1986 N.Y.U. INST. ON CORP. TAX 
PLAN. 280, 290-91. 
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that sometimes one standard is appropriate and at other times another 
standard "works" better.136 This pattern of choosing a different test 
for different cases seems to be generally followed by the Internal Reve-
nue Service as well as lower courts. 
Professor Bittker has suggested that different tests may be appro-
priate where different statutory provisions apply. 137 However, Profes-
sor Bittker himself points out that "if the courts have been 
significantly influenced by considerations of this type, they have not 
explicitly said so."138 Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find even 
an implicit acknowledgment that different statutory provisions require 
different standards for integration. In interpreting a single Code sec-
tion (the reorganization provisions139) the courts and Internal Reve-
nue Service have at times used each of the three different tests: in 
determining whether a series of acquisitions is a single "B" reorganiza-
tion, the intent test is generally applied; 140 at other times, determina-
tion of whether a purportedly separate "B" reorganization should be 
so treated has seemed to warrant application of the interdependent/ 
business purpose test; 141 and at still other times, determining whether 
a "B" reorganization has occurred has apparently mandated applica-
tion of the binding commitment test. 142 The Supreme Court has at 
times applied the binding commitment test and the interdependent/ 
business purpose test to the same kind of reorganization. 143 Indeed, it 
has been suggested that two different tests can be applied at the same 
time to a single transaction!144 
Nor do the courts choose a specific test based upon the relationship 
136. In Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968), the Court enunciated the "binding 
commitment" test. In Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the same court applied the 
"business purpose" test. In McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 697-702 (1947), the 
Court appeared to apply the "intent" test. In none of the cases did the Court feel a need to 
differentiate the case before it from the other situations. The Internal Revenue Service agreed 
with the Court in all three cases and continues to use the three different tests without explaining 
its choices. 
137. B. BlTIKER, supra note 48, ~ 4.3.5. 
138. Id. at ~ 4.3.5, at 4-50. 
139. l.R.C. § 368 (1982). 
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (as amended in 1986). 
141. See Weikel v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 432 (1986); West Coast Mktg. v. Com-
missioner, 46 T.C. 32 (1966) (§ 351 transfer followed by purported "B" reorganization held taxa-
ble because there was no independent business purpose for incorporation). 
142. Rev. Rut. 72-354, 1972-2 C.B. 216 (sale of target stock followed by reacquisition as part 
of "B" reorganization separate transactions because purchaser not under binding commitment to 
retransfer). 
143. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, both 
involved tax-free "spin-offs," now described in l.R.C. § 355 (1982). 
144. Note, Step Transactions in ''.A" Reorganizations: A Proposal for a Binding Commitment 
Test, supra note 119, at 265 (current case law seems to suggest that for purposes of determining 
whether purportedly separate exchanges, one of which is a tax-free reorganization under 
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of the parties involved. Gregory applied the business purpose test to 
related parties; Gordon applied the binding commitment test to related 
parties; and in other situations the intent test has been applied to re-
lated parties. 145 In sum, the step transaction doctrine simply provides 
no consistent method for determining the "facts" of a specific 
exchange. 
A closer look at what the doctrine purports to do reveals why no 
test can serve its purpose. The transaction-based nature of the tax sys-
tem requires correlating each receipt with one or more specific pay-
ments. Only when each payment is linked to a particular receipt and 
each receipt to a particular payment can the two (or more) events be 
treated as an "exchange," which can then be characterized as a partic-
ular type of "transaction," depending on other circumstances sur-
rounding the exchange. If "what was done" means something other 
than a determination of the purely legal rights and liabilities that ex-
isted, it would appear that it must mean "what was exchanged for 
what?" Unfortunately, as suggested earlier, 146 that question is one 
which simply cannot be answered. 
But the fact that the kind of reciprocal causation which the step 
transaction doctrine seeks to identify often does not exist is only one of 
the problems with application of the doctrine. Even where such recip-
rocal causation does exist, the doctrine attempts to go further and to 
provide a means for determining when reciprocal exchanges should be 
separated and when they should be treated as part of some still larger 
reciprocal "exchange." For example, assume thatA transfers her busi-
ness assets to N ewco in exchange for all of the N ewco stock, and that 
A does so for the purpose (and with the intention) of transferring the 
Newco stock to Publicly Held in exchange for Publicly Held stock in a 
tax-free "B" reorganization.147 One might suggest that there are two 
reciprocal exchanges: assets for Newco stock, and Newco stock for 
Publicly Held stock. Using the tests applied by the courts, the facts of 
these exchanges may be proved by each party's purpose, intentions or 
binding legal commitments: A's purpose in transferring the assets was 
to receive the Newco stock, which A wanted so that she could trade 
with Publicly Held; Newco's purpose, intention, and legal commit-
ment in transferring its stock to A was to receive A's assets. A's pur-
§ 368(a)(l)(A), should be integrated, one step transaction test applies for determining the ques-
tion of "control" and a different ·test applies to the question of continuity of interest). 
145. For example, in Rev. Ru!. 85-139, 1985-2 C.B. 123, acquisitions by a parent and its 
subsidiary were integrated because of their combined intent. See also Rev. Ru!. 85-138, 1985-2 
C.B. 122. 
146. See supra Part l.B.1. 
147. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(B) (1982). 
416 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:365 
pose, intention, and obligation in transferring the Newco stock is to 
receive Publicly Held stock; and Publicly Held acts to receive A's 
Newco stock. Each party in turn makes its transfer for the purpose of 
receiving the property it gets; and mutually interdependent purposes, 
expectations, and obligations establish reciprocal causation. 
Unfortunately, the step transaction doctrine is not used to establish 
exchanges such as the ones above, but instead provides a rationale for 
explaining that in "reality" those two exchanges did not occur - that 
there was only a single exchange in which A transferred assets to 
Newco and Publicly Held transferred stock to A. The result is that 
when the traditional step transaction tests of intent and purpose do 
have a legitimate role in determining reciprocal causation, the ex-
changes which they describe are not the exchanges found by the 
courts. 
The problem is that there are innumerable levels of reciprocal ef-
fect: A's action can affect B, whose resultant action can affect C: 
whose action can affect D, whose action can in tum affect C: B, and 
eventually A. That one might choose to describe each relationship as 
independent or all as parts of a whole "transaction" seems clear. It 
may be that the further away the two ends of the defined transaction, 
the less primary are the reciprocal causes, but the difference in pri-
macy of causation is only one of degree; and the relationship between 
A and D will in some cases be stronger than the relationship between A 
and B in others. 
If one chooses to look beyond each individual "exchange," the 
more appropriate issue is the basis for doing so. Taxpayer intention or 
purpose may serve to establish a connection between A and D, but it 
does not establish a basis for determining when that connection should 
be more signifi~ant than the connection between A and B. Perhaps the 
degree of reciprocal effect between actions might establish a basis for 
determining when to integrate those purportedly separate actions, but 
no test for determining the degree of reciprocal effect has ever been 
suggested. In any event, it is difficult to imagine any situation where 
the reciprocal effect between more distant actions could be stronger 
than that between the direct "intermediary" exchanges; but at the 
same time it is easy to imagine several transactions where the degree of 
reciprocal causation in even a single direct exchange is minimal. 148 
Another problem with the doctrine and the way it has been applied 
is that to the extent that the traditional tests of intent or purpose are 
relevant, they are relevant because they tend to establish reciprocal 
148. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
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causation. However, when intent or purpose is referred to in applica-
tion of the doctrine, it is not reciprocal causation, but the intention or 
purpose of a single party that seems to carry the day. How a single 
party's intent or purpose could establish a reciprocal "exchange" be-
yond the legal one reported by the parties is unclear. 
Given the impossibility of any consistent standard for application 
of the step transaction doctrine, it would appear that while the doc-
trine may serve some purpose, that purpose is something other than 
determining "what was exchanged for what." Use of three different 
standards, each to be applied where "appropriate," has the same effect 
as would administration of any other single test with a series of stan-
dards which can be applied by the test administrator as he sees fit. It 
allows the test administrator to discriminate among the test-takers by 
using some other, unexpressed, subjective criteria. For example, as-
sume that A, B, and C each take a test, and A gets a grade of 60, B gets 
a grade of 70, and C gets an 80. Further assume that a passing grade 
is sometimes a 50%, sometimes 75%, and sometimes 90%, depending 
on which standard the administrator applies. To suggest that whether 
or not one of the takers passes the test is a determination of the "facts" 
with respect to that person, rather than a determination of whether the 
administrator made a predetermination of whether that person should 
pass, and then chose to apply the standard which brought about the 
desired result, is simply naive. Similarly, to suggest that the step 
transaction doctrine represents a method to determine the "facts" of 
an exchange, rather than an ex post rationale for decisions made on 
some other ground, is simply wrong. 
3. Substance Versus Form 
a. Step transaction cases. Even were there a principled rationale 
for determining when a series of exchanges ought to be treated as a 
single, integrated exchange, classification of that exchange as a partic-
ular transaction requires one more step. That step, of determining the 
"substance" of the redefined exchange, generally replaces some inap-
propriate transactional label with a different one that more accurately 
describes the facts surrounding a given exchange or series of 
exchanges. 
At the heart of the substance versus form doctrine is the search for 
some label that can appropriately account for the economic conse-
quences which result from a given set of exchanges. As applied to step 
transaction cases, the doctrine would ideally be applied to whatever 
"steps" make up the completed "transaction" and would label that 
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transaction as one that accurately describes the economic impact on 
every party thereto. Unfortunately, there are three problems with the 
application of the substance versus form doctrine to these cases: 
(1) there is often no single transactional label that accurately describes 
the "exchange" from even one party's point of view (instead, steps that 
have been "integrated" by application of the step transaction doctrine 
must, as often as not, be immediately disintegrated by the substance 
versus form doctrine in order to permit accurate description of the 
economic consequences for the parties involved); (2) where some label 
does accurately describe the economic consequences to one party, that 
label is often inconsistent with the economic results to the other par-
ties to the same exchange; and (3) in those cases where labels can be 
found that accurately describe the series of exchanges, there is gener-
ally a variety of applicable labels, each with different tax consequences, 
and no apparent basis for choosing any one label over the others. 
Several cases have made it clear that the system depends on the 
"discovery" of a single transactional label that accurately describes an 
exchange from all viewpoints, rather than on different labels for differ-
ent parties. One of the more recent of these is McDonald's Restau-
rants v. Commissioner. 149 There, McDonald's transferred its newly 
issued stock to the shareholders of X, and X was merged into McDon-
ald's. Shortly after the merger, the X shareholders, who had indicated 
a desire for cash, sold their McDonald's stock. 150 The court held that 
the step transaction doctrine should be applied and that the merger 
and the subsequent sale of the McDonald's stock should be treated as 
an integrated series of exchanges. As a result, the substance of the 
exchange did not qualify as a tax-free reorganization because the X 
shareholders did not have the type of continuing interest in McDon-
ald's (because of their stock sale) required for such characterization. 151 
What makes this decision interesting is that the X shareholders, 
whose actions and intentions served to disqualify the transaction from 
nonrecognition treatment, were not before the court and were unaf-
fected by the outcome of the case. Instead, it was McDonald's which 
was before the court, arguing that the transaction was not a reorgani-
149. 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). 
150. The agreement between McDonald's and the X shareholders provided that the newly 
issued McDonald's stock would be included in an upcoming SEC registration, so that it could be 
easily traded by the X shareholders. 688 F.2d at 521-22. 
151. In so holding, the court noted the Internal Revenue Service's ruling that the continuity 
of shareholder interest requirement would not be met if the shareholders receiving stock in the 
purported reorganization had a " 'plan or intention ... to [reduce their new holdings] to a 
number of shares having, in the aggregate, a value ofless than 50 percent of the total value of the 
acquired stock outstanding immediately prior to the proposed transaction.' " 688 F.2d at 528 
(citation omitted). 
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zation and that its basis in the acquired assets was therefore its cost for 
those assets152 rather than a transferred basis.153 Indeed, the result to 
the X shareholders would have remained unchanged regardless of the 
characterization of the transaction.154 Not only did the court search 
for a single transactionally consistent label for the exchange, but it was 
only this requirement of transactional consistency that allowed Mc-
Donald's even to raise the question of application of the step transac-
tion doctrine in the first place.155 
152. l.R.C. § 1011 (1982). 
153. I.R.C. § 362 (1982). 
154. If the transaction had been a reorganization, the reorganization would have been tax-
free (I.R.C. § 354 (1982)), but the shareholders would have been taxed on the subsequent sale of 
the McDonald's stock (which would have first taken a basis equal to the shru;eholders basis in the 
exchanged X Corp. stock under l.R.C. § 358 (1982)). If the exchange were instead a taxable sale, 
the shareholders would have been taxed at the time of that exchange, but would have taken a cost 
basis in the McDonald's stock, so that no fui:ther tax would have been imposed on their sale of 
that stock. · 
155. Another case in which the only party before the court was the party who had not en-
gaged in a series of unified exchanges, but who was nonetheless affected by an implicit transac-
tional consistency requirement, was Kass v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 218 (1973), ajfd., 491 F.2d 
749 (3d Cir. 1974). The taxpayer had traded her shares of A to Track Company, pursuant to the 
merger of A into Track; and the issue before the court was again whether the merger qualified as 
a tax-free reorganization, l.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A) (1982). Although the exchanges appeared to 
meet the requirements of§ 368(a)(l)(A), the court determined that the transaction failed to qual-
ify because there was, as in McDonald's, no continuity of shareholder interest. Prior to the 
merger, Track had purchased, for cash, a substantial amount of A stock. Immediately after the 
merger, the pre-merger shareholders of A, including Track, owned enough Track stock to meet 
the continuity requirement. The court, however, held that Track's pre-merger stock purchase 
should be integrated with the merger for tax purposes. As a result, the shareholders required to 
have a continuing interest in Track did not include Track itself, but instead included the former 
A shareholders who had made the pre-merger cash sale to Track. So viewed, the relevant group 
failed the requirement. As a result, the substance of the taxpayer's exchange depended on the 
plans and actions of a party (Track) that was neither subject to her control nor responsive to her 
wishes. The court explained: "We realize that in one sense petitioner was not privy to the plans 
of the [other parties]. In another sense - in the same way that all shareholders in a corporation 
play a part in major corporate decisions - she was a party to the choice of steps taken." 60 T.C. 
at 225 n.15. Because the corporation took these steps in part because they allowed it to circum-
vent the taxpayer's desires, 60 T.C. at 219-20, the taxpayer's role in making this choice was 
minimal. 
The general requirement of transactionally consistent treatment of exchanges is also well 
illustrated by comparison of two other Tax Court cases. In Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 
472 (5th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972), the taxpayer received an interest in a 
building, pursuant to the purported liquidation of her interest in a partnership. She traded this 
to her husband's estate in exchange for different real estate, and the husband's estate then sold 
the building to Corporation, which was owned by the continuing partners and which contributed 
the building back to the partnership. The taxpayer contended that both the liquidation of her 
partnership interest and her subsequent exchange of real estate were tax-free under l.R.C. 
§§ 736(b), 1031 (1982). The court determined that the exchanges should be integrated and 
treated as if the taxpayer had exchanged her partnership interest with X in a taxable sale and 
then used the cash to purchase the real estate. 
In Harris v. United States, 356 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1966), the facts were similar to Crenshaw, 
except that the building was not recontributed to the partnership. Although that last step was 
admittedly of no concern to the taxpayer, the court found that the substance of the exchange 
could not be recharacterized because to do so in the absence of that last step was inconsistent 
with the consequences of the transaction to a party other than the taxpayer. 
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Even a cursory review of the cases reveals, however, that often 
there simply is no transaction which accurately describes a given set of 
exchanges for all parties involved. For example, if A transfers assets to 
Newco for stock, in contemplation of trading the Newco stock to Pub-
licly Held for Publicly Held stock, and the series of exchanges is inte-
grated, the "exchange" will be treated as one involving A's assets for 
Publicly Held stock. If Newco is liquidated by Publicly Held prior to 
engaging in any economic transactions, its transitory existence will 
have had no long term economic effect and can easily be ignored. 
However, if Publicly Held decides not to liquidate Newco upon its 
acquisition, the single "exchange" (as characterized by the step trans-
action doctrine) will have had effects on at least three different entities: 
A will have "exchanged" assets for Publicly Held stock; Newco will 
have "exchanged" its newly issued stock for assets; and Publicly Held 
will have "exchanged" its stock for the stock of Newco. If one looks 
at any one of the taxpayers individually, characterization of its ex-
change seems apparent: A has engaged in a taxable exchange of assets 
.for Publicly Held stock; Newco has engaged in a tax-free exchange of 
stock for assets; 156 and Publicly Held has engaged in a tax-free ex-
change of stock for stock.157 However, if tax consequences are based 
on characterization of the actions of all parties to a single transaction, 
it is not enough to state that, for example, A transferred assets and 
received Publicly Held stock. Instead, determination of A's tax conse-
quences would seem to require explanation of the entire transaction in 
which A engaged- to whom didA transfer assets, and what did that 
person transfer to A in exchange for those assets? In our example, A 
has transferred assets to Newco and received stock from Pub!icly 
Held; there is no such transaction descri~ed in the Code. 
There have generally been two kinds of responses to this problem. 
Courts have either (1) recharacterized step transactions by defining 
them not as a single, integrated exchange, but as a series of separate 
exchanges whose net economic effect mirrors the actual impact on the 
parties involved; or (2) recharacterized transactions differently with 
respect to each of the different parties to the exchange. Neither of 
these actions is without its own problems. 
One problem with redefining the substance of step transaction 
cases as a different series of exchanges rather than as a single transac-
tion is that, while such treatment might allow consistent treatment of 
all parties to a series of exchanges, it would also undo exactly what the 
156. See I.R.C. §§ 351, 1032 (1982). 
157. See I.R.C. § 1032 (1982). 
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step transaction doctrine was supposed to have done in the first place. 
Why application of the step transaction doctrine to "integrate" a series 
of exchanges into a single transaction should be followed by applica-
tion of the substance versus form doctrine to resegregate those ex-
changes into a different series of transactions is unclear and perhaps 
nonsensical. It is not, however, without precedent. In Commissioner 
v. Court Holding Co., 158 Court Holding had discussed the sale of its 
only asset to Purchaser. Prior to signing a contract of sale, however, 
the company realized that it could save taxes by distributing its asset 
to its two shareholders in complete liquidation, and having them then 
sell the asset to Purchaser. The company proceeded to liquidate, and 
the shareholders then sold the asset to Purchaser. The Court deter-
mined that the series of steps should be treated as a single transaction. 
Surprisingly, its next step was to impose taX as if the company had 
sold the asset and then in a separate exchange distributed the sales 
proceeds in liquidation.159 
Similarly, in Idol v. Commissioner, 160 the taxpayer sold some of the 
stock of his otherwise wholly owned corporation to Purchaser, and 
subsequently caused the corporation to distribute some assets to Pur-
chaser in redemption of that stock. After concluding that the ex-
changes should be integrated and that the same net result could have 
been reached (with greater tax liability) by the corporation's first sell-
ing some assets to Purchaser and then distributing the cash to Idol, the 
Tax Court decided to tax the exchanges as if they had occurred in the 
latter order.161 
158. 324 U.S. 331 (1945). 
159. It has been suggested that the decision in Court Holding Co. was actually based on the 
Court's restructuring of the entire series of events to comport with the real negotiations between 
the parties, on the assumption that the negotiations represented the true substance of the transac-
tion. Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J. 861 
(1976). While Mr. K.ingson's article makes many excellent points, the suggestion that negotia-
tions can represent the true "substance" of a transaction is not one of them. Whatever form is 
ultimately agreed on by the parties is itself the end product of their negotiation. If negotiations 
could provide evidence of a different substance, it would have to be the product of only some of 
the negotiations - not including the set of negotiations which finally brought about the final 
structure of the agreement. Unfortunately, there is no logical way to determine which negotia-
tions represent the "substance," and which of the negotiations should be disregarded. 
160. 38 T.C. 444 (1962), ajfd., 319 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1963). 
161. An example of a more recent case where the Tax Court followed the Supreme Court's 
lead in integrating and resegregating exchanges is Estate of Schneider v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 
906 (1987). Schneider was the major stockholder of Transport Co. Transport offered employees 
the right to purchase stock from Schneider. If the employees opted to do so, they were given (in 
exchange for services) a check issued with a restrictive endorsement to Schneider. Upon the 
employee's endorsing the check to Schneider, Schneider would transfer some of his Transport 
stock to the employee. The Tax Court determined that the exchanges were all parts of an inte-
grated transaction. It then proceeded to impose tax as if separate exchanges had occurred, but in 
reverse order. The parties were treated as if Transport had paid Schneider for his stock and then 
issued the stock to the employees. 
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Finally, in a case decided only this year, the Tax Court seems to 
have realized the folly inherent in integrating steps only to resegregate 
them in reverse order. In Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 Purchaser 
acquired approximately 50% of the outstanding stock of Esmark, and 
Esmark subsequently distributed the stock of Subsidiary to Purchaser 
in redemption of Purchaser's newly acquired Esmark stock. In refus-
ing to adopt the Internal Revenue Service's argument that Esmark 
should be taxed as if it had first sold the Subsidiary stock to Purchaser 
for cash and then used the cash to redeem its own shares, the Tax 
Court stated that "[t]his [proposed] recharacterization does not simply 
combine steps; it invents new ones. Courts have refused to apply the 
step-transaction doctrine in this manner."163 
What is perhaps more surprising than the court's belated acknowl-
edgement of this inconsistency in the application of the step transac-
tion doctrine is the ease with which the court was able to reconcile its 
insight with previous cases in which it had done exactly what it found 
so offensive in Esmark. Indeed, even in the very. case in which it 
voiced its antipathy to the concept of inventing new steps, the court 
appeared to reconfirm its holding in Idol, 164 where it had done exactly 
that. Rather than overrule Idol, the Esmark court merely found it 
"factually distinguishable"165 because in Idol the percentage of shares 
redeemed was smaller. If the implication is that a court can invent 
new steps only in certain kinds of cases and not in others, then the 
court was somewhat lax in its explanation of what separates those dif-
ferent kinds of cases. If the court simply decided to proceed slowly 
along a more rational path, then there are many steps along the path 
of irrationality that eventually need to be undone. 
Aside from its own inherent inconsistency, another problem with 
this integration-reverse-disintegration approach is that reversing the 
order of exchanges would appear to have sometimes significant effects 
on other parties to the redefined transaction. 
In Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 166 the taxpayer-
corporation sought to acquire the assets of Seller. Rather than simply 
purchase the assets, Kimbell-Diamond decided to purchase the stock 
of Seller and immediately liquidate the company because that se-
162. 90 T.C. 171 (1988). 
163. 90 T.C. at 196. 
164. 38 T.C. at 444. See supra text accompanying note 161. 
165. 90 T.C. at 190. 
166. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), affd., 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 827 (1951). 
For a discussion of this case and its implications, see Pugh, Combining Acquired and Acquiring 
Corporations and Their Subsidiaries Following a Purchase of Stock: Some Anomalies of Form and 
Substance, 35 TAX L. REv. 359 (1980). 
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quence of events would leave it with a higher basis in the newly ac-
quired assets. 167 The court, realizing that the stock purchase and 
liquidation were parts of a single pre-arranged plan by Kimbell-Dia-
mond, decided to treat the actions as a unified exchange. It deter-
mined that Kimbell-Diamond paid to acquire the assets and should be 
treated as if it had acquired those assets directly. Essentially, K.imbell-
Diamond was taxed as if the liquidation of Seller had preceded, rather 
than followed, the taxpayer's purchase. 
As a result, the court disallowed Kimbell-Diamond's planned 
transferred basis and determined that the company's asset basis was 
simply its cost for each asset. Seller was not before the court in that 
case, but the court's opinion clearly implied that its presence would 
not have changed the result and, moreover, that the result did not 
change the consequences to Seller. In other words, the court looked 
only to Kimbell-Diamond's actions to determine whether to treat the 
purchase-liquidation as a direct purchase, and it was satisfied with 
simply changing the consequences to that taxpayer. 
The implication, then, is that the substance versus form analysis 
may provide a method for redetermining the tax consequences to one 
party to a multiparty exchange without affecting the other parties. 
Aside from the obvious and direct conflict between this single party 
approach and cases such as McDonald's, 168 which appear specifically 
to require interparty transactional consistency, neither the courts nor 
the Internal Revenue Service would be likely to be content with this 
approach for several other reasons. 
Some of the problems with inconsistent treatment of the parties to 
an exchange can be made apparent by putting Kimbell-Diamond·in a 
post-1986 setting. In the original case, the court (and the Internal 
Revenue Service) disregarded the tax consequences of its own liquida-
tion to Seller. Since at that time, liquidation carried no tax conse-
quences to the liquidating corporation, and the tax consequences of a 
liquidation to the owner of the "liquidated" company would not have 
differed from those of a stock sale, disregarding the consequences to 
Seller was not problematical.169 Under current law, liquidation of a 
167. A corporation owning at least 80% of the stock of a subsidiary could assume the subsid-
iary's asset basis upon its liquidation under former l.R.C. §§ 332-334(b)(l) (1982) (now I.R.C. 
§ 337 (Supp. IV 1986)). Because Seller's asset basis exceeded the value of those assets, Kimbell-
Diamond hoped to have the assets retain that high basis. 
168. 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 149-55. For a discus-
sion of cases rejecting this doctrine see Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 
710-12 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that Kimbell-Diamond was superseded by l.R.C. § 334(b)(2) 
(1982)). 
169. See 14 T.C. at 79. Seller would have been treated basically the same whether it had 
liquidated and sold the assets under the pre-1987 version of I.R.C. § 336 (1982), amended by 
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corporation results in recognition by that company of all gain inherent 
in all of its assets. 170 It is doubtful that either the Internal Revenue 
Service or any court would now be content to allow Seller's gain to go 
unrecognized simply because the liquidation occurred immediately af-
ter the acquisition of its stock and as part of the purchaser's plan to 
acquire its assets. 
Another case that illustrates the same problem is Basic Inc. v. 
United States. 171 In Basic, Parent company owned Child company, 
which in tum owned Grandchild company. Purchaser sought to ac-
quire the assets of Child and Grandchild. Prior to the sale, Child dis-
tributed all of the Grandchild stock to Parent, which then sold the 
stock of both companies to Purchaser. Parent reported its receipt of 
the Grandchild stock from Child as a dividend. This characterization 
was essentially tax-free to all parties172 and gave Parent a basis in the 
Grandchild stock which served to reduce Parent's gain on the sale to 
Purchaser. The court, referring to its actions as being based upon a 
"business purpose" or "substance versus form" approach, treated the 
distribution and sale as a single transaction, and then held that the 
"substance" of the distribution was not a dividend. Instead, it ex-
plained that "the whole transaction was a foregone conclusion that 
might just as well have been carried out in reverse order without 
changing the attendant risks or final result to the slightest degree."t73 
Apparently, the court believed that this justified disintegrating the 
"whole" transaction and treating it as if it had been carried out in 
reverse order. Parent was taxed as if it had not received any distribu-
I.R.C. § 336 (Supp. IV 1986), or first sold its assets pursuant to a plan of liquidation and then 
distributed the receipts of that sale under "old" I.R.C. § 337 (1982), amended by I.R.C. § 337 
(Supp. IV 1986). (Query whether old § 337 would apply if no plan of liquidation had been 
formally adopted prior to a "deemed" liquidation. See former I.R.C. § 337(a) (1982), amended 
by I.R.C. § 337 (Supp. JV 1986); Virginia Ice & Freezing Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1251 
(1958) (§ 337 applies only to sales after formal adoption of plan of liquidation).) Even during 
most of that period, however, there would have been different treatment if part of the purchase 
price were an installment obligation, since some of the shareholders' gain could be deferred on an 
asset sale followed by liquidation (I.R.C. § 453(h) (1982)), but not on a liquidation followed by 
an asset sale (I.R.C. § 331 (1982)). Under current law, the difference in result to Seller if it were 
deemed to have liquidated prior to sale would be substantial, because that liquidation would 
result in current (pre-sale) corporate-level income equal to all accrued appreciation in the com-
pany's assets under the current version of I.R.C. § 336 (Supp. IV 1986). 
170. I.R.C. § 336 (1986). This assumes that the transition rules of the 1986 Act are inappli· 
cable and that the liquidating corporation is not at least 80% owned by another corporation and 
thus would not qualify for deferred recognition under I.R.C. § 337 (Supp. IV 1986). 
171. 549 F.2d 740 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
172. Parent would receive the distribution tax-free under I.R.C. § 243 (1982); Child would 
have escaped recognition of gain under the version of I.R.C. § 311 in effect at that time. See 
I.R.C. § 311 (1982), amended by I.R.C. § 311 (Supp. IV 1986). 
173. 549 F.2d at 746. 
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tion but had sold the Child stock while Child still owned the stock of 
Grandchild. 
To complete the picture, Purchaser acquired stock of two compa-
nies, Child and Grandchild. If the "real" facts were that Parent sold 
the stock of Child, which, at the time of sale, owned the stock of 
Grandchild, it would appear that subsequent to the sale, Child must 
have distributed the stock of Grandchild to Purchaser. In Basic, Pur-
chaser was not before the court, so that Purchaser's tax consequences 
were not at issue. Nonetheless, it would not be exaggerating to suggest 
that Purchaser might have been surprised to learn, after purchasing 
the stock of two separate corporations, that it had "really" purchased 
only the stock of Child and that Child distributed the Grandchild 
stock as a dividend immediately after the purchase. · 
The court in fact treated the seller as if there had been no pre-sale 
dividend without any apparent need to treat Purchaser as if there had 
been a post-sale dividend, with the result that the distribution of the 
Grandchild stock was essentially ignored. At the time the case arose, 
the tax result of the distribution, had it not been ignored, would have 
been simply to increase Parent's basis in the stock it sold, thereby re-
ducing its taxable gain.174 Under current law, however, a diVidend 
distribution by Child could result in that company recognizing as gain 
all the accrued appreciation on its Grandchild stock.175 A transac-
tionally inconsistent recharacterization of the exchanges which disre-
garded the dividend would allow substantial and unwarranted tax 
savings; and it is highly unlikely that taxpayers who sought that sav-
ings could find it by simply making the dividend distribution without 
any business purpose and as part of a broader plan of tax avoidance.176 
174. At the time of the transaction, reordering of the exchanges would have had some effect 
on Purchaser, such as changing its current earnings and profits under I.R.C. § 312 (1982); but 
the effect would not have been substantial. 
175. See I.R.C. § 31l(b) (Supp. IV 1986). This would be true unless the distribution would 
qualify as a tax-free reorganization under § 355 (it apparently would not, because of the absence 
of any business purpose). The consequences of reordering to Purchaser might be of even more 
interest if Purchaser were an individual, so that the deemed distribution to it of the Grandchild 
stock would be fully taxable (because the § 243 deduction for dividends received is available only 
to corporate shareholders). 
176. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 
U.S. 939 (1971), is another typical case in which a transaction was restructured with respect to 
one party without any perceived need for logically consistent restructuring of the transaction 
from the perspective of the other parties. For a discussion of Waterman and related cases, and a 
suggestion that in these cases the form of the transaction ought to be determinative, see Lang, 
Dividends Essentially Equivalent to Redemptions: The Taxation of Bootstrap Stock Acquisitions, 
41 TAX L. REV. 309 (1986). In Waterman, a case not unlike Basic, Inc., the taxpayer planned to 
sell the stock of its wholly owned subsidiary. Just prior to the sale, the subsidiary purported to 
distribute a substantial dividend (tax-free to Waterman under § 243 and to the distributee under 
the pre-1984 version of§ 311) in the form of a note. The subsidiary's liability on the dividend 
note substantially reduced its net worth, so that the sales price, and Waterman's taxable gain, 
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The conclusions to be drawn from analysis of the above cases are 
that (1) sometimes inter-party transactional consistency is crucial to a 
determination of whether and how an integrated series of exchanges 
will be recharacterized; (2) other times such consistency is irrelevant; 
and (3) no basis has ever been enunciated for distinguishing between 
the two possibilities or for determining which aspect (importance or 
irrelevance) will rule in any particular case. 
There are many substance versus form cases, however, where inter-
party consistency is not a problem. Courts can often simply ignore 
self-cancelling steps or telescope two or more steps into a single, less 
complex, transaction;177 in these cases, deciding that the "substance" 
were minimal. Shortly after the sale, the purchaser lent to its newly acquired subsidiary enough 
cash to pay off its note to Waterman, and the subsidiary did so. The court, treating all of the 
actions as an integrated series, determined that the "substance" of the series was that Waterman 
had not received a dividend but had instead "sold" the subsidiary stock for an amount equal to 
its actual sales price plus the pre-sale dividend. 430 F.2d at 1191. Transactional consistency 
would seem to require treating the parties as if the following order of events had occurred: 
(1) Waterman sold the subsidiary stock for cash; and (2) the subsidiary distributed a dividend 
note to its new purchaser. Nonetheless, reference to a post-sale dividend was never made, and 
the tax consequences of such a dividend were not explored. 
Consideration of the effects on third parties would have been of even greater interest in a 
similar case following Waterman. In TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328 
(Sth Cir. 1980), the pre-sale dividend consisted of appreciated securities, and the post-purchase 
transfer from the purchasing company to its newly acquired subsidiary was a cash contribution. 
Consistent restructuring of the transaction seemingly would have resulted in treating the ex-
changes as (1) a cash sale of the subsidiary; and (2) a post-sale purchase of the subsidiary's 
appreciated securities by the original seller. Because the court determined that the exchanges 
should not be integrated in that case, the reordering did not occur. Had the court found that the 
actions were a single scheme worthy of reordering, however, the proper result to the subsidiary 
would be unclear. Apparently, the subsidiary should have been taxed as if it had sold the appre-
ciated securities, in spite of the fact that either a pre-sale or post-sale distribution of those securi-
ties would have been tax-free under the version of§ 31 I(a) then in effect. Whether the court 
would have taxed the subsidiary on a sale that did not occur, simply because of its parent's 
attempted tax savings, is doubtful; but a failure to do so would have been inconsistent with a 
restructuring of the transaction with respect to the other parties. This dilemma was avoided by 
the court's finding that the distribution and sale were independent. A series of cases and rulings 
in this area seems· to indicate that the intended end result is in fact generally reached not by the 
application of a substance versus form approach, but by a decision of what "test" to use for 
integration. Compare Rev. Ru!. 75-493, 1975-2 C.B. 109 (binding commitment) and Waterman, 
430 F.2d at 1194-95 (business purpose), with Casner v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 379, 389 (5th 
Cir. 1971) (plan). It is also possible that the basis for choosing a certain test (and achieving a 
given end result) depends on facts such as whether the subsidiary distributes its own assets 
(TSN), borrowed funds, a note (Waterman), or some other asset. See Bowen, Structuring Lever-
aged Buyouts-Selected Tax Problems, 63 TAXES 935 (1985); Kingson, supra note 159. Why 
that should be determinative, as opposed to whether or not it is so, is unclear. 
177. Both kinds of transactions are plentiful. Self-cancelling steps, such as a transfer from 
one person to a second person and then back to the first, come in many forms. Examples include 
a sale of property followed by resale of the same property back to the seller and a loan followed 
by a transfer of the same amount by the borrower back to the lender. In Battelstein v. Commis-
sioner, 611 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1980), Taxpayer owed interest to Creditor. He borrowed more 
money from Creditor to pay the interest, and the court integrated the series of actions into a 
single "nonpayment" of the interest. Cf. Hauer v. United States, 85-2 T.C.M. (CCH) ~ 9447, at 
89,005 (S corporation distributed cash to shareholders, who lent it back to corporation. Divi-
dend respected as long as not dependent on subsequent shareholder loan.). 
Application of a substance versus form approach to telescope two or more exchanges into a 
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of the exchanges differs from the characterization chosen by the tax-
payer seems more straightforward. Even these seemingly straightfor-
ward cases leave room for concern, however. They necessarily 
advance from a determination that a series of exchanges should be 
integrated to a conclusion that integration means characterization as a 
single transaction - or, in the case of self-cancelling steps, characteri-
zation as a "nontransaction" - is a more appropriate description of 
the "substance" of the exchanges. The problem is that when the "sub-
stance" of an exchange is so defined, all that can be meant by "sub-
stance" is "a more convenient way of achieving a given result." 
Unfortunately, in most areas of tax law, a more convenient way of 
doing something is only a more convenient way of doing something; it 
is not necessarily the "substance" of actions that are done less 
conveniently. 
The difference between "convenience" and "substance" is well es-
tablished. For example, tax-free reorganizations are only those ex-
changes which meet certain statutory requirements. 178 If X acquires 
all of the stock of Y in exchange solely for X voting stock, the ex-
change would qualify as a reorganization. 179 If X does not want reor-
ganization treatment, it could intentionally fail to meet some of the 
statutory requirements, perhaps by acquiring some of the stock for 
cash or for X nonvoting stock. Similarly, if X had wanted to acquire 
some of the Y stock for cash, but went to the trouble of issuing X 
voting stock instead, it could qualify the exchange as a reorganization. 
In either case, X could manipulate the status of the transaction (as a 
tax-free reorganization or as a taxable sale) by simply acting in a some-
what less convenient way than it had at first anticipated. 
One might be tempted to point out that in the above context, un-
like in other substance versus form cases, characterization as a reor-
ganization or a sale is dependent on real economic distinctions - the 
quality of consideration (some cash or all equity) makes for a substan-
single, direct transfer is also common. A person who performs services for a partnership or 
corporation in exchange for a right to payment and then exchanges that right to payment for 
partial ownership of the enterprise will be treated for tax purposes as if she performed services in 
return for that partial ownership (resulting in a single, taxable transaction instead of two tax-free 
exchanges). See w. McKEE, w. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNER-
SHIPS AND PARTNERS 1J 4.02[3] (1977). Or, a person who advances cash or property as a loan 
and, pursuant to a plan, cancels the loan, may be treated as if she had made the initial transfer 
free of any repayment obligation. See Rev. Ru!. 77-299, 1977-2 C.B. 343 (installment sale fol-
lowed by pre-planned cancellation of payments when they became due treated as gift of entire 
property in year of purported sale). But see Kelley's Estate v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 321 (1974), 
and Haygood v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 936 (1964) (reaching conclusion opposite of Rev. Ru!. 
77-299). 
178. I.R.C. § 368 (1982). 
179. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(B) (1982). 
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tive economic difference, which in turn governs the tax characteriza-
tion of the exchange. The point, while superficially appearing 
persuasive, is irrelevant. The Code is full of other provisions which 
make tax characterization wholly independent of economic sub-
stance.180 Nonetheless, no court has been tempted to hold the "sub-
stance" of these actions to be different from their form. 181 Even more 
telling, the Code often makes determination of the tax "substance" of 
transactions explicitly dependent on nothing more than the taxpayer's 
own stated choice of form.182 
On the other hand, there often is economic effect to actions which 
are disregarded in even the most straightfonvard cases. When a tax-
payer simply takes two steps to achieve a single result, there often is 
some effect on legal rights during the interim between the two steps. If 
A l~nds B $100 on Monday and forgives the debt on Tuesday, the 
"transaction" puts A and B in a different legal and economic position 
for 24 hours than hadA simply givcnB $100 on Monday (or on Tues-
day). While in cases such as this the economic consequences of two 
steps may differ only minutely from what would have been the case if 
only a single step had been taken, the degree of economic consequence 
would appear to be of little concern. Indeed, the economic conse-
quences of a corporation paying $1,000 to a single shareholder (in ad-
dition to transferring, say $1,000,000 worth of its voting stock to other 
shareholders) to avoid characterization of a stock acquisition as a "B" 
reorganization, or the consequences of a taxpayer waiting two days 
(until the next tax year) to sell an asset in a fixed market, are them-
selves almost meaningless. 
In addition to some perhaps insignificant economic consequence 
inherent in almost all step transaction and substance versus form 
cases, many such cases which are found to have a substance different 
from their form can actually involve substantial economic conse-
quences which are simply disregarded. For example, in Knetsch v. 
United States, 183 the Supreme Court collapsed a loan and transfer of 
the same proceeds into essentially a "nontransaction," despite the tax-
payer's out-of-pocket costs of over $90,000. 
180. For example, a decision to operate as a corporation rather than as a sole proprietorship 
may have no real consequences aside from tax considerations; a year-end decision to defer the 
sale of an asset for a few days, until the next taxable year, may have no consequences aside from 
deferring tax liability; or the distribution of a stock dividend to one shareholder may have eco· 
nomic consequences identical to those of a redemption of a different shareholder. 
181. See generally Kingson, supra note 159. 
182. E.g., I.R.C. § 7l(b)(l)(B) (1982) (treatment of alimony payments); I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) 
(1982) (determination of which parent gets personal exemption for dependent); I.R.C. § 1361 
(1982) (consolidated returns). 
183. 364 U.S. 361 (1960). 
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The problem with attempting to redefine the substance of a trans-
action based upon its ultimate economic effect is that transactions are 
simply not defined by reference to their economic effect, but by refer-
ence to facts such as the items exchanged and other similar attrib-
utes. 184 While the substance of a series of exchanges might be seen as 
the overall change in economic status of the taxpayer involved, tax 
transactions are always defined by reference to the means (i.e., ex-
changes) used to reach the ends (economic changes) rather than by the 
ends themselves.18s 
When courts do tax individuals by looking to the change in their 
overall economic circumstances and determining what transaction(s) 
might have achieved those economic results, their actions do not seem 
184. See supra Part I.B. 
185. One consequence of looking to economic result, rather than the means of achieving that 
result, to define a transaction is that often the "substance" of the redefined exchange is held to be 
a transaction defined by the Code as consisting of one or more specific exchanges when those 
exchanges which define the transaction have, quite simply, not occurred. For example, in Da-
vant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1966), shareholders 
owned all the stock of X Co. and Y Co. They decided to combine the operating assets of both in 
a single corporation and to withdraw $900,000 cash from the combined company. Pursuant to 
the advice of Attorney, the following steps were taken: Shareholders sold the X stock to Attor-
ney's Son for $900,000, which amount Son had borrowed from Bank. Son caused X to sell its 
operating assets to Yfor $700,000. X distributed this $700,000, plus $215,000 cash which it had, 
to Son in complete liquidation. Son used $900,000 to repay Bank and kept $15,000 as his profit. 
The court determined that this series of exchanges should be treated as a unified transaction, 
and that, when so viewed, the transaction which had occurred was a reorganization under 
§ 368(a)(l)(D). That section defined a "D" reorganization as a transfer by one corporation (X) 
of all or part of its assets to another corporation controlled by the same shareholders (Y) "only if, 
in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which the assets are transferred 
[(Y)] are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under section 354, 355 or 356 .... " l.R.C. 
§ 368(a)(l)(D) (1982). The court noted that although no stock of Y was distributed to Share-
holders, the "substance" of the exchange had the same result as if it h,ad been (because Share-
holders owned all of the Y stock in any event) and in light of that, the actual statutory 
requirement was irrelevant. 
The Davant court has had plenty of company in holding that it could disregard an unmet 
statutory requirement for characterization of an exchange as a particular transaction when that 
statutory requirement would have been, in effect, a meaningless gesture. See, e.g., Reef Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967); James Armour 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295 (1964); Grubbs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 42 (1962). The 
concept has been used by courts to justify holding that taxpayers have met the requirements for 
tax-free incorporations despite their failure to meet the requirement that they maintain, after the 
transfer of assets, 80% control of the newly formed corporation. E.g., D' Angelo Assocs. v. Com-
missioner, 70 T.C. 121 (1978); Florida Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Fahs, 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 
1948) (shares distributed directly to third party held to have been distributed to taxpayer). It has 
been used to justify taxing individuals on funds they never received, see, e.g., Old Colony Trust 
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), and has been said to have provided the basis for the 
entire assignment of income doctrine. See Gunn, supra note 62, at 760-65. The doctrine taxes a 
person on money earned but never received. The doctrine might well be justified by the fact that 
the taxpayer who earned the funds was en-ic'.1ed by them to the extent he could direct them, 
because to that extent he enjoyed consumption of that amount (le., by making a gift and "con-
suming" the amount gifted). Such justification of the doctrine has never been offered, however. 
Instead, courts simply explain that the "substance" was that money was transferred to the earner 
and then to the eventual recipient. 
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unreasonable; but the problem in most cases is simply that there is not 
just a single transaction that could have achieved the actual economic 
results. Instead, there are usually several different kinds of transac-
tions by which those results could have been reached: for some, the 
formal statutory requirements have been met; for others, they have 
not. Typically, in these cases, the court will choose only the latter as 
accurately describing the "substance" of the transaction. 
Indeed, in those few. situations where there is a single economic 
substance that appears more accurate than other choices, courts never-
theless will frequently characterize the situations as constituting a 
transaction that, according to the Code, has requirements that are un-
met by the exchange, even as recast, and that also fails to reflect the 
economic substance of the exchange. For example, in Higgins v. 
Smith, 186 a shareholder sold property to his wholly owned company, 
and the Court simply disregarded the sale, despite the fact that prop-
erty previously owned by the shareholder was afterwards owned by 
the corporation.187 Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 60-133 188 the tax-
payer transferred stock of one wholly owned corporation (X) to an-
other wholly owned corporation (Y) just prior to X's payment of a 
dividend. The Internal Revenue Service simply ignored the transfer 
and treated the taxpayer as if he had personally received the dividend. 
Again, the recharacterized transaction was further from the economic 
substance (and from its statutory definition) than was the taxpayer's 
original characterization of the exchange.189 
186. 308 U.S. 473 (1940). 
187. The transfer might have been treated as a contribution to capital followed by a dividend, 
which would have been consistent with the economic substance, if not more consistent than char· 
acterization as a sale. The Court did not characterize the transaction as such. 
188. 1960-1 C.B. 189. 
189. Another case where the recharacterized economic "substance" was further from a re-
flection of reality than was the taxpayer's initial characterization is Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 
368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967). In that case, Old Co. was 
owned by two groups, A and B, each of which owned approximately half of the outstanding 
shares. Pursuant to a plan, A formed Newco by transferring to it some of A's Old Co. stock. A, 
B, and Newco then sold all of their Old stock to Attorney for notes and some cash borrowed 
from Old. Attorney caused Old Co. to sell all its assets to Newco in exchange for Newco notes. 
Old Co. was then liquidated, distributing to Attorney $1,000,000 cash on hand and the Newco 
notes, which Attorney transferred to A, B, and Newco to pay off his obligations to them. The net 
result of all this was that Newco had the Old Co. operating assets; A owned all the stock of 
Newco and some Newco notes; and B had some cash and some Newco notes. 
The court integrated the exchanges and held that the transaction was a reorganization under 
- § 368(a){l)(F). That section applied to exchanges which were a "mere change in form" and did 
not apply when there was a shift in proprietary interest. As a result, the substance of the transac-
tion, in which there was an ownership change of approximately 50% {because B no longer owned 
any stock), '\Vas treated as a transaction which caused no shift in proprietary interest. The court 
explained that it viewed the ownership change as a redemption which occurred prior to the reor-
ganization. It noted that this redemption should not be treated as part of the overall reorganiza-
tion because it was "functionally unrelated." This explanation, however, is weak. If by 
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b. Summary of substance versus form in step transaction cases. 
To the extent that the "substance" of a series of exchanges for a single 
taxpayer can be determined, that substance represents an overall 
change in the taxpayer's economic position. For example, she may 
have begun with stock of X and may end up with stock of Y, which 
owns the former operating assets of X so that the "substance" from 
her point of view is an exchange of X stock for Y stock. This change in 
substantive rights might have been accomplished by some tax-free 
transaction, but it might also have been accomplished by a fully taxa-
ble exchange. The problem is that the Code does not impose taxes 
based on changes in economic rights; it imposes taxes based on certain 
transactions, and transactions are not defined as any actions which 
work certain changes in economic rights. They are defined as very 
specific sets of exchanges. 
While it would not be "wrong" to impose tax on net economic 
"substance" rather than on the objective determinants listed in the 
Code, the substance versus form doctrine provides no framework for 
determining either when or how such should be done. Even were 
there guidelines for determining when substance should rule over 
form, because the Code specifies transactions only by reference to for-
mal characteristics, there often is no true substance that describes a 
taxpayer's exchanges, but only a choice of potentially applicable 
forms, one of which was chosen by the taxpayer accurately, and a dif-
ferent one of which may be chosen by a court. Finally, even if a single 
transaction could be said to describe the substance of the actions of 
one taxpayer accurately, it is just as likely as not that that transaction 
would misdescribe the actions of all the other parties to the exchange. 
The overwhelming contradictions in both the theory and the appli-
cation of substance versus form analysis to step transaction cases can 
be understood only when it is also understood that the doctrine is sim-
ply not what it purports to be. When it is acknowledged that the doc-
"functionally unrelated" the court meant that the so-called "redemption" had an independent 
effect, its statement is meaningless: every step, looked at individually, has an independent effect. 
It is only when steps are looked at together that they may be recharacterized. The buyout of B 
was a contemplated part of the transaction; and indeed there.was no evidence that any exchange 
would have occurred absent that step. If the court meant something else by its "functionally 
unrelated" language, it is not clear what that was. 
Professor Manning had suggested earlier that two parts of a legally interdependent transac-
tion may be treated as separate if one, and not the other, is pursuant to the "plan of reorganiza-
tion," thus focusing on the "plan" rather than on whether some exchange is functionally 
independent. See Manning, "In Pursuance of the Plan of Reorganization'~· The Scope of the 
Reorganization Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890-91 (1958). 
This does not adequately address the problem. If all the actions were planned together, and if 
taken together they do not constitute a reorganization, then it may be that the "plan" is simply 
not a plan of reorganization. Reliance on a "plan" provides no basis for determining what should 
and should not be included as parts of the plan. 
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trine is aimed at preventing tax-motivated behavior, a court's 
conclusion that the parties could have achieved their goals by different 
means, so they should be taxed as if they did so becomes understanda-
ble. All of a sudden, questions such as whether and when transac-
tional consistency should be required and which sequence of exchanges 
more "accurately" reflects the substance become readily answerable. 
Unfortunately, at the same time, any appearance of judicial honesty 
disappears. 
c. Substance versus form in defining relationships. In some 
cases, the substance versus form issue appears to have a fundamentally 
different role from that discussed above: rather than seeking to 
recharacterize transactions by focusing on the order of exchanges or 
by defining transactions by reference to their economic effect, the issue 
raised by these cases has to do initially with characterizing ongoing 
relationships. If A simply sells property to B, the exchange is obvi-
ously a sale. But what if A transfers some, but less than all, of his 
rights in that property? Depending on the extent of the rights trans-
ferred, the exchange may be characterized as a sale, a lease, a financing 
agreement, or any of numerous other transactions. Proper characteri-
zation, it seems, depends on the relationship between A and B and the 
property. If B "owns" the property after the exchange, the exchange 
is a sale. If A "owns" the property, then whatever the transaction is, it 
is not a sale. Essentially, rather than attempting to redefine what 
rights are exchanged for what other rights, these cases focus on defin-
ing the relationship190 caused by transfers which are acknowledged to 
have occurred.191 Unlike transactions, relationships do vary based on 
190. While it is suggested that these cases determine relationships such as ownership and do 
not characterize transactions, the two are admittedly not quite so readily distinguishable. Many 
cases attempt to determine ownership because the person in the relationship of "owner" is enti· 
tied to depreciation. However, one could point out that even depreciation is not relationship· 
oriented, but is transaction-dependent. While depreciation is intended to account for the gradual 
decline in value of property over its useful life, current depreciation provisions allow one to 
determine exactly when and what those deductions will be by reference to a single transaction -
the placing of the property in service. See I.R.C. § 168 (1982). Nonetheless, one must be the 
owner of property in order to place that property in service; hence, the significance of the per· 
son's relationship to the property. 
191. Although these cases do not explicitly acknowledge that they are applying the step 
transaction doctrine in conjunction with, or, more accurately, precedent to, determining the 
"substance" of the relationships involved, they are doing so. The transactions are most fre· 
quently structured by the taxpayers as sales and leasebacks. If the Internal Revenue Service and 
courts acknowledged that there were two separate exchanges, a sale and a later lease, they could 
not proceed to determine that the purported seller was still the owner and that no sale had ever 
occurred. Often the sale and leaseback are parts of a unified contractual arrangement, so that 
integration of the steps is beyond dispute. Even when that is not the case, however, the only issue 
seriously considered is the substance versus form question, not whether integration of the steps is 
initially appropriate. 
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actual economic substance, so that an analysis of the substance seems 
not only possible, but appropriate. Analysis of these cases reveals in-
teresting results. 
In Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co. 192 the taxpayer transferred 
legal title in some buildings to a bank as trustee for land-trust certifi-
cate holders. Pursuant to the same contract, the taxpayer leased the 
buildings for 99 years with an option to repurchase. The annual rental 
was five percent of the amount that had been paid to the taxpayer by 
the bank. The agreement provided for additional payments that 
would, over 49 years, equal the principal amount paid by the bank. 
Upon completion of those payments, the taxpayer could retain posses-
sion of the building without further cost. The Court explained that 
"[i]n the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, 
are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written docu-
ments are not rigidly binding."193 It hel4 that the substance of the 
agreement was more like a mortgage than a sale and leaseback, and 
that the taxpayer should be treated as the tax "owner" of the 
buildings. 
The Supreme ·Court's most recent and best known foray into the 
sale-leaseback issue took place in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States. 194 
Worthen Bank & Trust Co. owned land on which it wanted to build 
an office building. State and federal banking laws made that direct 
course impossible. Instead, Frank Lyon Co. leased the land from 
Worthen for 76 years, at an annual rent of $50 for the first 26 years, 
and higher amounts in later years. Lyon purchased the building from 
Worthen piece by piece as it was constructed, but the building was 
leased back to Worthen under a net lease. Worthen's rent to Lyon 
equaled Lyon's mortgage payments on the building. At all times, 
Worthen could acquire ownership of the building by paying to Lyon 
an amount equal to Lyon's original down payment plus 6% interest, in 
addition to the unpaid balance of Lyon's mortgage. The government 
argued that the transaction was not a sale and leaseback, but that in 
substance Worthen continued to be the owner of the building and 
Lyon was simply a conduit for Worthen's own mortgage payments. 
The Court treated Lyon as the owner of the property, stating that 
[w]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with eco-
nomic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regu-
latory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is 
192. 308 U.S. 252 (1939). 
193. 308 U.S. at 255. 
194. 435 U.S. 561 (1978). See also Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Fail-
ure of Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1981). 
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not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels 
attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights and du-
ties effectuated by the parties.195 
Lyon has been often cited, but for different propositions by differ-
ent courts.196 The Tax Court has recently found it to stand for "the 
principle that, in a sale-leaseback context, a nonuser-owner recipient 
of tax benefits must prove that his entry into the transaction was moti-
vated by a business purpose sufficient to justify the form of the transac-
tion." 197 While the court did not hold that business purpose alone is 
sufficient to determine whether a specific party is the owner of prop-
erty, it implied that if the form of a business transaction does not meet 
a minimum threshold of business purpose or economic objective, own-
ership of property may be determined according to what an objective 
observer may determine to be its substance.198 
One principle clearly established by Lyon, then, is that the same 
rights may be deemed ownership in one case and mere tenancy in an-
other, depending on the presence of business purpose. In these cases, 
no party is "the owner ... in any simple sense."199 Each of the parties 
has some rights; none of the parties has all; and looking to a business 
purpose at least avoids requiring a weighing of these rights against one 
another in all cases. 
Unfortunately, focusing on whether or not parties had a business 
purpose for structuring a transaction a certain way· in order to deter-
mine the substance of the relationships created thereby does create 
some problems. If nothing else, the focus suggested by the Court 
makes the parties' relative economic rights and liabilities of only sec-
195. 435 U.S. at 583-84. There are several other situations where transactions were en· 
couraged by regulatory realities. In Rev. Ru!. 83-142, 1983-2 C.B. 68, a foreign corporation 
incorporated, and then liquidated, a subsidiary in order to accomplish an exchange that could 
not have been accomplished more directly because of local law problems. Despite the business 
purpose for, and economic realities of, its creation, the transitory subsidiary was disregarded (at 
the taxpayer's request). In Rev. Ru!. 85-133, 1985-2 C.B. 192, banking law made technical com-
pliance with the installment sales provisions impossible. The Internal Revenue Service rejected 
the taxpayer's argument that the step transaction doctrine should apply and that, as in Rev. Rut. 
83-142, 1983-2 C.B. 68, the steps required by local law should be disregarded. The differcnc'!S in 
the rulings appear to be irreconcilable. 
196. See Simonson, Determining Tax Ownership of Leased Property, 38 TAX LAW. I, 18 
(1984) ("Despite the frequency with which the Lyon case is cited, the only enduring principles 
that can be derived from the majority opinion are that no single test is determinative of owner-
ship and that each case must be decided on its own complex and numerous facts and 
circumstances."). 
197. Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184, 201 (1983), ajfd. in part, revd. 
in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985). 
198. The attempt to determine who is, in substance, the owner then would appear to depend 
on facts such as which party has what benefits and liabilities and who has what investment in the 
property. See generally Simonson, supra note 196. 
199. 435 U.S. at 581. 
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ondary importance. The crux of Justice Stevens' lone dissent in Lyon 
is apparent in his first sentence: "In my judgment the controlling issue 
in this case is the economic relationship between [the parties];"200 and 
the majority opinion itself explained that generally "[i]n applying this 
doctrine of substance over form [we have] looked to the objective eco-
nomic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the 
parties employed."201 Nonetheless, when the Lyon majority looked at 
the "economic realities," those to which it gave the most significance 
were the objective legal factors that mandated the choice of a specific 
form rather than the economic rights which arose out of the arrange-
ment between the parties.202 The implication is that the transaction 
has the "substance" assigned to it by the taxpayer because it was en-
gaged in for some nontax reasons (business purpose). Thus, in one of 
the few situations where there may be ongoing economic relationships 
which may be characterized by terms (owner or lessee) which actually 
reflect different economic relationships, those economic relationships 
would seem to become irrelevant (or only marginally relevant). 
Another problem with Lyon is that it gives little guidance for de-
termining how ownership should be determined in the absence of a 
business purpose for the structure adopted by the parties. If parties 
are free to structure a transaction as either a sale-leaseback or as a 
financing transaction, and can achieve identical economic results from 
either structure, when will the parties' chosen form be respected for 
tax purposes? Unless Lyon also means that lack of business purpose is 
enough to justify rejecting the taxpayer's form (which would com-
pletely eliminate economic relationships from the equation), there 
must be some way to evaluate objectively the economic relationships 
200. 435 U.S. at 584. 
201. 435 U.S. at 573. 
202. The Court stated that 
[w]e, however, as did the District Court, find [these] ... economic realities of the transac-
tion: the competitive situation as it existed between Worthen and Union National Bank in 
1965 and the years immediately following; Worthen's undercapitalization; Worthen's conse-
quent inability, as a matter of legal restraint, to carry its building plans into effect by a 
conventional mortgage and other borrowing; the additional barriers imposed by the state 
and federal regulators; the suggestion, forthcoming from the state regulator, that Worthen 
possess an option to purchase; the requirement, from the federal regulator, that the building 
be owned by an independent third party; the presence of several finance organizations seri-
ously interested in participating in the transaction and in the resolution of Worthen's prob-
lem; the submission of formal proposals by several of those organizations; the bargaining 
process and period that ensued; the competitiveness of the bidding; the bona fide character 
of the negotiations; the three-party aspect of the transaction; Lyon's substantiality and its 
independence from Worthen; the fact that diversification was Lyon's principal motivation 
435 U.S. at 582. Note the extent to which these economic realities prove motive and do not 
describe the actual resultant relationship. This problem has not escaped the attention of other 
scholars. See, e.g., Del Cotto, Sale and Leaseback: A Hollow Sound When Tapped?, 37 TAX L. 
REV. 1, 30-31, 41-47 (1981). 
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growing out of a transaction so that one of the parties can be labeled 
"owner." Unfortunately, no one has yet been able to enunciate exactly 
how that determination can be made. Some suggest that ownership 
means a "realistic hope of profit."203 Others believe that it means a 
realistic possibility of loss.204 Most simply acknowledge that there is 
no accurate test. 20s 
This inability to articulate a means of determining the "substance" 
of ownership says more about the shortcomings of ownership as a con-
cept than it does about any shortcomings of tax attomeys.206 The 
problem is that the cases are generally concerned with determining 
which of two (or more) parties is the "owner" of a specific depreciable 
asset. But to the extent that the concept of ownership has any real 
meaning (outside of tax law), it relates not to an asset as a whole, but 
to certain rights to act with respect to that asset. While people often 
casually refer to "ownership" of property, "what one owns is properly 
not the [asset], but rather [certain] rights" with respect to the asset, 
such as current or future possession or use of the asset.207 At least 
under commonly accepted principles of property law, "[o]ne having a 
lesser estate [such as tenancy] may be an owner, and, indeed, there 
may be different estates in the same property, vested in different per-
sons, and each be an owner thereof. "20s 
Where one of the parties is the owner of certain property, in the 
sense that she owns all of the possible rights to possession and enjoy-
ment of that property, no court will be asked to determine ownership; 
when a court is asked to determine "ownership" of a particular asset, 
no such thing exists. To the extent that courts are attempting to 
ascribe to one party a relationship (ownership of the asset) that does 
not exist in the cases before them, it is understandable that they have a 
hard time getting it right. 209 
Another common situation in which tax consequences explicitly 
203. See Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377 (1980), revd. and remanded on other 
grounds, 670 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1982); Marsh, Tax Ownership of Real Estate, 39 TAX LAW. 563 
(1986) (suggesting that potential for appreciation should be the most significant determinant of 
ownership). 
204. See Simonson, supra note 196, at 20-24. 
205. Id. at 31. See also Cliff & Levine, Reflections on Ownership - Sales and Pledges of 
Installment Obligations, 39 TAX LAW. 37 (1985) (concept of ownership is necessarily imprecise, 
and no single test can be relied upon). 
206. In general, a group with very few, if any, shortcomings at all. For example, talk to my 
friend David Gerson. 
207. See 1 H. TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 4 (3d ed. 1939). 
208. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Walker, 45 Ohio St. 577, 16 N.E. 475, 480 (1888). 
209. One could imagine fairly straightforward ways of determining who is the "owner" of 
property, such as simply stating that the owner is the one with the most valuable rights in the 
property. Among the effects of such a rule would be that most property would be found to be 
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depend on characterization of the relationships created by an ex-
change, rather than on identification of the items exchanged, arises 
when courts and the Internal Revenue Service attempt to define corpo-
rate obligations as debt or equity. If the obligations represent owner-
ship of the corporation (equity), corresponding corporate payments 
are either dividends210 or stock redemptions.211 Neither is deductible 
by the paying corporation. If the obligations are debt instruments, 
payments are either interest (deductible to the payor under section 
163(a)) or tax-free payments of principal. Significant tax consequences 
thus depend on whether the relationship established by the share-
holder's transfer is ownership of the corporation. 
Generally, the difference between debt ahd equity is that equity 
represents an investment in the company, while the return on debt is 
more secure and not dependent on the company's performance. In 
those cases ]iard enough to attract attention, the obligations sought to 
be characterized have significant elements of both debt and equity but 
all of the elements of neither. Sometimes the obligations on their face 
have more risk (perhaps because they may be subordinated to other 
"owned" either by long-term tenants or by mortgagees; and no one connected with the tax law is 
willing even to contemplate the confusion and consternation that would follow. 
Even if a satisfactory test of ownership could be developed, it could not be consistently ap-
plied. Assuming such a test related to the value of certain rights and the realistic expectation or 
possibility of future gain or loss, ownership would necessarily be dependent on the value of the 
entire asset, because a substantial change in the asset's value would affect the relative value of the 
different rights as well as the different parties' realistic possibilities of gain or loss. Unfortu-
nately, while a determination of ownership is necessarily a determination of the economic rela-
tionship between a person and an asset, and while the significant (and defining) aspects of the 
relationship can vary from day to day (e.g., the value of a deed of trust securing a nonrecourse 
loan may vary in accordance with the value of the property securing it), determination of owner-
ship in the tax sense cannot change along with the changes in the economics that define it. If, 
under an objective test, A were found to be the owner of property on Monday, but on Wednesday 
substantial market changes made it so that B was the objective "owner," for tax purposes, A 
would still have to be considered to be the owner on Thursday morning. For an analysis of how 
and why courts could account for ownership changes even absent some observable exchange, see 
Rosenberg, Better To Bum Out Than To Fade Away? The Consequences of the Disposition of a 
Tax Shelter. 71 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 119 (1983). 
Arguably, tests for determining "ownership" could be enunciated if one takes into account 
the reasons for making the determination; and the above problems could be said to be nothing 
more than the result of removing the term "ownership" from context. By placing "ownership" 
in its appropriate context, one could simply ask questions such as: "Given all the facts, who 
should be entitled to the depreciation deductions for the decline in value of the property?" Un-
fortunately, merely rephrasing the question provides no answer. Perhaps the depreciation deduc-
tions should go to the person who bears the loss from the property's decline in value; but in many 
situations risk of loss is divided among two or more parties. In many others, depreciation is not 
based on the property's decline in value in any event. Real property is depreciable despite the 
likelihood in some cases that it will increase in value, and personal property is depreciable at a 
rate which often bears little relationship to the rate at which its value actually declines. See 
Steines, supra note 73, at 535-45. Nor does looking to congressional intent provide assistance. In 
these, as in most hard cases, Congress simply did not foresee the problems. 
210. I.R.C. §§ 301, 316 (1982). 
211. I.R.C. § 302 (1982). 
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creditors or because the corporation is thinly capitalized) and more 
upside potential (perhaps because of high interest conditioned on the 
company's performance) than "debt," but have less risk (because of 
priority over other shareholders and because payment is dependent 
not on profits but on simply avoiding bankruptcy) and upside potential 
than equity. Other times obligations appear to be straight debt, but 
the relationship between the corporation and the shareholder is such 
that the parties are unlikely to treat it as such.2 12 
Judicial attempts to determine whether obligations are debt or eq-
uity have been summarized by professors Bittker and Eustice: "[I]t is 
well established that the formal terms [of the instrument] are not deci-
sive . . . . On the other hand, no alternative standards can be distilled 
from the viper's tangle of cases, which commonly refer to such general 
principles as ... 'substance over form,' 'business purpose,' 'tax avoid-
ance,' and the like."213 Neither legislative nor administrative action 
has resulted in a more reasoned or logical approach to the problem, 
however. After failing in an earlier attempt to codify definitions of 
debt and equity,214 Congress in 1969 enacted section 385, which au-
thorized the Treasury to draw up workable definitions. Treasury has 
tried to do so three different times and has yet to approach success. 
To some extent, the problems in determining whether certain obli-
gations are debt or equity mirror problems found in several other areas 
of tax law: Exchanges (i.e., payments) must be classified as a certain 
kind of transaction (e.g., interest payment or dividend distribution or 
rent). Such classification requires a particularized labeling of relation-
ships (e.g., owner or creditor or tenant) when none of the possible la-
bels describe the relationships that actually exist. 
Another example of the same problem involves determining 
whether transfers from one person to another are gifts or compensa-
tion: The answer depends on whether the payments are compensation 
for past or future services by the recipient (or someone else), or 
whether they are made out of detached and disinterested generosity.215 
But in fact, when cases come up, the truth lies somewhere in the mid-
dle. Similarly, whether payments from a corporation to a shareholder 
212. For example, a sole shareholder is unlikely to enforce the terms of a debt instrument 
against her own corporation. See, e.g., Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408 
(1954), affd., 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957) (notes were not 
debt because controlling shareholder would not enforce them to corporation's detriment). 
213. B. BrITKER & J. EusncE, supra note 34, ~ 4.04. 
214. Definitions were passed by the House and rejected by the Senate in 1954. See H.R. 
8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 312(b)-312(d) (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 42 
(1954). 
215. See Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
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are dividends or compensation for services depends on establishing 
which extreme is the case when the reality is simply somewhere be-
tween the two. 
The result is that when there are easy cases, description of the sub-
stance is simple. When there are hard cases, all available descriptions 
of the substance are simply wrong. 
4. The Real Basis for the Doctrines 
At this point, one might question the validity of much of the judi-
cial analyses of tax cases. "Business purpose" is supposedly a require-
ment of certain statutes, but it appears to be relevant only as a means 
of determining whether the facts of a case are different from those 
alleged by the taxpayer. The relevant facts must be determined so that 
the appropriate law can be applied; but there is no way to determine 
what those facts (the "real" exchanges) are, so that a court's view of 
the "facts" depends more on what law it wants to apply than on any 
kind of objective observation of facts. Transactions are to be charac-
terized as those which reflect the "substance" of the facts; but· the facts 
often have different substance for the different taxpayers involved. 
Other times none of the potentially applicable characterizations accu-
rately reflect the substance from anyone's point of view. Still other 
times, several different provisions, with very different tax conse-
quences, can describe a single exchange equally well. Citizens may do 
whatever they wish to avoid taxes; but if actions are seen as motivated 
by tax avoidance rather than by a business purpose, the desired tax 
consequences may not be available. Then again, maybe they will be. 
All of these inconsistencies flow from the same basic systemic 
flaws: (1) the system attempts to force precise transactional definitions 
on imprecise relationships; (2) even where the facts of a case accu-
rately reflect the precise statutory requirements for certain tax-favored 
exchanges, they may not reflect the behavior that Congress sought to 
encourage (or to avoid discouraging) because the statutory require-
ments simply do not mirror the statutory objectives,· and (3) in any 
system where a person's taxable income and ultimate liability depend 
on his transactions rather than on accurate measurement of economic 
income, taxpayers will be encouraged to engage in tax-favored transac-
tions rather than in the most economically productive activities. As a 
result, the system is inherently inaccurate both in defining transactions 
and in defining income by way of transactions. Left unchecked, these 
problems would allow taxpayers to avoid taxes through economically 
meaningless (or worse) activity. 
Those charged with administering and enforcing the tax laws have 
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responded to the flaws caused by the system's transaction focus by 
enunciating and applying all of the doctrines discussed above - busi-
ness purpose, step transaction, and substance versus form. None of 
these doctrines adequately addresses the problems, however, because 
these doctrines are children of the same system that created the 
problems. The problems are the result of basing taxation on transac-
tions. The purported solutions are all simply ex post justifications for 
recharacterizing one transaction as some different one, resulting in 
neither accuracy nor consistency. 
While courts have made a _point of explaining that tax minimiza-
tion is not "bad,"216 the truth is that some tax minimization is bad and 
is condemned by the courts. All of the above doctrines were designed 
essentially to combat it. The problem is that when doctrines address 
tax minimization only within the context of determining whether some 
implicit statutory requirement is met (business purpose), whether the 
"facts" are different from those embodied in legal contracts (step 
transactions), or whether the "substance" of a transaction is different 
from its form, the response seems to be simply that tax minimization 
becomes "bad" only when the taxpayer's exchanges can somehow be 
recharacterized as a different transaction from that posited by the tax-
payer. In the law of tax avoidance, the remedy determines the rights. 
Sometimes courts will hold that the "facts" are different from those 
alleged by the µixpayer; other times they will instead hold that the 
substance of the exchange is different from its form. In either case, the 
unexpressed reasoning behind the decision is the same: If the transac-
tion can be recharacterized, tax minimization becomes tax avoidance 
and is bad. If the taxpayer was motivated by tax avoidance but there 
is no other label we can readily put on her exchanges, her behavior is 
only tax minimization and is good. 
Viewing these doctrines as mere devices to combat tax avoidance 
when the recharacterization remedy is available also serves to explain 
why the business purpose test for either doctrine does not always 
"work." If the doctrines are nothing more than justifications for pun-
ishing certain transactions fraught with tax avoidance, it would make 
sense that when taxpayers engage in transactions that have a legiti-
mate business purpose and are not motivated by tax avoidance those 
taxpayers should not be punished. It should not be surprising that the 
business purpose test does not "work" only in those cases in which its 
216. "[A] man's motive to avoid taxation will not establish his liability if the transaction does 
not do so without it." Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 
296 U.S. 641 (1936). See generally Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax 
Avoidance, 71 YALE L.J. 440 (1968). 
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application might do something other than punish tax avoidance. In 
cases such as Zenz v. Quinlivan 217 and Revenue Ruling 83-142218 the 
taxpayer had a business purpose for his actions, but those actions were 
nonetheless integrated for the taxpayer's benefit. If viewed as excep-
tions to a general rule that determines "facts" by reference to business 
purpose, these cases do not make sense. When viewed from the per-
spective of a doctrine which is addressed to punishing tax avoidance 
and rewarding economically motivated behavior, they make perfect 
sense.219 
Use of these doctrines to combat tax avoidance does have some 
benefits. It allows the courts and the Internal Revenue Service to 
counter abuses, and it allows them to do so in a manner that appears 
(to some) to be consistent with the system and with the rule of law. 
Rather than stating that tax avoidance is wrong but our weapons 
against it are weak, we can explain that tax minimization is not tax 
avoidance and is not therefore wrong; sometimes the taxpayer simply 
"did" something other than what she thought she had done. Courts 
and the Internal Revenue Service can enforce equity under the guise of 
determining "facts" or "substance," thus protecting the image of pre-
cision while fighting some of its untoward consequences.22° 
But use of the business purpose, step transaction, and substance 
versus form rationales for punishing tax avoidance does have some 
flaws. Essentially, there are three problems with this approach: (1) it 
is misunderstood; (2) it is inaccurate; and (3) it is misdirected. 
If the courts and Internal Revenue Service acknowledged the true 
role of the step transaction and substance versus form doctrines as ex 
217. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954). 
218. 1983-2 C.B. 68. 
219. Analysis of the few substance versus form cases which have resulted in recharacteriza-
tion of the "substance" in the taxpayer's favor reveals that the taxpayer has "merited" relief from 
the purported substance by acting without a tax avoidance motive. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-142, 
supra note 218; Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985) (taxpayer was obliger of 
debt in substance, even though in form her corporation was debtor). 
220. For a discussion of the value of this image, see P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND 
SOCIETY IN TRANSmoN: TOWARD REsPONSIVE LAW 68-70 (1978). Adoption of "equitable" 
principles in these cases is probably more common than might appear. A kind of perceived 
equitable estoppel might be behind situations such as that in Rev. Rul. 72-354, 1972-2 C.B. 216 
(sale and reacquisition of stock held separate) and cases such as Grove v. Commissioner, 490 
F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1973), and Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684 (1974), affd., 523 F.2d 1308 
(8th Cir. 1975) (charitable contributions and repurchases of the contributed property from the 
charity held separate). In these situations, taxpayers who disposed of property for tax purposes 
and with the intention of reacquiring the transferred property were not subjected to having their 
transactions recharacterized. Cf McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947) (denied 
losses on stock sales where sales by one spouse matched by identical purchases by other spouse). 
Very possibly, it was believed that because the taxpayers incurred a risk of not reacquiring the 
sought after property and because that risk was incurred in reliance on express statutory provi-
sions, some sort of equitable estoppel against the government was in order. 
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post justifications for punishing tax avoidance when the facts are close 
enough to some other transaction so that either the "facts" or the 
"substance" of the exchange can be said to be described by that other 
transaction, at least everyone would understand both the principles to 
be applied and the relevant facts. Because the doctrines are instead 
supposed to be objective observations of fact or law, however, their 
roles are often fundamentally misconceived. Courts may be convinced 
that they are reaching an objective determination of an exchange when 
there is no such thing. While tort scholars long ago realized that prox-
imate cause is merely identifying circumstances where "the law is jus-
tified in imposing liability"221 and that liability must therefore be 
rooted in fairness at least as much as in causation, tax lawyers and 
courts are still attempting to figure out objective causation - a task 
which is not only fruitless but also misleading. As a result, a court 
may cling to a test such as business purpose, intent, or binding com-
mitment, or to a concept such as transactional consistency, because 
that court, or one by whose decision it is bound, used that test in a 
previous decision. By so doing, it may reach an inappropriate result in 
the case before it, because it fails to understand that really the proper 
test is a function of the desired result rather than vice versa. 
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
Because the current doctrines aimed at countervailing the inherent 
flaws of a transaction-based system of taxation are misdirected, the 
question becomes whether there is any more rational way to deal with 
these problems. The problems will not disappear, and, unless some 
alternative approach is available, it may be that misdirected solutions 
are better than none at all. What follows is the outline of a way of 
viewing and solving these problems which, while not without its own 
drawbacks, may provide the foundation for a more reasoned and justi-
fied approach to the problems. 
A. Introduction 
1. Defining the Problem 
Because it measures income and imposes liability by reference to 
exchanges and transactions, our system impacts on every transaction 
(and every failure to engage in a transaction) in which a person might 
otherwise take part. Some transactions result in tax liability in excess 
221. w. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 39, at 264. 
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of the income generated by the tax-significant exchange;222 others may 
result in accurate taxation of accrued income; and, indeed, some trans-
actions may even result in a negative rate of tax on accrued income.223 
Because every taxpayer has a potentially infinite number of alter-
native transactions available, each with different tax consequences, 
every taxpayer's choice will theoretically be impacted by the applica-
ble tax consequences. To the extent that some transaction generates 
more tax liability than would some alternative behavior, the tax laws 
will tend to discourage it when compared with that favorably taxed 
alternative. To the extent that a certain transaction generates less tax 
than some other alternative, the tax laws will tend to encourage it, as 
opposed to the more highly taxed avenue. On the other hand, no 
choice will be governed entirely by tax consequences: no taxpayer 
would enter into a transaction that generates even $1,000,000 in tax 
savings if the transaction will also result in a $1,500,000 economic 
loss. Unless the economics are sufficiently acceptable so that the net 
after-tax result, taking into account both economic and tax conse-
quences, is positive, the transaction will be foregone. As a result, to 
condition tax benefits on the presence of some "business purpose" is, 
in reality, to do nothing at all.224 
Nor is conditioning tax benefits on the taxpayer's pursuit of some 
pre-tax profit, either in gross-dollar or present-value terms, an accepta-
ble alternative. Congress has specifically enacted many tax benefits 
expressly to encourage taxpayers to engage in transactions which 
would be economically unproductive absent the tax incentive. In ad-
dition, the worst tax abuses would not be made more tolerable by the 
presence of some minimal pre-tax profit. 
Similarly, to withdraw tax benefits where the taxpayer fails to take 
some economic risk, as the law seems to do in many situations, ap-
pears to lack any reasoned justification. Many risk-free investments 
are motivated by a desire to avoid risk, not by a desire to avoid taxes; 
and the absence of risk itself indicates nothing about tax avoidance. 
As a corollary, the presence of economic risk is no indication of the 
absence of tax avoidance. If someone is avoiding taxes that she ought 
222. Any sale or exchange of appreciated property results in taxation of gain accrued prior to 
the sale, even if the sale or exchange itself is a losing proposition. See supra text at note 32. 
223. Any sale or exchange of property that had declined in value prior to the sale results in 
such a negative tax. 
224. One might suggest that there are certain activities that result in tax savings but that 
have no economic effect at all, and taxpayers may at least engage in these kinds of activities solely 
for their tax consequences. Such a suggestion misses the point. Every action necessarily has 
some economic effect - even an action that simply maintains the status quo (e.g., if a taxpayer 
refrains from selling an asset). 
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to pay, the fact that her plan requires her to engage in some economi-
cally risky (or, even counterproductive) activity does not itself make 
that plan any more productive or desirable. At most, the presence of 
economic risk might make a taxpayer less inclined to engage in some 
activity, but it cannot make the activity itself less inclined towards tax 
avoidance. One might analogize tax avoidance to robbery from the 
public fisc. The presence of economic risk, like the presence of a dan-
gerous neighborhood surrounding a vault that houses some public 
funds, may make that robbery less likely to occur, but it does not make 
the taking of funds from that dangerous vault any less of a robbery 
when it does occur; nor does it make that robbery any more acceptable 
than, for example, robbery of a smaller amount from a less dangerous 
vault. 
Many have responded to this apparent dilemma by claiming that 
tax avoidance ought to be irrelevant to the determination of tax liabil-
ity. 225 But the fact rem,ains that the system is subject to abuse and 
that avoidance-motivated taxpayers do abuse the system.226 Because 
the system focuses on transactions rather than on income, and because 
those transactions themselves are not always defined in a way that. cor-
relates with their underlying purpose, the system is easily subject to 
manipulation. Taxpaye~s can tailor their conduct in ways that in-
crease the distortions in the system, decrease their share of tax liabil-
ity, and produce results that are economically either meaningless, or 
worse, undesirable. Unfortunately, purely legislative correction of the 
mismeasurements that create the problems is sometimes impossible, 
and is always too late. As long as many of the country's best lawyers 
continue to be so well paid for finding and maximizing the mis-
measurements that lead to abuse, it is likely that the lawyers and their 
clients will almost always remain at least a year or two ahead of legis-
lators' attempts to close down the mines. 
Nor does the fact that current approaches to tax avoidance are 
irrational imply that tax avoidance cannot be dealt with reasonably. It 
225. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 62, at 743; Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in 
Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859 (1982); Summers, A Critique of the Business-Purpose Doctrine, 
41 OR. L. REv. 38 (1961). But see Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 
MICH. L. REv. 1021, 1052 (1953) (admitting that the current judicial approaches to tax avoid-
ance are not necessarily logically consistent, but upholding the need to protect the federal reve-
nues from tax avoidance, hoping that somehow "legal principles will emerge"). 
Professor Blum has suggested that these problems make any unifying theory of the role of 
form or substance simply unattainable. See Blum, The Importance of Form in the Taxation of 
Corporate Transactions, 54 TAXES 613, 621 (1976). 
226. See Cohen, Tax Avoidance Purpose as a Statutory Text [sic] in Tax Legislation, 9 TUL. 
TAX INsr. 229 (1960) (concluding that statutory tests that refer to tax-avoidance motive are the 
result of Congress' inability to deal adequately with the problems before it). 
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means only that it has not been so dealt with yet. The remainder of 
this article suggests and explores some consistent and workable alter-
natives to current judicial analysis. 
2. Defining Tax Avoidance 
Any reasoned approach to tax avoidance ought to begin with a 
question that, surprisingly, has generally been ignored to date: What 
is tax avoidance? Because some tax-motivated behavior is not only 
sanctioned, but also encouraged and relied on by Congress, while 
other. such behavior is clearly frowned upon, it must be apparent that 
tax-motivated behavior is not per se tax avoidance. The first step is 
thus to determine when tax-motivated behavior becomes tax avoidance 
- what distinguishes acceptable tax-motivated behavior from abusive 
tax-motivated behavior. 
Obviously, any transaction that results in the accurate measure-
ment of accrued income cannot realistically be said to result in the 
"avoidance" of any tax, regardless of the taxpayer's motive; and any 
statutory provision that accurately measures the taxpayer's accrued in-
come cannot really be subject to abuse. There can be no tax avoidance 
absent some provision that undermeasures the taxpayer's economic 
income. 
Equally obvious is the fact that many provisions that result in 
mismeasurement of economic income have been enacted with the 
knowledge and expectation that they will do so, and that this under-
measurement of economic income will encourage certain desirable tax-
payer behavior, which will in turn promote some desired congressional 
goal. A tax incentive that achieves a congressional purpose by re-
warding the taxpayer who acts in the manner sought to be encouraged 
by Congress is not bad, nor is the taxpayer who carries out the in-
tended legislative purpose and who is rewarded accordingly engaging 
in tax avoidance. The result of ~hese fairly obvious statements is that 
there can be tax avoidance only when (1) some Code provision mis-
measures economic income; and (2) that mismeasurement · accompa-
nies behavior that fails to implement the congressional purpose 
underlying that Code provision. 
Essentially, there are two different ways that a provision might re-
ward behavior that is in fact inconsistent with the provision's underly-
ing aim: (1) a statute may fail to encourage the specifically desired 
exchanges or transactions at which it is aimed; or (2) a desired trans-
action may fail to further the general legislative goals which it was 
intended to implement. Both of these possibilities are necessary conse-
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quences of any transaction-based system, and both merit further 
analysis. 
Because the tax system imposes taxation on transactions and ex-
changes, the specific taxpayer conduct at the foundation of any incen-
tive will usually be the taxpayer's engaging in some exchange. For 
administrative purposes, these exchanges must at least in the first in-
stance be defined in terms of objectively verifiable criteria. As previ-
ously noted, nonrecognition treatment is generally given to exchanges 
that meet certain numerical requirements rather than to exchanges 
that work no change in substance. Accelerated depreciation may have 
been enacted to assist the user of depreciable property but, for admin-
istrative purposes, the benefits go to the "owner," a term that, unlike 
"user," is generally easily and objectively represented by possession of 
legal title. Congress meant to allow corporations to deduct payments 
that were necessary costs of doing business, and to disallow any deduc-
tion for payments that represent mere distributions of profits. In order 
to create some certainty as to specific payments, however, it allows 
deduction for payments on "debt" and not for payments on "equity." 
The reason is that, at least initially, the distinction between debt and 
equity, unlike that between costs of doing business and distribution of 
profits, is objectively determinable by reference to existing documents. 
In all of these examples, transactions are defined by, and tax conse-
quences are conditioned on, criteria which are objectively verifiable 
but which do not always coincide with the activity or relationship 
sought to be encouraged. When a taxpayer takes actions to fit within 
some objective statutory definition, while failing actually to engage in 
the underlying behavior for which that definition is intended to substi-
tute, he is engaging in tax avoidance. 
Even if a taxpayer engages in the very transaction encouraged by 
Congress, the potential for abuse exists. Although tax benefits are 
usually conditioned on a taxpayer engaging (or failing to engage) in 
certain transactions, the congressional goals which underlie those ben-
efits are rarely fulfilled by the mere completion of those transactions. 
Instead, those goals often relate to the taxpayer's achievement of some 
desirable status, and the favored transaction is generally one which 
may tend to, but does not always, produce that desired ultimate result 
or status. Again, examples are numerous. Congress allows the ac-
crued value of annuities227 and of life insurance22s to escape current 
taxation primarily in order to encourage taxpayers to save; and gener-
227. l.R.C. § 72 (1982). 
228. I.R.C. § 101 (1982). 
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ally the purchase of annuities and insurance has the intended result. 
But the purchase of an annuity or insurance policy does not guarantee 
savings. Where that purchase is accompanied by some other activity 
that reduces the purchaser's net worth (such as incurring a debt), the 
terms (le., purchase of an annuity), but not the goal (le., increased 
savings), of the incentive provisions have been met. 
Similarly, to the extent that the exemption from taxation of unreal-
ized gains is premised on considerations aside from administrative 
convenience, at least one such consideration is that the taxpayer who 
has not yet realized her gain has no cash to pay tax. Where nonreal-
ization is accompanied by other transactions, such as borrowing, 
which generate cash without tax liability, at least one purpose of the 
realization requirement remains unfulfilled. 
What the above implies is that the converse of tax avoidance is not 
some generalized "business purpose." Instead, tax avoidance exists 
only when there is a convergence of undermeasurement of economic 
income with a failure to achieve the specific goals underlying the pro-
vision that allows for that undermeasurement. If any provision accu-
rately measures income, that provision is inherently not sul;>ject to 
abuse. If any provision undermeasures income, that provision is being 
abused unless both (1) the taxpayer engages in the actual exchange (or 
lack of exchange) whose concept underlies the objective statutory defi-
nition, and (2) the taxpayer does not engage in any other behavior 
whose effect tends to cancel the desired impact of the tax-favored 
transaction. 
3. Remedying Tax Avoidance 
When tax avoidance is so defined, an appropriate remedy becomes 
apparent: to the extent that the purpose of some provision that un-
dermeasures economic income is being defeated, the benefit afforded 
by that provision ought to be removed. To the extent that the un-
dermeasurement benefit of any provision is removed, the taxpayer's 
income will be measured accurately, so that no opportunity for tax 
avoidance exists. 
While this definition of, and suggested remedy for, tax avoidance 
does not alone solve all of the problems discussed above, it does at 
least provide a firm conceptual foundation upon which solutions can 
be built. What follows is a logical and workable framework for those 
solutions. 
B. Defining the Transaction 
The approach to tax avoidance suggested above and explored here-
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after suggests that tax avoidance can exist even when the facts indicate 
that the statutory requirements of some provision have been met, and 
that tax avoidance can be remedied without holding that either the 
facts or any particular statutory provision are something different 
from what they are. Acknowledgement of these possibilities would 
have significant implications for tax cases. Once a redetermination of 
the "facts" of an exchange is no longer seen as the major remedy for 
undesirable tax-motivated behavior, administrators and courts 
charged with determining the facts surrounding a given transaction 
will no longer need to precede that "factual" determination with an 
analysis of whether there has been "tax avoidance" and will no longer 
need to premise that "factual" determination on an unspoken prede-
termination with respect to tax avoidance. Instead, courts and the In-
ternal Revenue Service could view tax cases as potentially raising two 
sequential, but fundamentally different, inquiries: (1) What is the 
transaction that has occurred? and (2) To what extent has the tax-
payer engaged in tax avoidance? 
While new to tax cases, this two-level inquiry has deep roots in 
many other areas of the law. Tort cases, for example, always require 
that a determination of the facts precede a judgment as to whether 
there has been negligence. Similarly, the initial inquiry suggested 
above is essentially a factual one; the second issue, like a finding of 
negligence, is a mixed question of law and fact. 
Of course, merely segregating the appropriate inquiries without 
more does not solve all problems; as with tort cases, each of the two 
inquiries must be defined with sufficient precision to allow it to be di-
rectly addressed. But segregation of the inquiries does allow for a de-
gree of precision within each issue that may be new to tax law. 
Because the first inquiry suggested above is a determination of the rel-
evant "facts," the first step towards more precise definition of that in-
quiry is a determination of which facts to look for; if the ultimate 
"factual" finding is a decision that some specified relationship exists or 
that some transaction has occurred, how does one reach that decision? 
In line with both the above approach and with generally applicable 
principles of tax law, a determination of what transaction has occurred 
ought to rest only on the legal relationships among the parties.229 A 
significant reason for basing taxation on transactions rather than on 
economic income is that economic relationships are simply too diffi-
cult to measure; on the other hand, legal relationships are generally 
229. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (it is state law as deter-
mined by the federal court that determines real legal rights). 
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clear-cut and readily determinable. Indeed, with respect to relation-
ships such as "ownership," the reasonableness of basing the relation-
ship on legal i;ights ought to be self-evident. As previously explained, 
there is no "fact" of ownership at all. Almost the first thing any first-
year law student learns in her property class is that property does not 
have some natural "owner," but that "ownership" is merely a legal 
term applied to describe a certain bundle of legal rights which one 
person has with respect to a certain asset. To assert that "ownership" 
is a question of "fact" rather than of law is to claim that the existence 
of some inherently legal relationship can be described without refer-
ence to the law. It simply makes no sense. 
Even aside from relationships that can be explained only in terms 
of their legal foundation, tax consequences generally are dependent in 
the first instance on a person's legal rights rather than on his economic 
intentions or expectations. The employee who expects a bonus is not 
taxed on it until and unless it is received or the employee's legal rights 
become fixed; the businessperson who establishes good working rela-
tionships is not taxed on their value until they translate into receipt of 
some legal right. Characterization of payments as "alimony,"230 of 
transfers as "completed gifts,"231 of relationships as "ownership," or 
of entities as corporations, partnerships, or trusts232 has always been 
based on examination of the parties' legal rights and liabilities. Rela-
tionships with some economic benefit which cannot be translated into 
the receipt or accrual of an actual legal right, while possibly relevant 
in determining true economic income, are essentially ignored for tax 
purposes. 
Basing the facts on a determination of the legal rights and liabili-
ties created by the parties does not mean that issues such as the inten-
tion and purpose of the parties are irrelevant. While it is the federal 
tax law that characterizes relationships based on legal rights, it is rele-
vant state law that determines the rights and liabilities on which that 
characterization depends. The determination of what is a single "ex-
change" is, as most other facts in tax, ultimately a question of legal 
relationships, and the legal relationships involved are necessarily those 
created under the relevant state laws. Whether purportedly separate 
exchanges should be integrated ought to depend simply on whether 
the exchanges form an integrated contract under basic principles of 
contract law. Under those principles, a "contract is entire when by its 
terms, nature, and purpose it contemplates and intends that each and 
230. I.R.C. § 71 (Supp. IV 1986). 
231. E.g., Bosch, 387 U.S. 456. 
232. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 to -4 (as amended in 1986). 
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all of its parts and considerations shall be common to the other and 
interdependent. "233 Essentially, if one party can enforce one part of 
an overall agreement (i.e., one exchange) against another, based upon 
the consideration provided by another part of that overall agreement 
(i.e., a different, but integrated exchange), then the exchanges are part 
of an integrated contract and ought to be treated as such. If the ex-
chang~s can be separately, and independently, enforced, they should 
be treated as separate. In determining whether a contract is inte-
grated, Professor Williston suggested that "[t]he essential test ... can 
be nothing else than the answer to an inquiry whether the parties as-
sented to all the promises as a single whole, so that there would have 
been no bargain whatever, if any promise or set of promises were 
struck out."234 
Thus, applying state contract law to redetermine what the parties 
would or would not have assented to might well involve inquiry into 
their intent and purpose. Nonetheless, the inquiry is fundamentally 
different from, and more reasonable than, the intent or business pur-
pose test sometimes used for application of the step transaction doc-
trine. Rather than sometimes basing integration on the intent of only 
one of the two (or more) parties to a series of exchanges, and other 
times conditioning integration on mutual intention without providing 
any reasoned basis for determining when either individual or mutual 
intention should be the basis for decision, a test that looks to contract 
law would make clear what intention is relevant (mutual intention of 
the parties) and why it is relevant (to determine the understandings 
reached between or among the parties). 
Looking to contracts to determine when exchanges are integrated 
would not mean always accepting at face value the documents submit-
ted by the parties. Contract law does not always restrict itself to the 
documents, but can and often must take into account parol evidence to 
determine the real, rather than merely the written, agreement of the 
parties. In addition, where a single document (or several simultane-
ously executed documents) sets out a series of exchanges, whether 
those exchanges are understood by the parties to be mutually interde-
pendent is simply unascertafo.able without reference to extrinsic facts. 
Contracts which purport to establish as separate a sale and leaseback, 
a sale and nonrecourse (or, for that matter, recourse) loan, a dividend 
and recontribution, or any number of other possibly interdependent 
exchanges may well lack the independence asserted therein. Further 
233. First Seattle Dexter Horton Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1242, 1247, ajfd., 
77 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1935). See generally Paul & Zimet, supra note 104, at 235-54. 
234. 6 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS§ 863 (3d ed. 1957). 
November 1988] Tax Avoidance 451 
factual inquiry will often be necessary, but at least the decisionmaker 
and the parties will all be inquiring after the same facts. 
Conditioning the determination of transactions on legal relation-
ships may not be as "helpful" to the government in some circum-
stances as is the current approach. If transactions between individuals 
and their controlled entities are respected as separate in the absence of 
"mutual" intent sufficient to establish contractual interdependence, 
much self-dealing will be possible. On the other hand, in a system that 
generally recognizes as separate taxable entities an individual and her 
wholly owned corporation, some self-dealing is inevitable. Such po-
tential "abuse" would seem to be best dealt with by provisions which 
recognize the possibility and address it directly, rather than by artifi-
cial restructuring of the "facts" when the government sees fit. 
Nor will determination of the facts of an exchange always be as 
simple as explaining the legal foundation for that determination. Be-
cause the government is not a party to the negotiations or to the con-
tracts which it seeks to enforce (either as written or as "intended"), 
and because the government's interest will usually be adverse to the 
interests of the other parties, proof will be difficult and collusion be-
tween taxpayers will be tempting. Indeed, it may be that certain fac-
tual presumptions in the government's favor would be appropriate. 
On the other hand, only by consistently using some logical basis 
for determining contractual integration will the parties know what it 
is they are attempting to prove. And any attempt to apply a standard 
for integration other than that established by contract law must be 
either nothing more than a rationalization for some other predeter-
mined (but not necessarily predictable) outcome or else inherently 
doomed to failure. 
In addition, confining a determination of "facts" to a finding of 
legal relationships will force courts to focus with a more critical eye on 
the substance of those legal relationships. If the judiciary were forced 
to determine what legal relationships exist, it could not so easily find 
that some legal contract does not exist just because it was motivated by 
tax avoidance; and what would necessarily follow would be an accu-
rate analysis of what the real legal relationships are.235 
235. Cases involving the acquisition of property subject to nonrecourse debt in excess of the 
property's value provide a good example of what might be gained by requiring courts to focus on 
existing legal relationships. In these cases, some courts have held that property sold (in the 
sense, at least, that legal title passed to the purchaser) subject to such debt was not sold, Estate of 
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), thereby denying the very existence of 
legally enforceable agreements. Even in situations where the Internal Revenue Service has ac-
knowledged that a sale has occurred, it has asserted that an admittedly enforceable, legally bind-
ing obligation was, for tax purposes, not an obligation at all. See Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 
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By giving credence to blatantly false assertions that legal relation-
ships simply do not exist, current doctrines allow decisionmakers to 
avoid determinirig what these relationships really are. On the other 
hand, admitting the existence of what is, and then determining what it 
is, could result in decisions that are both more accurate and more ef-
fective in combatting tax avoidance. 236 · 
58 (nonrecourse debt in excess of property's fair market value not included in the purchaser's 
basis because unlikely that it would be paid). 
236. For example, assume that P purchases a building from S for $10,000 cash and takes the 
building subject to a nonrecourse debt of $190,000, payable in full, with all accumulated interest, 
at the end of 30 years. Further assume that the building is worth only $10,000 at the time of the 
purchase. A straightforward analysis of the legal situation created by this sale would be that P 
becomes the owner of the building upon taking legal title thereto, and that P's cost for the build-
ing consists of two parts: (1) a current payment of $10,000 cash, and {2) an obligation to transfer 
to Sin 30 years the lesser of $190,000 plus accumulated interest or the building. (One might 
suggest that to require a court, or the Internal Revenue Service, to determine what the building 
will be worth at the end of 30 years would be too burdensome. It is not. Current valuation of 
any asset is based, in large part, on the asset's predicted income stream. As a result, under this 
model, the step from current to future valuation involves taking the present value of the property 
and decreasing that amount by the predicted economic depreciation. Because the economic de· 
preciation of any particular asset may be difficult to determine, the process might be simplified by 
applying the alternative depreciation schedule of I.R.C. § 168(g) (1982), which at least roughly 
approximates economic depreciation, to the present value of the asset in question. The possible 
use of the § 168(g) schedule to approximate, or, perhaps more accurately, substitute for, eco-
nomic depreciation, is suggested by Cunningham & Schenk, How To Tax the House That Jack 
Built, 43 TAX L. REv. (forthcoming). 
If the building had a predicted future value of, for example, $500 (the predicted future value 
of any depreciable property would always be less than its current value under the approach 
suggested above), P's real cost for the building would be $10,000 plus the lesser of (1) the present 
value of $190,000 plus interest payable in 30 years or (2) the present value of an obligation to 
transfer property worth $500 at the end of 30 years, or a total of about $10,040. (Of coursr, the 
exact present value of a future obligation would depend on the discount rate used. The simplest 
rate to use would be the applicable federal rate on instruments of similar term, because that rate 
is published monthly by the Internal Revenue Service.) By focusing on the legal relationships 
rather than denying their existence, the legal sale could be accurately characterized as a sale, the 
legal debt could be accurately characterized as a debt, and the highly inflated basis sought by the 
taxpayer would nonetheless be disallowed. As Freud suggested, denial of reality, and the 
problems that accompany that denial, is simply unnecessary. See generally S. FREUD, THE 
PROBLEM OF ANXIETY (H. Bunker trans. 1936); s. FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 
(A. Brill trans. 3d ed. 1933). (It may be that cases such as Franklin are aimed at the transfer of 
depreciation deductions from Seller to Buyer as much as at the inflation of the amount of those 
deductions. To the extent that free transferability of tax benefits is undesirable, the problem can 
be best addressed by the method suggested infra in the text at note 317.) 
If the sale discussed above occurred in conjunction with a lease from P to S for "rent" of 
$20,000 per year, and if $20,000 "interest" were payable annually (rather than compounding 
until due in year 30), the "facts" would more closely resemble those of the Franklin case; deter-
mining the actual legal relationships might be somewhat more difficult but it would not be any 
less appropriate. In truth, it is doubtful that such documents would accurately reflect the legal 
relationships between the parties. Instead, it is likely that the contracts would be integrated 
under state law (indeed, it is almost impossible to imagine why S would lease property worth 
$20,000 for $20,000 per year if he could separately enforce P's obligation to pay $20,000 per year 
interest). If the sale and leaseback were treated as an integrated contract, then even though the 
legal obligations created by that contract might require P and S to exchange checks for $20,000 
per year, it is doubtful that those amounts would be legally characterized as "rent" and "inter-
est,'' respectively. The amount of the payment from S to P that would be characterized as rent 
would not exceed the property's fair rental value, and the excess would be found to be nothing 
more than consideration for P's excessive annual payments to S. More importantly, if the sale 
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Finally, reliance on legal relationships to establish the facts of any 
purported transaction would prevent one taxpayer from taking advan-
tage of someone else's tax avoidance to implement her own tax avoid-
ance goals. If A enters into a binding legal agreement with B, there is 
no apparent reason why A's tax liability ought to depend on B's mo-
tive for entering into the agreement. Nonetheless, under cases like 
McDonald's, 237 Kass, 238 and Lyon, 239 the court's determination that 
the facts of a transaction can change because of one party's actions or 
motivation, either prior to or subsequent to that transaction, explicitly 
allows such manipulation. Limiting a determination of facts to legal 
relationships logically and ~onsistently prevents the "facts" from being 
abused. 
C. Finding Tax Avoidance 
1. Introduction 
At its most basic level, the assertion that someone is engaging in 
tax avoidance necessarily implies that the taxpayer is not paying some 
tax that she ought to pay. To the extent that the system attempts only 
to measure economic income, each person ought to pay tax equal to 
that which would result from applying her own rate to her actual eco-
nomic income as it accrues.240 Thus, absent some underinclusion of 
and leaseback were legally separate transactions, there should be no need to pretend that they are 
not. If, in a legally independent contract, P agrees to pay more than actual value to purchase 
property, it should not matter whether the property is purchased from the property's future 
tenant or from someone else. Similarly, if, in a legally separate contract, S agrees to pay exces-
sive rent for some building, it should not matter whether or not that building is one that she 
recently sold to P. In either case, there may be tax avoidance, and in either case the existence of 
tax avoidance can be dealt with (see infra text at note 295); but in no case does the existence of 
tax avoidance change the legal relationships that otherwise exist, nor is it necessary to pretend 
that it does so. 
Numerous other well-known tax cases equally demonstrate the validity of reliance on legal 
relationships to determine "facts" and reliance on principles other than a reworking of the 
"facts" to determine tax avoidance. In Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), the Court 
helu that the taxpayer who had purportedly purchased and then borrowed against an annuity 
from the same company had in "fact" not done so (i.e., that no purchase or loan had occurred). 
While the decision produced a satisfactory result in that case, its implication is that the taxpayer 
might have succeeded in avoiding tax by simply borrowing from someone other than the com-
pany from which he initially purchased the annuity, so that the Court would have been unable to 
disavow the occurrences asserted. On the other hand, using legal relationships to determine the 
facts, and separating that issue from a determination of tax avoidance, could allow a court to 
defeat tax avoidance even if the taxpayer went through more than just one other party to attempt 
it. See infra Part III.C. 
237. McDonald's Restaurant v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). 
238. Kass v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 218 (1973), affd, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974). 
239. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). 
240. Sometimes one taxpayer may be required to pay tax on an amount in excess of her 
economic income as a way of indirectly taxing some other party to the transaction. See, e.g., 
I.R.C. §§ 83(h), 404(a), and 267 (1982) (deferring one party's accrued deduction pending inclu-
sion of income by the other party). These situations can be viewed either as negative incentives 
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accrued income, or taxation of accrued income at a rate lower than 
that specified for the taxpayer to whom the income is accrued, there 
simply can be no "avoidance" of tax. 
Of course, the system does more (and less) than merely measure 
economic income. It is replete with provisions that do result in either 
the undertaxation or overtaxation of accrued income.241 To the extent 
that any provision undertaxes accrued income, it is essentially 
equivalent to the payment of some amount242 to the taxpayer by the 
government; and to the extent that a provision results in the overtaxa-
tion of accrued income, it is essentially equivalent to the exaction of 
some price for the specified conduct. To the extent that these pay-
ments or charges reward the taxpayers at whom they are directed and 
otherwise accurately impact upon those taxpayers whom they were 
intended to influence, the system can be said to be working well. 
Where Congress has acted to provide benefits to assist taxpayers in a 
certain status,243 or where it has provided benefits to encourage tax-
payers to take certain actions believed to be helpful to society,244 tax-
payers who fit the status intended to be benefited, or who take those 
actions intended to be rewarded, cannot be said to be improperly 
"avoiding" tax. Ultimately, then, there can be no tax avoidance if the 
Code distributes benefits accurately. 
Unfortunately, while there is often a high correlation between the 
transactions or legal relationships upon which the Code relies to dis-
tribute benefits and the status or economic behavior the transactions 
are intended to reflect, that correlation is necessarily less than com-
plete. To the extent that the transactions and legal relationships relied 
on by the Code do not correlate with the activities, statuses, or eco-
nomic relationships at which the benefits are intended to be directed, 
the potential for tax avoidance exists. To the extent that a taxpayer 
intentionally directs her actions towards that potential, she is actually 
engaging in tax avoidance. 
or as an indirect payment of some other party's tax, rather than as a surcharge on the party 
whose deduction is deferred. 
241. See supra Part I. 
242. The present value of the exemption or deferral of the tax that would otherwise be paya-
ble. See supra Part I.A. 
243. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 121 (1982) (taxpayers over age 55 entitled to one-time exemption for 
first $125,000 of gain on the sale of a principal residence); I.R.C. § 1 (1982) (taxpayers with 
lower taxable incomes are permitted to pay tax at lower rates). But see I.R.C. § 56 (1982) (alter· 
native minimum tax imposed on certain individuals with low taxable incomes resulting from 
certain tax preference items). 
244. E.g., taxpayers are allowed deductions for contributions to charity, I.R.C. § 170(a) 
(1982). 
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2. Problems 
Because a person can be engaging in tax avoidance only if his be-
havior (1) is tax motivated and (2) conflicts with the actual goals of the 
incentive or benefit provision of which he is taking advantage, any ex-
amination of tax avoidance must begin with an examination of those 
provisions that mismeasure economic income and are therefore poten-
tially capable of generating tax-motivated behavior. Essentially, there 
are five ways in which the system can deviate from "accurate" 
taxation of accrued economic income: (1) underinclusion;245 (2) defer-
ral;246 (3) bracket differentia1;247 (4) overinclusion;248 and (5) accelera-
tion. 249 At least three of these possible types of mismeasurement may 
motivate taxpayer behavior. Obviously, any taxpayer would prefer 
245. The most obvious of these incentives, underinclusion of income, often results from very 
deliberate Code provisions which specifically exclude from income certain receipts. See generally 
I.R.C. §§ 101-34 (1982) for a list of specific exclusions. Other exclusions, such as the exclusion 
of imputed income from property and services, are the result of tax common law. See, e.g., 
Bittker, supra note 69, at 135. Still other times, underinclusion results from the grant of deduc-
tions for certain expenditures that do not decrease a person's income, either because they provide 
untaxed consumption, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 163 (1982) (allowing taxpayers to deduct home mort-
gage interest payments); l.R.C. § 213 (1982) (allowing taxpayers to deduct certain medical ex-
penses), or because they do not decrease the payor's net worth, see, e.g., 1.R.C. § 164 (1982) 
(allowing taxpayers to deduct state taxes without any corresponding taxation of state provided 
services). 
246. Deferral may result either from specific Code provisions that defer taxation of accrued 
gains, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 72 (1982) (deferring taxation of accrued increases in the value of annui-
ties until payments are received or funds borrowed against the annuity), or from tax common law 
that does the same thing (le., the realization requirement, see supra note 12). And, like underin-
clusion, deferral can result from "negative" as well as positive provisions: Code sections that 
allow for deductions in advance of their economic accrual effectively defer payment of the tax on 
any income offset by those deductions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168 (1982) (providing for accelerated 
depreciation). 
247. Bracket differential occurs when a person's income is taxed at the "wrong" bracket. 
Basically this could occur under pre-1987 law if ordinary income was improperly taxed as capital 
gains, which were taxed at a preferential rate. Although some tax theorists describe this concept 
as "shifting" of income from one taxpayer to a different one in a lower bracket, the problem at 
which that concept is directed is in truth always either deferral or underinclusion. Unless some 
taxpayer is undertaxed either by underinclusion or deferral, there can be no "shifting" of income 
to a lower bracket. When the taxpayer is undertaxed because of underinclusion or deferral, it is 
that undertaxation that is the source of the problem. 
Bracket differential can also occur if a taxpayer is in different tax brackets in different years, 
and income is taxed in a year other than when it accrued and in which the taxpayer is in a lower 
tax bracket than in the year of accrual. 
248. Overinclusion of income, which, like acceleration of income, can best be described as a 
"negative" incentive, can take the form of either denied deductions for business expenditures, see, 
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 280(A), 280(F), 274 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), or inclusion of income never accrued 
by the taxpayer. See I.R.C. §§ 362, 1015 (1982) (taxpayers who receive gifts of appreciated 
property or who receive appreciated property in certain nonrecognition exchanges are required 
to pay tax on the gain inherent in those assets that accrued to the transferors prior to the trans-
fer). See Kohl, supra note 15, for a discussion of this aspect of nonrecognition exchanges. 
249. Acceleration of income may be effected by either requiring a taxpayer to include earn-
ings prior to their economic accrual, see, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963), or 
by deferring deductions until after their accrual. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 461(h), 404(a), 83(h) (1982 
& Supp. IV 1986). 
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permanent underinclusion of accrued income or permanent undertax-
ation of that income by way of bracket differential; and most would 
also prefer deferral of inclusion, and its accompanying deferral of tax 
liability.250 
Because tax avoidance cannot exist unless these incentives are in 
some way misdirected, the next problem is to determine whether, and, 
if so, how they miss their intended marks. There are basically two 
ways in which provisions that act as incentives (because they either 
undertax or overtax accrued income) can be misdirected: (1) provi-
sions intended to measure one status or relationship, or intended to 
reward one behavior, do so only by reference to some different status, 
relationship, or behavior (substituted reference); and (2) provisions 
that do directly measure the status, relationship, or behavior which 
they are intended to measure do so only in gross - and inherently 
inaccurate - increments (gross measurement). 
a. Substituted reference. The first of these problems, that of 
substituted reference, is prevalent throughout the tax system and 
causes problems in both the measurement of income and the effective-
ness of intended tax benefits and incentives. Essentially, whenever 
economic income or some other status is too difficult to measure di-
rectly, Congress substitutes some other, more readily determinable 
status or behavior that tends to reflect the actual status sought to be 
250. It is difficult to imagine ways in which either overinclusion or acceleration may be 
"abused" by taxpayers. For the most part, these provisions have been enacted in order to counter 
some other provisions that have been abused. For example, §§ 404(a) and 83(h), which defer an 
employer's deduction for much compensation until the employee's inclusion of a like amount, 
have been enacted to remedy, albeit indirectly, the drain on the treasury caused by employee use 
of the cash method of accounting (§ 461), which allows the employee to defer inclusion of ac· 
crued earnings. It was thought that deferring the employer's deduction might both generate 
compensatory revenue and, to a limited extent, encourage the employer to see to it that the 
employee's (taxable) receipt was not delayed. Indeed, because of this intended impact, these 
provisions have been described as merely "shifting" the tax payment from the employee to the 
employer; and the combination of employee deferral and employer acceleration has been referred 
to as doing little other than allowing the parties effectively to shift the rate at which the yield on 
that deferred payment is taxed from the employee's marginal rate to the employer's marginal rate 
rather than shift the time at which the principal is taxed. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing 
the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506, 520 (1986). While these provisions may not 
always be adequate to counter the abuse (in which some other taxpayer is engaging) at which 
these provisions are aimed (e.g., because they do permit the "shifting" of tax liability from em· 
ployee to employer, or from donor to donee in the case of a gift), they do nonetheless invariably 
increase the tax burden of the person to whom they apply. That person thus cannot be said to be 
"abusing" the provision any more than anyone else who willingly pays a higher tax cost for 
engaging in tax disfavored activity. (Compare the individual who receives cash earnings and 
elects not to contribute to an individual retirement account, savings plan, or contributory pension 
plan.) To the extent that there is "abuse" in these situations, it arises from the deferral accorded 
to the employee, and not from the inefficiency of some penalty that attaches to the employer. 
Taxpayers may also attempt to accelerate income into a year in which they are in a lower tax 
bracket than they will be in in the actual year of accrual, but in such a case it is the lower bracket 
(bracket differential) rather than the earlier time of inclusion that results in a tax savings. 
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measured. Measurement of this secondary referent then substitutes 
for actual measurement of the status in question. A common substi-
tute referent used to approximate the measurement of economic in-
come is the system's use of a person's motive for engaging in a 
particular transaction as a substitute measure for the result of that 
transaction. Theoretically, any expenditure that results in consump-
tion equal to the amount expended does not decrease a person's eco-
nomic income, and ought not to be deductible, while any expenditure 
that does not result in equivalent consumption does decrease a per-
son's income and ought to be deductible. Similarly, to the extent that 
any investment generates consumption,251 any corresponding decline 
in value of that investment does not reduce the taxpayer's economic 
income and should not be deductible, while an accrued loss on an in-
vestment that does not provide offsetting consumption should be de-
ductible. Because of perceived administrative difficulties in measuring 
the taxpayer's actual consumption from any expenditure or invest-
ment, however, the Code forgoes any attempt to make that measure-
ment, and instead requires a determination of whether the taxpayer's 
motivation for a particular expenditure was "business" or "personal," 
and whether or not an investment was acquired in (or converted into 
after acquisition) a transaction for profit. 252 The determination of 
whether or not an expenditure or investment was made for a business 
or profit-seeking purpose will often correlate with whether or not that 
expenditure generates consumption equivalent to the expenditure, or 
to the decline in value of the investment, but it will not always do so. 
Many "business" expenses, such as business meals and many business-
related travel and entertainment expenses, will generate substantial 
(untaxed) consumption;253 and many "personal" expenses and invest-
ments will fail to generate consumption equal to the (nondeductible) 
amount expended or to the investment's decline in value. 254 The mis-
measurement of income in these situations is caused by reference to 
the person's motive for making an expenditure to measure the con-
sumption generated by that expenditure. 255 
251. An example of such an investment is the taxpayer's use of her home or other personal 
use property. 
252. I.R.C. § 165(c)(l)(2) (1982). 
253. See generally Halperin, supra note 250. 
254. For example, a taxpayer who purchases a home for $200,000 and sells it one year later 
for $90,000 has probably not received $110,000 in consumption from that home. To the extent 
the consumption she enjoyed from the home was less than $110,000, her economic income has 
declined, but because the investment was "personal" she is entitled to no deduction. 
255. For an excellent discussion of the issue of personal versus business expenses, see gener-
ally Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Un-
solved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (1974). 
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Another example of the use of motive as a substitute for some 
other, less readily determinable fact inheres in the Code's definition of 
capital gains. The special treatment accorded such gains will ideally 
be granted to the increase in an asset's value that results from appreci-
ation of property independent of the taxpayer's performance of serv-
ices on, or with respect to, the asset, and will not apply to increases in 
value that result from the taxpayer's labors.256 The exclusion from 
capital gains treatment of gain from the sale of property held primarily 
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business is intended to 
effectuate this distinction, but does so by reference to the taxpayer's 
motive for holding the property, rather than to the actual source of the 
income. In situations where the taxpayer holds the property for in-
vestment, but the increase in the value of the property results from her 
labors with respect to the property, rather than from unrelated appre-
ciation, this reference to motive misdescribes the character of the 
gain.257 Similarly, when a taxpayer who regularly sells a particular 
kind of property in her business purchases an asset and later sells it at 
a profit due solely to appreciation, the entire gain will nonetheless be 
characterized as other than capital because the asset was held primar-
ily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. 258 
The above examples of substitute reference deal with mismeasure-
ment of income (business versus personal) and of status (capital gain 
versus ordinary income) that generates problems of underinclusion 
and bracket differential, respectively. Not surprisingly, substituted 
references can also cause undertaxation by way of deferral. One exam-
ple of this problem is the system's reliance on realization of gain as a 
substitute for the measurement of accrual of income with respect to 
any asset. Reference to the time of the sale or exchange of an asset to 
measure the time of the taxpayer's gain on that asset is without doubt 
a more convenient measurement tool than is reference to accrual, but 
it is also necessarily an inaccurate one. 
Some have suggested that another justification for the realization 
256. See B. BITIKER, supra note 48, 11 51.1. 
257. One example of this is the situation where a taxpayer buys a single asset for $100,000, 
makes $40,000 worth of repairs, and sells it for $140,000, the profit being due solely to those 
repairs. While the gain may be "capital gain," it should not be so. See id. 1] 51.1 (describing the 
transactions subject to capital gain or loss treatment). 
258. It should be pointed out that the characterization of gains as capital, or of expenses as 
"business," will often suffer from a "gross measurement" problem. All of the examples in the 
text assume away that problem by dealing with situations where the taxpayer holds an asset 
either exclusively for investment or exclusively for sale in the ordinary course of business (or 
where all of an expenditure is either business or personal). Difficulties arising from the presence 
of mixed motives, rather than from the use of a substitute referent, are problems of gross mea-
surement, and are dealt with in Part 111.C.2.b. 
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requirement is the fact that the taxpayer who has not sold her asset 
does not yet have cash with which she could pay tax in any event.259 
If this is indeed a factor, it is only indicative of another substituted 
referent problem - in this case, the problem lies in the use of the 
taxpayer's realization of gain to measure her possession of cash. While 
it is true that a taxpayer may receive cash on the sale of property, it is 
not necessarily true that the taxpayer who sells an asset will have more 
cash than one who refrains from selling. First of all, the one who 
continues to own a particular asset may have much other cash, while 
the one who sells may have none. Secondly, the one who sells may do 
so only because she wants to use the cash for some emergency expen-
diture or some other investment, so that she will ultimately have no 
more cash than if she had not sold. 260 
Another problem with using realization of gain to measure "in-
come" with respect to a particular asset is that a taxpayer may derive 
income from an asset without .realizing any "gain" at all. The person 
who buys property that generates consumption will have economic in-
come from that property regardless of any realized or even accrued 
gain. But because the system uses realized gains to measure income, 
that imputed income from the asset will never be taxed, resulting in 
underinclusion. 261 
Similarly, making reference to a worker's receipt of cash or prop-
erty to measure his accrued income, as does the cash method of ac-
counting, 262 results in deferral of any earned amounts until that 
receipt; and making reference to a seller's receipt of cash or property 
to measure her available cash, as does the installment sale provision of 
section 453, fails accurately to measure the status at which it is 
directed. 263 
Another example of the potential mismeasurement of·income or 
status caused by substitute reference is the way in which most nonrec-
ognition provisions work. If A transfers land to newly formed X Cor-
poration in exchange for all the stock of X the exchange is tax-free 
under section 351. A is granted continued deferral of any realized gain 
259. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
260. Indeed, the need for cash, as where the taxpayer is beset by an extraordinary expense 
such as a medical bill, may itself have induced the sale of the asset. 
261. The above discussion highlights both the merits and the defects of substitute reference: 
the system can use a single, readily determinable, criterion to measure at least three other"factors, 
each of which might otherwise be difficult to ascertain. On the other hand, by doing so, the 
system often significantly mismeasures each of those factors. 
262. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a) (as amended in 1967); see ~enerally I.R.C. § 461 (1982). 
263. This status being, presumably, the seller's ability to pay tax on realized gain without 
impacting negatively on her other investments. 
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on the land because she is now the owner of X, and, as a result, she has 
presumably not substantially changed her interest in the land.264 Ob-
viously, A's ownership of Xis a substitute for the measurement of her 
continuing ownership of the transferred land. While this substitution 
of A's ownership of X for her ownership of the land works in the above 
example, reliance on A's admitted legal and economic ownership of X 
to measure her continuing relationship to the land becomes inaccurate 
either if X owns something other than the land or if stock ownership in 
some other way differs substantially from ownership of land. In either 
case, there is no doubt about A's continuing ownership of X, but that 
relationship is an inaccurate means to describe A's relationship to the 
land. 
The system also frequently uses substitute references as a means of 
effectuating intended incentives. Often, the system bases incentives on 
a person's ownership of a particular asset when what it seeks to en-
courage is not the ownership of that asset per se but some other char-
acteristic or status which may (but also may not) be heightened by that 
ownership. Typical are those provisions that seek to encourage tax-
payers to save in order to provide for themselves, in old age, and for 
their heirs. These provisions generally reward the taxpayer's owner-
ship of particular assets, when what they seek to encourage is a behav-
ior (saving for retirement) that does not always correlate with 
ownership of the tax-favored asset. Examples include the deferral 
granted to contributions to qualified retirement plans,265 individual re-
tirement accounts,266 and accrued annuity gains,261 as well as the ex-
clusion of life insurance proceeds.268 While the taxpayer who 
contributes to a pension, or who invests in an annuity or in life insur-
ance, may be increasing her savings thereby, it is equally possible that 
the investment was made in the place of some other investment rather 
than in the place of consumption. If that is the case, the taxpayer's 
ownership of the tax-preferred savings vehicle has not increased her 
savings, and the incentive has been ineffi.cient.269 
264. See supra text at note 34. 
265. I.R.C. §§ 401-03 (1982). 
266. I.R.C. § 408 (1982). 
267. I.R.C. § 72 (1982). 
268. I.R.C. § 101 (1982). 
269. To the extent that these various incentives are directed not just at encouraging taxpay-
ers to save, but at encouraging them to save in a particular way, rewarding the acquisition of a 
particular investment vehicle may be an accurate reference. It will encourage the purchase and 
retention of the particular investment vehicle at issue, so that the taxpayer who takes money out 
of a bank and purchases an annuity, while not increasing savings, has necessarily increased her 
investment in that particular kind of savings. But it is somewhat doubtful that encouraging the 
acquisition and retention of any particular investment vehicle is indeed the real goal that Con-
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b. Gross measurement. While many Code provisions end up 
measuring some status (or relationship) by reference to some different 
status (or relationship), or rewarding some desired behavior by refer-
ence to a different behavior, the problem of substituted reference is 
only one of the two ways in which the system mismeasures taxpayer 
status. Regardless of whether or not any measurement is subject to a 
substituted reference problem, that measurement may be inaccurate 
simply because of imprecision in measuring whatever status it is that is 
subjected to the measurement. Generally, the system allows for meas-
urement of any status only by way of a determination that the tax- · 
payer either does or does not have that status, when the truth is 
usually that every taxpayer has the status, but to varying degrees. 
Problems that spring from the system's use of such gross measure-
ments are numerous. 210 
An obvious gross measurement problem occurs in the tax treat-
ment of interest and dividends paid by corporations. Interest pay-
ments are a cost of doing business and therefore decrease a 
corporation's net worth and are properly deductible. Dividends are 
ideally only voluntary distributions of profits, and are not costs of do-
ing business·; instead, like gifts made by individuals, they may be prop-
erly viewed as generating consumption, in the form of personal 
satisfaction, equivalent in value to the amount distributed.271 Thus, 
measuring corporate income relating to payments to shareholders and 
lenders by allowing deductions for interest payments272 and disallow-
gress had in mind when it enacted these provisions. It can be inferred that a particular type of 
savings (such as an annuity) is encouraged over some other type becallSe Congress believed that 
the favored investment vehicle would encourage more long-term savings than the taxpayer would 
otherwise have (the accurate reference). However, just as generic "savings" are not a necessary 
result of any particular investment, increased long-term savings are not necessarily encouraged 
by granting tax benefits to a long-term savings vehicle. The taxpayer might have decided to make 
a particular long-term investment without any tax benefit, or the taxpayer may make the invest-
ment and take other actions (such as borrowing or selling other long-term investments) that 
negate the economic impact of the acquisition of the tax-favored investment vehicle. In either 
case, the taxpayer has no more long-term savings than he would have had absent the incentive, 
but his tax is nonetheless reduced. 
270. The difference between substitute reference and gross measurement may be best illus-
trated by an example having nothing to do with tax. Assume that a system is designed to meas-
ure a person's weight. To the extent that any person's weight is measured by reference to her 
height, the system has a substitute reference problem. On the other hand, if the system seeks to 
measure each person's weight but can only determine, with respect to any person, that she is 
either "heavy" or "light," the system suffers from a gross measurement problem. There can, of 
course, be combinations of the two problems: viz, the system that accurately measures height to 
determine whether a person is light or heavy, or worse, the system that determines only whether 
a person is short or tall to determine whether she is light or heavy. 
271. If one chooses not to regard a dividend distribution as consumption, one might simply 
state that a distribution of profits cannot reduce those profits, so that denial of a deduction for 
dividends paid accurately measures income. 
272. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982). 
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ing deductions for dividend payments measures a status -income -
by direct reference to that status and not by reference to any other, 
substitute status or relationship. 
Nonetheless, the Code often mismeasures the impact of such trans-
fers by corporations. This mismeasurement is a result of the fact that 
proper measurement of income requires, in the first instance, proper 
characterization of those payments upon which measurement is based. 
If a payment from a corporation to a lender represents a distribution 
of profits, rather than a payment of interest, that payment is not inter-
est, but is a dividend. However, to the extent that the corporation's 
lenders and shareholders are the same person, payments to that person 
may be, in fact, partly (deductible) interest and partly a (nondeduct-
ible) distribution of profits (i.e., dividends). Unfortunately, the system 
currently provides for no such mixed characterization of payments. 
The result is that when such payments are made, the corporation's 
income is necessarily mismeasured. If the payments are characterized 
as all interest, corporate income is understated; if they are character-
ized as all dividend, corporate income is overstated. Either way, eco-
nomic income is not being measured by some other referent, but it is 
still being mismeasured, because the system simply does not allow for 
the gradations necessary for accurate measurement. 
Problems of gross measurement can also occur side by side with 
substitute reference problems. When that is the case, the two 
problems can, and ought to, be distinguished. An example of this 
combination involves the provisions generally allowing deductions for 
business expenses and disallowing deductions for personal expenses. 
As noted above, these provisions can involve a substitute reference 
problem. 273 But they can also mismeasure income even in the absence 
of any such problem. Assume, for example, thatA spends $1,000 on a 
meal, that his purpose for the expenditure is 60% business and 40% 
personal, and that the meal provides consumption worth $400. The 
reference to business purpose accurately traces the distinction between 
consumption and nonconsumption so that there is no problem caused 
by the acknowledged substitution of referents. However, if A deducts 
the cost of the meal as a business expense, he will nonetheless under-
state income by $400.274 Ifhe fails to deduct the cost, he will overstate 
income by $600. Because the system requires the gross polar measure-
ment of a factor that is· nonpolar, A's income will be mismeasured in 
either case, regardless of the accuracy of the substituted referent. 
273. See supra Part 111.C.2.a. 
274. But see I.R.C. § 274(n) (1982), which would limit A's deduction to $800 in any event. 
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Similar potential confluence of gross measurement problems with 
problems of substituted reference can occur in the characterization of 
capital gains. If C purchases an asset and holds it with mixed motives, 
for example, 80% for potential appreciation and 20% for possible sale 
in the ordinary course of business, then even if that mixture accurately 
reflects the ideal referent of determining the source of gain (labor or 
appreciation), the character of the gain (which depends on C's rela-
tionship to the asset) will necessarily be mismeasured. Because the 
gain must be either capital or ordinary, when in truth it is partially 
each, accurate characterization of C's gain becomes impossible. 
Another area where gross measurement has been a problem is the 
determination of ownership. Assume that Congress seeks to allocate 
some benefit to a person who will use asset X, allocates the benefit to 
the owner of X, and that the ownership of X asset correlates with its 
use.275 Although ownership will be an appropriate referent for such 
an allocation as long as it correlates with use, the status of ownership 
simply cannot always be accurately measured. Because any asset can 
have only one "owner" (or "user," to the extent that there is no substi-
tute referent problem) inaccuracy necessarily results whenever some, 
but less than all, of the asset is sold. As long as D owns (and uses) 
100% of X measuring the desired status presents no problem. Be-
cause X can be divided into accurate gradations along physical lines, if 
D divides X into two assets, and sells 20% of X to F, who then uses 
that 20%, measurement remains accurate. However, if D sells to F 
the ownership (and use) of X for two years only, and that current 
ownership (and use) has a value equal to 20% of the full value of X 
measurement of the ownership of both D and F will necessarily be 
inaccurate because neither is the owner of the entire asset. 
Finally, and perhaps even more directly related to tax avoidance 
cases, the question of taxpayer motivation in any context, from deter-
mination of whether a person was motivated by "tax avoidance" to a 
determination of whether one asset was actually exchanged for some 
other asset (because the existence of a particular exchange ultimately 
depends on reciprocal causation, and the cause of any taxpayer's ac-
tion is ultimately the motivation behind that action276) is essentially a 
gross measurement problem. Even assuming that motivation is an ap-
propriate referent (or that it is an adequate substitute), it is doubtful 
275. Often the description of ownership results in substitute reference problems as well. If 
Congre~s seeks to measure some specific relationship to an asset, such as use of, investment in, or 
income from the asset, but does so instead by measuring "ownership," there is a substitute refer-
ence problem to the extent the owner does not use, or bear that other relationship to, the asset. 
276. See supra text accompanying notes 122 & 149. 
464 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:365 
that any taxpayer will ever have only a single motive for taking any 
action. Thus, where the existence of a single motive is in issue, the 
issue can never be decided with complete accuracy. 
3. Abusing Mismeasurement Problems 
a. Substitute referents. Of course, the fact that the system may 
mismeasure a person's status or relationship does not mean that the 
person has engaged in tax avoidance. Because tax avoidance necessar-
ily implies intentional conduct, it can occur only when a taxpayer 
abuses or takes advantage of the system; this can be said to happen 
whenever a person acts in a way that is intended to, and does, exagger-
ate some mismeasurement problem that otherwise exists. To the ex-
tent that a person is motivated by a desire to increase the variation 
between the status, relationship, or behavior that the system seeks to 
measure and the measurement at which the system ultimately arrives, 
that person is abusing weaknesses in the system and ought to be 
deterred. 
Unlike current law's reliance on misplaced concepts such as busi-
ness purpose, or on merely intuitive distinctions between tax avoid-
ance and tax planning, the above model presents a logical basis for 
analyzing cases and can be used to demonstrate both the existence of, 
and the rationale for finding, tax avoidance in all cases where it has 
been found to exist. In addition, this analytical framework avoids the 
problem of basing the existence of tax avoidance on the taxpayer's en-
gaging in actions that themselves accurately measure income. For ex-
ample, assume that K borrows $1,000,000 from Insurance Company 
in order to purchase an annuity in a given year.277 Assume further 
that each year that the annuity increases in value by $100,000, K bor-
rows an additional $100,000 secured by the annuity and uses that 
$100,000 to pay that year's interest on the original loan. Finally, as-
sume that K does all of this because it presents an economically risk-
free way to minimize his taxes. Current judicial attitudes would lead 
to the conclusion that K has engaged in tax avoidance, and that the 
specific activity at the foundation of that tax avoidance is K's borrow-
ing of money.278 A problem with this way of viewing tax avoidance, 
however, is that the taxation of borrowing transactions can never itself 
cause tax avoidance because borrowing transactions are accurately 
277. In order to present a fact situation similar to Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 
(1980), the text disregards the existence ofl.R.C. § 264 (1982) for the moment. The justification 
for § 264 and similar provisions is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 284-88. 
278. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. 361. 
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taxed. If K borrows $100,000, his receipt of funds is accompanied by a 
corresponding liability to repay that same amount. The net economic 
effect of the borrowing (no change in net worth) is accurately reflected 
by the net tax consequence that attaches thereto (no change in taxable 
income) and cannot therefore be the cause of, or the basis for, tax 
avoidance. 
Instead, K has engaged in tax avoidance because he has acted in 
order to exaggerate the potential mismeasurement inherent in the tax 
treatment of annuities. Congress has granted deferral to the accrued 
increased value in annuity contracts in order to encourage more long-
term savings. Annuity investment is therefore a substitute referent for 
increased savings. By intentionally acquiring the annuity without in-
creasing his pre-tax savings over what they otherwise would have been 
(absent that incentive), K has exaggerated the difference between the 
measurement of the real intended referent (i.e., his status of having 
saved more than he otherwise would have) and the substitute referent 
of his annuity investment. 
Because the proposed approach determines tax avoidance only by 
reference to the transaction that actually causes the mismeasurement, 
integration of different exchanges is not a prerequisite to a finding of 
tax avoidance. If K had borrowed the purchase money and the money 
used to pay the interest from some disinterested lender, his tax avoid-
ance would be no less real, despite the fact that the borrowing and the 
annuity investment were "separate" transactions.279 Nor would his 
tax avoidance vanish if Insurance Company guaranteed him a $1,000 
annual profit on the deal by increasing the value of his annuity invest-
ment at a rate higher than the rate of interest he paid on his outstand-
ing indebtedness.280 If K were still motivated by his ability to defer 
$100,000, while at the same time failing to increase his savings over 
what they otherwise would have been, he would still be engaging in 
tax avoidance. 
On the other hand, in the unlikely event that (1) K could borrow 
the annuity purchase money at a rate that would guarantee him a 
$1,000 pre-tax profit, (2) K was actually motivated to enter into the 
transaction entirely by the desire to increase his savings by $1,000 per 
year, and (3) K was not influenced by his ability to generate tax savings 
of approximately $28,000 per year,28 1 he has not engaged in tax avoid-
279. Compare Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 365-66. 
280. Le., if K had some general "business purpose" or "profit-seeking motive" for entering 
into the transaction. 
281. This assumes that K is in the 28% marginal tax bracket. 
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ance.282 This is true despite the fact that if K entered into the transac-
tion for the sole purpose of making this $1,000 profit from arbitrage, 
he might not be engaging in the behavior that section 72 was intended 
to encourage. 283 Because tax avoidance exists only when the taxpayer 
abuses some provision by acting intentionally to increase the mis-
measurement of the accurate referent, it does not exist when the tax-
payer just happens to reap some benefit from mismeasurement through 
no intentional act on his part. 
Another result of the proposed definition of tax avoidance is that a 
person such as K might be just as "guilty" of tax avoidance even if the 
original annuity had not been acquired with borrowed funds. Assume 
that T has $1,000,000 that he has decided to save. T has this money 
in a bank account, but because of section 72, he decides to use this 
money to purchase an annuity. Tis intentionally taking advantage of 
section 72's deferral without having increased his savings over what 
they otherwise would have been, and he may therefore be said to have 
engaged in tax avoidance. 
Of course, to the extent that the correct referent for section 72 is 
not only the taxpayer's increased savings,284 but also the conversion of 
savings from one kind, such as bank accounts (short-term invest-
ments), to annuities (long-term investments), Twill have behaved in a 
way (converting bank savings to annuity savings) that is accurately 
measured by an appropriate referent when he purchases the annuity. 
There are, however, two responses to this assertion that T is not en-
gaging in tax avoidance. First, it is doubtful that the conversion of 
savings from bank to annuity is anything more than a substitute refer-
ent for long-term savings,285 and whether T's annuity investment will 
actually result in longer-term investment is unclear. Second, and in 
this case more significant, is the fact that if conversion from bank sav-
ings to annuity savings is an accurate referent for section 72, then to 
that extent K may not have engaged in tax avoidance even when he 
acquired the annuity with borrowed funds. In either case, the taxpayer 
has converted $1,000,000 of bank savings to $1,000,000 of annuity sav-
ings. Whether his bank balance goes from plus $1,000,000 to zero (T) 
or from zero to minus $1,000,000 (K) does not change that fact. In-
deed, it is possible in the above scenario that K may be less guilty of 
282. In most situations of course, K's motives would be mixed. For an appropriate response 
to the existence of mixed motives, see infra Part IV.B. 
283. If the section was intended to encourage taxpayers to convert consumption to savings, K 
has not done so. He has only converted one kind of savings into another. • 
284. In other words, the goal of§ 72 is not solely to encourage taxpayers to save rather than 
to consume. 
285. See supra text at note 274. 
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tax avoidance than is T. If T had money invested in a bank at 10% 
interest and invests in an annuity that increases at the rate of 9%, he is 
decreasing his net pre-tax savings by making the conversion, while if K 
can borrow at 8.9% for the same investment, he will be increasing his 
pre-tax savings despite his use of borrowed funds.286 
To analyze, under the framework suggested above, another exam-
ple of what is generally considered to be tax avoidance, assume that G 
enters into a forward contract that requires her to purchase an aspara-
gus for $1,000 on January 15, year two and that she simultaneously 
enters into a contract to sell an asparagus for $1,000 on the same date. 
The net result is that G will be required both to purchase and to sell an 
asparagus for $1,000 on next January 15. If an asparagus costs more 
than $1,000 (e.g., $1,200) in December, G will close out her short posi-
tion in asparagus at a $200 tax loss, but will retain her long position, 
now worth $200. The net economic result will be that on December 
30 G will hold a contract worth $200, and she will have paid out a 
total of $200. On the other hand, if an asparagus costs less than 
$1,000 (e.g., $100) on December 30, G will close out her long position 
at a $300 loss, while retaining her short position and its inherent $300 
gain. Finally, assume that G does all of this in order to minimize her 
tax liability for the year: 
Clearly, G has engaged in tax avoidance by attempting to exagger-
ate the difference between accrued income (the real referent) and real-
ized income (the substitute referent). When the price of asparagus 
rises above $1,000 and G fails to close out her long position, her behav-
ior is the result of her intention to avoid current taxation of that ac-
crued gain.287 When the price of asparagus sinks below $1,000 and G 
refuses to close out her short position, she is again doing so only in 
order to defer tax on that accrued gain. Whether or not G's acquisi-
tion of the offsetting positions was a single transaction is irrelevant to a 
determination of whether she is avoiding taxes by refusing to recog-
nize her accrued gain on her gain position. Similarly irrelevant is the 
question whether or not G stood to make some minimal pre-tax profit 
286. Having weighed the possible inappropriateness of jumping ahead in this article against 
the possibility that the reader might regard this approach to tax avoidance as useless because it is 
unenforceable, the author feels compelled to mention several facts that will be discussed in more 
depth infra. Just as not every immoral act is a crime and not every crime is prosecuted, defining 
tax avoidance in a logical manner does not mandate prosecuting it whenever it may exist. In-
deed, there are several reasons that one might choose to prosecute K and not T in the above 
example, see supra text at notes 223, 227-28. What is important at this point is that none of those 
reasons is that K is more guilty of tax avoidance than is T. 
287. That her motive is not the accrual of economic income should be obvious from the fact 
that as long as she holds both the long and the short position, any actual economic gain is 
impossible. 
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or to suffer some pre-tax loss from her actions. Finally, because de-
ducting her recognized loss on the loss leg of this straddle resulted in 
the accurate taxation of accrued loss on that leg, the recognition of 
that loss cannot be said to result in the "avoidance" of any tax that 
should have been paid. Instead, it is the intentional abuse of deferral 
by refusing to recognize accrued gains that represents tax avoidance. 
Obviously, G's acquisition of offsetting positions with respect to 
asparagus prevents her from realizing any net pre-tax economic in-
come (or loss) from her actions; and this is strong evidence that her 
motivation for acquiring the long and short positions is tax avoidance 
rather than economic gain. The difference between the proposed ap-
proach and current judicial attitudes, however, is that the proposed 
approach suggests that the acquisition of offsetting positions is only 
evidence of G's tax-avoidance motive, and does not itself establish the 
presence of tax avoidance. The tax avoidance itself lies not in the ac-
quisition of offsetting positions, but only in G's tax-motivated refusal 
to recognize her accrued gain. One result of this approach is that one 
can point to tax avoidance without engaging in the fiction of asserting 
that two separate transactions (acquisition of a long position and ac-
quisition of a short position) are actually only one transaction, a fic-
tion that becomes difficult to maintain when G deals with different 
j 
parties on different days. 
In several cases involving taxpayers who acted as has G, above, the 
court did in fact integrate the taxpayer's offsetting positions.288 It then 
held that the taxpayer lacked a profit motive for entering into "the 
straddle" and deferred her deduction on the loss leg. While the result 
in these cases may appear similar to the suggested approach, it is not. 
First, the court relied not on a finding of tax avoidance but on a pur-
ported absence of a profit motive. As suggested earlier, however, the 
restriction in section 165 which allows losses only with regard to 
transactions entered into for profit is an attempt to separate expendi-
tures that generate consumption (not deductible) from those that do 
not generate consumption (deductible). It is not intended to substitute 
for a judicial approach to ·tax avoidance. Even if one accepted the 
application of section 165 to these cases, however, integration leads to 
unwanted results. First of all, it implies that if the taxpayer recognizes 
her gain in year one and defers her loss until year two, she need not be 
288. For the current judicial approach to tax straddles, see, e.g., Fox v. Commissioner, 82 
T.C. 1001 (1984); see also Dailey, Commodity Straddles in Retrospect: Federal Income Tax Con-
siderations, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 313 (1981) (overview of judicial approaches to tax straddles); 
Note, The Tax-Straddle Cases, 1982 DUKE L.J. 114 (analyzing judicial approaches to tax strad-
dle cases and suggesting use of the step transaction doctrine as the appropriate remedy). By and 
large, these situations are now governed by statute. See I.R.C. § 1256 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
. 
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taxed on it because the entire integrated "transaction," including the 
unrealized loss, shows no profit. This is simply a position that the 
Internal Revenue Service and courts will not always want to take. On 
the other hand, if one attempted to use the absence of G's profit motive 
to disallow a loss without integrating her offsetting positions into a 
single transaction, the result would be permanent loss disallowance on 
the loss leg, accompanied by taxation of the gain leg. This would place 
an unavoidable but undue hardship on the taxpayer who enters into a 
straddle for reasons other than tax avoidance. The net result of this 
analysis is that the proper focus in these cases should be on the pres-
em.:e of a tax avoidance motive rather than on the absence of a profit 
motive.289 
To return tq the application of the proposed approach to G's strad-
dle, the assertion that G's tax avoidance lies in her refusal to recognize 
accrued gain and her attempt thereby to exaggerate the timing mis-
measurement caused by the realization requirement has significance 
for many other transactions. For example, if M owns stock with a 
basis of $100 and a value of $1,000, and she refuses to sell the stock 
solely in order to avoid paying tax on her unrealized gain, M is just as 
guilty of tax avoidance as was G. 290 
On the other hand, assume that P has an asset with a basis of 
$1,000 and a value of $100, and that P sells the asset on December 31 
solely in order to be able to deduct a $900 loss. Although tax-moti-
vated, that action is not tax avoidance because deduction of the loss 
does not exaggerate or result in any mismeasurement of P's economic 
income. If P has no other property, that tax-motivated sale cannot 
result in the mismeasurement of P's economic income. If P has an-
other asset with a basis of $200 and a value of $1, 100, P's choice not to 
sell this oth~r asset will result in a net $900 mismeasurement of P's 
income; but the mismeasurement is the result of P's unrealized gain 
rather than of his recognized loss. Thus, if P chose not to sell his gain 
asset (or to sell the loss asset instead of the gain asset) in order to avoid 
realizing his accrued gain, he has engaged in tax avoidance. If P's 
decision to hold that gain asset was unrelated to an intention to defer 
tax on that accrued gain, he has not been guilty of tax avoidance.291 
289. Current case law might suggest that the presence of tax avoidance might provide the 
justification for integrating the transactions and for asserting that the taxpayer had rio profit 
motive, but, as suggested earlier, this approach only makes factual determinations depend on a 
finding of tax avoidance without explaining what "tax avoidance" is. See supra Part II.A. 
290. M's motive will, of course, be more difficult to detect, however, and that difficulty might 
suggest different treatment for M than for G. Nonetheless, the difference between Mand G is not 
that only one is motivated by tax avoidance. 
291. Obviously, practicality may demand that we not attempt to find and prosecute all of 
these cases of tax avoidance. Nonetheless, identifying these cases is important because it allows 
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Another area similar to the above cases (in that tax avoidance has 
been misdiagnosed by focusing on an action that results in the accu-
rate measurement of economic income as itself being an act of tax 
avoidance) is that of taxpayers who borrow money in order to pay 
deductible interest. If a taxpayer who owes $100 of interest on money 
that was borrowed for use in business borrows another $100 to pay 
that interest, she is not thereby engaging in tax "avoidance"; and, in-
deed, if that is her only tax-relevant transaction during the year, her 
$100 net loss will accurately reflect her economic income. While a 
taxpayer who has unrealized gains and who borrows money to pay 
interest may well be borrowing, rather than selling appreciated assets, 
in order to avoid realizing those accrued gains (and to exaggerate the 
deferral problem inherent in realization), that taxpayer's "avoidance" 
would consist only of his abuse of the realization requirement, if any. 
Unless he has those appreciated assets whose sale he is forgoing, his 
income will not be inaccurately measured, and he cannot be said to be 
"avoiding" any tax that he ought to pay. 
b. Gross measurement problems. While the above examples il-
lustrate taxpayers acting to enhance the mismeasurement of status or 
economic income caused by substitute referents, tax avoidance can 
also exist as a result of gross measurement problems. For example, 
assume that X Corporation desires to raise capital, and, absent tax 
considerations, would do so by issuing an instrument that bore some 
resemblance to both equity and debt (e.g., 70% like equity, 30% like 
debt). Assume further that the instrument, because of its greater re-
semblance to equity, would be treated as equity for tax purposes. Be-
cause X wants to be able to deduct the payments it makes on its 
capital, however, it issues an instrument that bears a 51 % resemblance 
to debt, so that the instrument will be treated completely like debt. By 
increasing the instrument's resemblance to debt by 21 %, X has issued 
an instrument that will be taxed like debt 100% more. Rather than 
having its income overstated by 30%, X's income will be understated 
by 49%. Under the proposed definition, this intentional action, taken 
to enhance distortion of income measurement, is tax avoidance. 
c. Combinations. One area that has often been a home to tax 
avoidance and that involves problems of both substitute reference and 
gross measurement is that of corporate organizations and reorganiza-
tions. For example, assume that A owns land with a basis of $10 and a 
one to make a reasoned determination of both practicality of enforcement and the presence of true 
avoidance. 
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value of $100 and that, in order to transfer that land to Publicly Held 
without having to pay tax on his realized gain, A transfers the land to 
Newco in exchange for all the Newco stock, later transferring the 
Newco stock to Publicly Held in exchange for $100 worth of Publicly 
Held stock. The organization of Newco is tax-free because, theoreti-
cally, A's investment has remained substantially the same. His owner-
ship of Newco substitutes for his prior ownership of the land. The 
exchange of Newco stock for Publicly Held stock is tax-free because 
A's ownership of Publicly Held stock substitutes for his ownership of 
Newco stock, so that, once again, his investment has theoretically re-
mained substantially the same. A has engaged in tax avoidance be-
cause he has acted in order to take advantage of the mismeasurement 
of his relationship to the underlying asset that results from the use of 
these substitute referents. While the Code grants nonrecognition to 
these exchanges because it presumes that they measure A's continuing 
relationship to the land, A has incorporated solely in order to change 
his relationship to the land. 
Just as a taxpayer abuses the substitution of annuity investment for 
increased savings when she purchases an annuity in order to receive 
deferral without increasing savings, A has abused the substitution of 
ownership of Newco stock for ownership of the land by forming 
Newco in order to receive nonrecognition without continuing substan-
tially the same relationship to the land. Because A forms Newco in 
order to change his relationship to the land (by transferring the Newco 
stock to Publicly Held Co.), rather than to continue it, abuse of the 
substituted referent is apparent. Of course, transfer o(Newco to Pub-
licly Held is ample evidence of A's tax avoidance motive; but, as sug-
gested earlier, it is nothing more than evidence of motive, and it is not 
itself a necessary component of A's tax avoidance. 
Not surprisingly, the view of the tax avoidance involved in the 
above series of exchanges also has implications for other situations. In 
the above situation, A's actions were designed to allow him to continue 
to defer taxation of his accrued gain on the land. But the reason for 
A's abuse of the mismeasurement of his continuing relationship to the 
land was not as significant as the fact that his tax avoidance consisted 
of his abusing that mismeasurement. Any tax-free incorporation will, 
to some extent, change the taxpayer's relationship to the incorporated 
assets and will, to that same extent, undermeasure a change in the 
relevant taxpayer status (continued asset-ownership). Not every such 
transaction, however, is abusive, because most _incorporations are not 
intended either to take advantage of or to increase that mismeasure-
ment. Instead, most incorporations are intended to take advantage of 
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some other factor (e.g., limited liability). The substitution of referents 
merely allows them to occur. When that substitution of referents, and 
the resultant mismeasurement of the accurate referent, is the motiva-
tion for the occurrence, tax avoidance is present.292 
If A had incorporated the land so that it would be in corporate 
form in order to allow him to transfer the land tax-free (by way of a 
"B" reorganization) at some future undetermined time to some pres-
ently unknown person, he would be just as guilty of tax avoidance as 
he was in the above hypothetical. While the temporal proximity of A's 
formation ofNewco and his exchange of the Newco stock for Publicly 
Held stock may well be strong evidence of the existence of a tax avoid-
ance motive, it is the existence of that motive,293 and not of any partic-
ular kind of evidence, that is the sine qua non of tax avoidance. 
Tax avoidance would also be present if A had already owned 
Newco and transferred the Newco stock to Publicly Held in exchange 
for stock, rather than for cash, in order to qualify for nonrecognition 
treatment. In that case, A would again be taking advantage of the 
mismeasurement of his continuing relationship to the Newco stock in 
order to continue the mismeasurement of economic income that would 
normally result from a change in that relationship.294 
In addition to presenting problems of substitute reference, the cor-
porate organization and reorganization provisions also present possi-
ble gross measurement problems. Again, assume that A transfers 
appreciated land to newly formed X Corporation in exchange for all 
the X stock and then trades the X stock to Publicly Held in exchange 
for 10% of the Publicly Held stock. A is entitled to nonrecognition 
because his interest in the land, represented by his ownership of X 
292. In this situation, the presence of some nontax "business purpose" would be evidence 
that the taxpayer is not abusing the substituted referent. The correlation of tax avoidance with 
the absence of business purpose in these cases, however, does not legitimize the general reference 
to business purpose in other situations. See supra Part 11.B.1. 
293. Determining this motive may be difficult. But see infra Part IV.B. (the Internal Reve-
nue Service has discretion to bring deficiency actions against the most egregious violators). 
294. The kind of tax avoidance described in the text above also closely resembles the kind of 
tax avoidance present in Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), 
affd., 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 41 U.S. 827 (1951). There the taxpayer purchased the 
stock of T corporation, which had high basis assets, and then liquidated T. It engaged in these 
actions in order to acquire the assets in a way that would allow them to retain their high basis 
rather than the cost basis they would have taken had Kimbell-Diamond simply purchased those 
assets. By taking these actions, the taxpayer was abusing the fact that its ownership of the newly 
acquired assets was used as a substitute referent for T's prior ownership of those assets. Given 
this analysis, tax avoidance would have existed any time one corporation chose to acquire the 
stock, rather than the assets, of a different company solely in order to avoid the change in basis of 
the corporate assets that would have accompanied an asset purchase. Because of statutory 
amendments since Kimbell-Diamond, the situation does not arise under current law. See supra 
note 167. 
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stock, is statutorily deemed to be substantially identical to his prior 
outright ownership of the land, and because his interest in underlying 
assets represented by his ownership of Publicly Held stock is statuto-
rily deemed to be substantially the same as the interest in underlying 
assets represented by his pre-reorganization ownership of X stock. In 
either case, the Code determines that the exchange will result in giving 
A an interest that either is "substantially the same" as his prior invest-
ment or is not "substantially the same" as that prior investment. In 
truth, even aside from the substitute referent problem, A's interest is 
only partially the same as it was before. When A transfers his X stock 
for 10% of the Publicly Held stock, A's indirect investment in the land 
is reduced from 100% to 10%, and his "continuity of investment" in 
the substitute referent is mismeasured by 90%. If A has acted inten-
tionally to exaggerate this mismeasurement, he has engaged in tax 
avoidance. 
Again, the above highlights the fact that tax avoidance is not lim-
ited to those situations in which it has been traditionally found. If, for 
example, A sought to transfer 90% ownership of his land to someone 
else and did so by joining with one or more persons to form a corpora-
tion in which A was a 10% stockholder, the exchange would qualify 
for nonrecognition under section 351. However, if A preferred simply 
to sell a 90% interest in his land, and if he consented to the corporate 
formation in order to take advantage of the mismeasurement of his 
continuing investment in the land caused by section 351 (which would, 
when it applies, implicitly describe his investment as remaining at 
100%), A has again engaged in tax avoidance. While current judicial 
analysis might apply the step transaction doctrine if this incorporation 
were followed by a tax-free separation of A's interest,295 that analysis 
misses the point in viewing the presence of that second transaction as 
the essence of tax avoidance rather than as merely evidence of A's tax 
avoidance motive. 
D. Addressing Tax Avoidance 
Not every attempt to minimize tax liability is tax avoidance. In-
stead, taxpayers are "avoiding" tax only when they take actions in-
tended to increase distortions in the measurement of economic income 
or other tax-significant factors. Nonetheless, the necessary result of 
tax avoidance, either because economic income is unintentionally un-
295. For example, a tax-free split off of stock of a subsidiary to A in redemption of his stock 
under I.R.C. § 355 (1982). See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(a) (1960); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.355-4, 42 Fed. Reg. 2699 (1977); Portland Mfg. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 58 (1971), acq. 
1972-2 C.B. 2, ajfd., 35 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 75-1439 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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dermeasured, or because intended benefits or incentives are uninten-
tionally overallocated (or misallocated) to the person whose status is 
mismeasured, is that the tax avoider will pay less than her intended 
share of tax. There are two basic approaches to the problem: (1) de-
tect and prevent tax avoidance, or (2) find a way to measure status or 
income more accurately. 
This part of the article explores these possible solutions to the 
problem. It concludes that when tax avoidance is the result of a tax-
payer's abusing a problem of gross measurement, any appropriate 
remedy requires, initially, the more accurate measurement of the sta-
tus in question. These problems, and the tax avoidance that they en-
gender, can be best solved by demanding that taxpayers make more 
refined measurements in the first instance, and by the Internal Reve-
nue Service and courts making more refined measurements thereafter. 
Where the taxpayer's initial mismeasurement is significant and tax-
avoidance-motivated, penalties should be imposed that relate to the 
extent of both the mismeasurement and the bad motive. 
When the problem results from the use of a substitute referent, any 
remedy requires focusing, either directly or indirectly, on the existence 
of tax avoidance rather than on the more accurate measurement of the 
status sought to be directly measured. In these cases, accurate mea-
surement of the ideal referent will likely be nearly impossible, so that 
curing tax avoidance will require identifying some behavior that ap-
pears to indicate tax avoidance. To the extent that tax avoidance is 
indicated, courts and the Internal Revenue Service should attempt to 
strip from the abusive taxpayer the benefits of that tax avoidance and 
to impose penalties based on the degree of abuse that is found to exist. 
1. Gross Measurement Problems 
a. Judicial and administrative responses. Any time a taxpayer 
abuses a pure gross measurement problem, her tax avoidance must lie 
in the fact that either (1) she has made a small change in the factor 
being measured in order to make a gross change in the resulting mea-
surement of that factor; or (2) she has refrained from making some 
change in that factor in order to avoid a gross recharacterization of 
that factor. In either case, the avoidance lies only in the taxpayer's 
attempt to exaggerate the tax effect of her actual activity. The tax-
payer will always have made some movement to bring her closer to the 
status that is recorded for tax purposes, but the movement she will 
have made is of a lesser degree than is registered. 
As long as the problem is only one of gross measurement, then the 
taxpayer cannot have engaged in a different kind of behavior or at-
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tained a status different in kind from· what she would have done absent 
a tax-avoidance motive. Instead, she has only done more (or less) of 
that same thing. The mismeasurement is not the result of her achiev-
ing a certain status, but only of her not achieving that status to an even 
greater extent. This is necessarily the case because, as long as the sta-
tus being measured is not a substitute referent, mismeasurement can 
only be a matter of degree. 
In order to prove that a taxpayer has abused a gross measurement 
problem, one would have to prove that the taxpayer both attempted to 
exaggerate, and did exaggerate, the difference between the degree of 
the status that in fact existed and the status that was reported for tax 
purposes. Thus, one could not prove tax avoidance without showing 
both the extent to which the taxpayer actually achieved the status in 
question and the extent to which that status would (or would not) 
have been achieved in the absence of the provision being abused. Of 
course, to the extent that one can accurately measure the degree to 
which any particular status has in fact been reached, it would make 
little sense to require any proof in addition to that accurate measure-
ment before taking action to impose accuracy. Because proving tax 
avoidance would require the additional proof of the extent to which 
the status would have otherwise been reached, proving such avoidance 
ought to be unnecessary in cases involving only. problems of gross 
measurement. 
An example of the above is the corporate taxpayer that issues an 
instrument bearing just enough resemblance to debt so that it will be 
treated like a debt instrument for tax purposes, rather than issuing the 
equity instrument it would have issued in the absence of the gross 
measurement problem inherent in classifying instruments as either 
debt or equity. One might prove tax avoidance by showing that (1) the 
taxpayer issued an instrument that was, for example, 51 % like debt 
and (2) absent the gross measurement problem involved, it would have 
issued an instrument that was 70% like equity. Because the first of 
these facts, standing alone and without regard to the taxpayer's mo-
tive, would result in accurate characterization of the instrument (i.e., 
51 % debt and 49% equity), one could reasonably suggest that no ad-
ditional proof of motive should be needed to allow implementation of 
that accurate characterization. 
Of course, to the extent that the system seeks to justify punishing 
the taxpayer rather than simply making an accurate measurement of 
the status in question, proof of motive should indeed be relevant;296 
296. The importance of mens rea to the criminal law has long been acknowledged. See W. 
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW§ 3.4 (2d ed. 1986). To the extent that a taxpayer may be 
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and to the extent that review of the taxpayer's case results in some-
thing other than the accurate measurement of the status in question, 
that "something else" often is a punishment, whether or not that label 
is affirmatively affixed. In debt equity cases, for example, when the 
taxpayer is found to have improperly classified an instrument as debt, 
the.basic remedy imposed by the court (or Internal Revenue Service) 
is the reclassification of that instrument as equity. While this new 
classification will be more representative of the instrument's true na-
ture than was its original characterization by the taxpayer, the new 
label will nonetheless not accurately describe the instrument's actual 
economic status. Instead, an instrument that may bear as much as a 
49% resemblance to debt will be characterized as equity, and pay-
ments that, in large part, are real costs of doing business, will be 
nondeductible. 
To the extent that the systemic goal involved in these cases is to 
encourage taxpayers to report their income more accurately, the impo-
sition of punishment on those who attempt to maximize the potential 
mismeasurement that inheres in the system is reasonable. Nonethe-
less, the process by which the punishment is imposed in these cases is 
curious. Because the basic punishment consists of the reclassification 
of the instrument as equity (or as debt if the taxpayer had originally 
labelled it as equity), that punishment will not be imposed, regardless 
of the taxpayer's motive, unless the instrument does actually bear 
some significant relationship to equity. Thus, the taxpayer who avoids 
tax by issuing an instrument that is 45% like equity rather than one 
that is zero percent like equity will suffer no untoward consequences, 
despite the fact that the 45% shift in the economics of the instrument 
from what they otherwise would have been may have been entirely 
tax-motivated. On the other hand, the taxpayer who makes only a 
10% shift as a result of his tax-avoidance motive (for example, chang-
ing an instrument from 45% to 55% like equity and still labeling it as 
debt in order to be able to deduct that extra 10% of interest) is more 
likely to have that instrument recharacterized despite the lesser impact 
of his tax-avoidance motive on his behavior. 
In addition to the inappropriate way in which the punishment for 
tax avoidance is administered in these cases, the amount of the punish-
ment also makes for strange results. Assume that A and B both seek 
to have instruments labelled as debt in order to secure an interest de-
duction with respect to that part of the eventual payments on the in-
strument that will in reality be distributions of profit. Further assume 
punished for her behavior, those same considerations are relevant, regardless of the label placed 
on that punishment. 
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that A issues an instrument that actually bears a 50% resemblance to 
debt, while B issues an instrument that bears only a 15% resemblance 
to debt, and that they both initially characterize their respective in-
struments as debt. If both of the instruments are eventually reclassi-
fied as equity, the status of A's instrument will be 50% wrong, while 
the classification of B's instrument (and the resultant overtaxation of 
B) will be wrong by only 15%. As a result, A will be overtaxed by 
50% andB, who is guilty of far greater deception, will be overtaxed by 
only 15%. 
The above problems are the necessary result of a system that seeks 
to have taxpayers report their status accurately, forces them to report 
that status inaccurately (by taking an all-or-nothing position with re-
spect to a status that is really some-and-some), and responds to some 
of these inaccuracies by imposing a different inaccurate result. The 
confusion of motive with status, and of measurement with punish-
ment, becomes overwhelming; and little is done to assure the accurate 
reporting of the status in question. 
This analysis of the problem leads to another approach, however, 
that may have much to recommend it. By distinguishing between 
problems of measurement and proof of motive, one can approach both 
problems in a logical and consistent manner. Because the ultimate 
goal is the accurate repo~ing of any tax-significant factors, one might 
begi::i to address the problems by simply making accurate measure-
ments of the factors in question. Although Justice Brandeis is said to 
have explained that "[t]o be effective in this world you have to decide 
which side is probably right; and, once you decide, you must act as if it 
were one hundred per cent right,"297 with respect to problems of gross 
measurement, courts and the Internal Revenue Service might simply 
acknowledge that (1) neither of the alternative classifications currently 
offered will ever be exactly right, and (2) it is counterproductive to act 
as if they were. 
Since any court that is confronted with a debt equity case will al-
ways have in front of it an instrument that is partially debt and par-
tially equity, and since that court must in any event determine the 
extent to which it is either one prior to making any determination with 
respect to tax avoidance, the court should, in the first instance, simply 
make that determination. Rather than substitute one inaccurate mea-
surement for a different one, the court should instead make an· accu-
297. Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 250, 260 (1980). I borrow the 
quotation from Professor Coons, who received it from Professor Nathaniel Nathanson, who 
heard it from Thomas Corcoran, who apparently heard it from Justice Brandeis. See generally 
Marvin Gaye, I Heard It Through the Grapevine (Tamla 1968). 
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rate measurement of the status in dispute. If an instrument is, say, 
35% like debt, the court ought to treat it as 35% debt, and as 65% 
equity. Payments made with respect to the instrument would then be 
treated as 35% deductible interest and 65% nondeductible distribu-
tions of profits. Retirement of the instrument would be treated as 
35% repayment of a debt and 65% redemption of stock. Other as-
pects of the instrument could similarly be treated in a blended manner. 
A court need not divide up the instrument into separate parts, but 
could treat the entire instrument as having the status which it in fact 
does.298 
b. Taxpayer reporting positions. While the above approach does 
not reject the idea that tax-avoidance motive is a problem, it suggests 
that it is a problem only to the extent that it causes inaccuracy in the 
measurement of some tax-significant factors; and that it is that inaccu-
rate measurement, rather than the taxpayer's motive, that is the source 
of the problem. Because accurate measurement is of paramount con-
cern, however, it would appear not just useless, but positively self-de-
feating, to wait until a case comes before a court before attempting to 
engage in such accurate measurement. Rather than requiring taxpay-
ers to mislabel their status intentionally and then searching for an ac-
curate label only if and when that taxpayer is brought before a court, 
one might instead simply ask taxpayers to apply an accurate label to a 
given status in the first instance. Only if the taxpayer failed to describe 
its own status with sufficient accuracy would the case be brought 
before a court. If a taxpayer engaged in tax avoidance by inaccurately 
measuring its status, the court could address that problem; but by sep-
arating the problem from that of status measurement, a court could 
look for, and then remedy, true tax avoidance rather than some other 
mixed, and mixed-up, perceived problem. 
Under this proposed regime, a corporation that issued an instru-
ment that was 35% like debt would properly treat that instrument as a 
blended one, of which each dollar is 35% debt and 65% equity. If the 
Internal Revenue Service's analysis of the makeup of that instrument 
differed substantially from the label set forth by the taxpayer, it would 
make its opinion known, and if the Internal Revenue Service had 
cause to believe that the inaccurate characterization employed by the 
298. Two courts in fact have bifurcated hybrid instruments into separate debt and equity 
components. See Richmond R.R. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1975); Farley Realty 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1960). None have attempted to apply anything 
but an "all or nothing" approach to debt equity problems outside of convertible hybrids, how-
ever. See generally Madison, The Deductibility of "Interest" on Hybrid Securities, 39 TAX LAW. 
465 (1986). 
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taxpayer was intentional, it would seek to extract a penalty from the 
taxpayer as punishment for tax avoidance. The result would be a sys-
tem in which accurate reporting was encouraged and intentional mis-
representation was punished. 
Another benefit that would accompany a system in which tax 
avoidance was directly addressed would be that when it was proved, 
the punishment that accompanied it could be one that bore an appro-
priate relationship to the factors that make such action deserving of 
punishment in the first place. Facts such as the extent of mis-
characterization, rather than the overall resemblance of the ·instru-
ment to either debt or equity, could take their proper place in 
determining the remedy. While any kind of tax avoidance that was 
especially difficult to detect, and which was therefore a significant 
threat to the system's integrity, might carry with it some legislatively 
imposed stronger potential sanction than would less threatening kinds 
of avoidance, a court could determine the extent to which that poten-
tial sanction should be actually imposed by looking to the degree to 
which the taxpayer has misrepresented the actual status being 
determined. 
c. Possible problems. Clearly, the suggested approach to gross 
measurement problems would encourage all those involved (taxpayers, 
the Internal Revenue Service, and courts) to attempt to describe the 
status at issue with greater precision than is currently the case; none-
theless, in many situations, complete precision might be unattainable. 
The current approach to these problems, while less accurate, may at 
least lead to greater predictability; and some may suggest that the loss 
of that predictability would outweigh the benefits of the more reasoned 
approach to the problem. It would not. While predictability of mea-
surement is not without some value, in tax cases, that predictability 
can also be the source of some significant problems. When taxpayers 
are told that they can even intentionally engage in mismeasurement of 
status or income with impunity, as long as they do so within fairly 
clearly delineated boundaries, they inevitably will do so, and they will 
do so in a way that maximizes the potential mismeasurement in their 
own favor. The result is not only that taxpayers will pay less tax than 
they should, but also that they will be encouraged by the tax laws to 
take uneconomic actions that no one actually intends to encourage. 
For example, assume that a corporation would, if it sought to act in 
the most economically efficient manner, issue an instrument that was 
48% like debt and 52% like equity. If it wants the instrument to be 
treated as debt and if it is told that it can be assured of debt status by 
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making relatively slight changes in the instrument, it will, in all likeli-
hood, make those changes. It will sacrifice economic efficiency for the 
benefits of tax avoidance. 
To the extent that it influences taxpayer conduct, the predictable 
classification of any instrument as either all debt or all equity, like any 
gross measurement problem, is simply malfunctioning. Ideally, the 
function of any measurement is to do just and only that - to measure. 
While the act of measuring any status may necessarily affect that sta-
tus to some degree,299 if the goal really is purely measurement of that 
status, then any impact that the act of measurement may have on that 
status is necessarily dysfunctional.300 To the extent that the function 
of the system is to measure economic income in a way that does not 
interfere with economic productivity,301 the "best" system would not 
be the one that was the most predictable, but would instead be one in 
which no one had any idea of how income would be measured, and 
taxpayers would therefore base their actions only on maximizing their 
pre-tax economic returns. Once taxpayers learn that certain predict-
able kinds of economic returns are under- or overtaxed, they will begin 
to consider tax consequences in planning their activities, and the tax 
system will have unintentionally gone from merely measuring to actu-
ally impacting on taxpayer economic activity. Similarly, mere mea-
surement of some status other than economic income can never be 
intended to affect the status that is being measured. 302 
In any event, the potential degree of uncertainty with respect to 
any estimate made by a taxpayer would be limited. First of all, if 
courts were asked to analyze cases and make more precise determina-
tions (and if they were told what it was that they were supposed to be 
measuring), judicial precedent would become more appropriately fo-
cused and, as a result, more exact. Rather than simply listing several 
factors that indicate that an instrument lies between two extremes, and 
then characterizing it as being only either extreme, courts would be 
299. This was the conclusion of Professor Heisenberg that gave rise to the famous "uncer-
tainty principle" dealing with the laws of physics. See R. LEIGHTON, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN 
PHYSICS 86 (1959). 
300. If there is, in these cases, a systemic goal aside from measurement of the status in ques-
tion, then that can only be because there is a substitute reference problem in addition to the gross 
measurement problem, and that other goal is necessarily not being met. Of course, the system 
will often want to encourage persons to exhibit the particular factor in question by rewarding 
them if, or to the extent that, they have achieved that status; but the reward is necessarily sepa-
rate from, and must always be subsequent to, accurate measurement of the status to be rewarded. 
301. As it is in the debt equity cases. 
302. One might, of course, affect the extent to which a subject exhibits some status by re-
warding (or punishing) the subject in accordance with his exhibition of the status in question; but 
in such a case it is the application of the reward, and not the mere measurement of the status, 
that affects behavior. 
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called upon to explain the relative significance of those different enu-
merated factors and then to decide where the instrument does in fact 
lie. 
In addition to requiring courts to address gross measurement 
problems with greater precision, requiring accurate measurement 
would also (hopefully) trigger significant administrative action. The 
Internal Revenue Service could issue guidelines and examples for 
characterization of instruments; and in setting forth the various fac-
tors and their relative rights, the Internal Revenue Service would be 
likely to achieve a much greater degree of success than was the result 
of its latest struggle to issue guidelines concerning characterization of 
debt and equity under the current all-or-nothing approach. 3o3 
Of course, there would necessarily be some uncertainty among tax-
payers with respect to precise characterization of status, but much 
could be done to minimize it both in amount and in impact. First of 
all, to the extent that a transaction involved more than one party,304 
the parties would be able to allocate responsib~ty for any subse-
quently determined inaccuracy in the asserted measurement to a single 
participant, who might then act as the "insurer" of the agreed upon 
position with respect to the other parties by compensating them for 
any subsequent tax increase. With respect to trarisactions where one 
party controlled both the real character and the tax label of a transac-
tion, other parties could consider the extent of the possible inaccura-
cies in status measurement that inhered in the label .affixed to the 
instrument, and the extent of any warranties behind that label, and 
could then price the instrument accordingly.305 
In cases where there were significant amounts of tax at stake, tax-
payers could, as tb,ey do now, ask for reassurance from the Internal 
Revenue Service in the form of advance private rulings. While the 
number of such requests might increase, any additional burden would 
be well worth its necessary consequence of more accurate measure-
ment. Of course, the Internal Revenue Service would neither want to, 
nor be able to, respond to ruling requests from every taxpayer on every 
status question. Those who could not obtain such rulings would often 
be unable to predict with exact precision the measurement that the 
Internal Revenue Service might make of the status in question; and the 
result might well be some degree of unpredictability of tax conse-
303. Sees. LIND, s. SCHWARZ, D. LATHROPE & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 34, ch.3. 
304. As under current law, all parties to a particular transaction ought to be required to take 
consistent reporting positions. 
305. It is, of course, possible that private "appraisers" and insurers might be used in some 
situations, but it is hoped the need for them would be minimal. 
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quences. One response to this possible problem, however, is that not 
every error (or disagreement with the Internal Revenue Service) in 
status measurement will lead to imposition of a different measurement 
by a court. Unless the Internal Revenue Service decides to challenge a 
taxpayer's proposed status measurement, that measurement will stand 
despite its imprecision; and unless the taxpayer's label is significantly 
incorrect, it is not likely to be challenged. Guidelines, presumably re-
lated to the degree of misrepresentation, the dollar amount in issue, or 
both, could be issued explaining when perceived difference between an 
actual status and the way it is presented by the taxpayer may subject 
the taxpayer's asserted measurement to challenge, so that, to some ex-
tent, safe harbors could exist. 
The above might place a greater significance on the Internal Reve-
nue Service's actions than does current law. However, because the 
problems with the current system are the result of attempts to make a 
system that is administratively convenient, it seems only appropriate 
that a determination of whether the potential revenue gains from chal-
lenging a measurement outweigh the administrative convenience of 
letting it go unchallenged ought to be made by the agency charged 
with administering the system. 
d. Applying the approach to other areas. Although the above 
discussion has focused primarily on the problem of debt-equity classifi-
cation, its premises are equally applicable to other gross measurement 
problems.306 If a taxpayer has held an asset for investment (capital 
gain) purposes and later converts the use of that asset to one that 
would result in its gain or loss being characterized as ordinary, some 
of the taxpayer's gain or loss on the asset ought to be "capital" and 
some ought to be "ordinary," but current law nonetheless requires the 
taxpayer to report all gain as either one ·or the other. As a result, 
under the current approach, if A and B each hold property with mixed 
motives, and A's motives are 45% "capital" while B's are only 30% 
"capital," each one's gain will be characterized as entirely ordinary, so 
thatA is punished with a reclassification that is 45% inaccurate, while 
B's punishment is only a 30% inaccuracy. Although A has exhibited 
more of the status sought to be benefited, A is subjected to a greater 
306. To the extent that it is necessary to determine the ownership of land or other property, 
such can only be done by reference to the value of each person's rights (or of whatever rights 
constitute ownership) in that property, so, as explained, supra, ownership is a gross measurement 
question. The article does not explore the application of this approach to ownership, however, 
because determination of who is the owner of property is likely to be irrelevant unless there is 
also a substitute reference problem in that "owner" is used to substitute for some other relation· 
ship. See infra Part III.D.2, where this concept is explored more fully. 
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punishment. To ask the taxpayer properly to characterize the resul-
tant gain or loss on sale as partly capital and partly ordinary will re-
sult in more accurate measurement of the status at issue, less 
unintended distortion of the taxpayer's behavior, more equity, and a 
more accurate distribution of intended incentives. 307 Similar to the 
suggested treatment of debt versus equity questions, punishment for 
the tax-avoiding person could be based on the degree of the taxpayer's 
misrepresentation, rather than on the arbitrary punishment inherent in 
reclassifying all of the taxpayer's gain as ordinary when, in reality, 
some portion ought to be treated as capital. 
Similarly, asking taxpayers to characterize expenses as partly busi-
ness and partly personal might assist in the correction of some other 
lingering measurement problems. 308 While difficulties of proof in-
volved in the business-personal distinction might lead to arbitrary 
classification of certain expenses as 100% personal,309 requesting accu-
rate reporting of expenses now often reported as 100% business would 
be both fair and fairly straightforward. 
Requesting accurate reporting of what are now gross measure-
ments might be simplest in cases of corporate formation and reorgani-
zation. In these cases, the taxpayer knows the exact extent to which 
his interest changes. For example, if A transfers property (basis $100, 
value $1000) to X Corporation in exchange for 60% of the X stock in a 
tax-free transfer, A's interest has gone from 100% in the land to 60% 
in the stock, which is a substitute referent for the land. Similarly, if 
A's interest goes from 60% of X to, say, 40% of the stock of X because 
of a subsequent stock issue, or to 40% of the stock of Y (a different 
corporation and substitute referent for the X stock) because of a reor-
ganization, the calculations are straightforward. Tax-free treatment is 
given to these transactions only because the taxpayers purportedly do 
not change their investment. Imposition of the negative incentive that 
attaches to other realization events (i.e., taxation of previously accrued 
gains), to the extent that a taxpayer does change that investment, 
seems only reasonable.310 
307. A similar approach could be taken when the taxpayer held a certain asset with mixed 
motives (le., partly for sale to customers and partly for investment) to the extent that such mixed 
motive investments are not governed by I.R.C. § 1231 (1982). 
308. Legislative recognition of the personal element that results from any business meal is in 
fact evidenced by I.R.C. § 274(n) (1982), which now limits deductions for such meals to 80% of 
their cost. 
309. See Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980), rehg. denied, 636 F.2d 1106 
(5th Cir. 1981) (clothing is a personal expense unless uniform is not suitable for personal use); see 
also I.R.C. §§ 280A, 280F (1982) (certain partly business-partly personal expenses made com-
pletely nondeductible in certain circumstances, despite business component). 
310. Because the negative incentive of a transferred basis attaches to the corporation that 
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Of course, changing the way in which we ask taxpayers to report, 
and the way that we view, remedy, and punish tax avoidance would 
necessarily be gradual and would require some enabling legislation; 
that legislation need not change the way we deal with all of these gross 
measurement problems, regardless of whether or not the general ap-
proach is sensible. Nonetheless, an attempt to pinpoint one or more of 
these areas and to attempt to apply the approach suggested above 
would be worthwhile and might well prove sufficiently beneficial to 
motivate a broad based switch to the replacement of gross measure-
ments with more re~ed, and more realistic, estimates of tax-signifi-
cant factors. 
2. Substitute Referent Problems 
Unlike gross measurement problems, substitute referent problems 
cannot be adequately addressed by demanding more accurate report-
ing by taxpayers. In these situations, the taxpayers are making and 
reporting precise measurements (unless, of course, there is also a gross 
measurement problem). Instead, the problem is that the factor that is 
required to be measured and reported is the wrong one. For example, 
rather than reporting the amount by which her retirement savings 
have increased over what they would have without the tax benefit af-
forded retirement plans, the taxpayer instead reports, with perfect pre-
cision, the amount of certain kinds of investments that she has made. 
While the most direct cure for substitute referent problems would 
be for the statute simply to refer to the real status at which it is aimed, 
the statute's failure to do so is generally the result of real difficulties in 
measuring the ideal referents. In other words, these cases arise only 
because it is impossible to measure accurately the real factor sought to 
be measured. Any approach to these problems, then, should not de-
pend on accurate measurement of the real referent. Instead, because 
the problem of inaccurate measurement of the ideal referent in these 
cases is generally acceptable except when it is exacerbated. by taxpay-
ers intentionally abusing the substitution of a different referent, these 
cases can be most efficiently addressed by simply preventing that in-
tentional abuse. Essentially, rather than eliminating tax avoidance by 
requiring accurate measurement of the real referent, the more worka-
ble approach to these problems would focus on minimizing inaccurate 
measurement of the real referent by eliminating tax avoidance. Where 
receives assets in a tax-free organization or reorganization, I.R.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), 
to the extent that A does not receive tax-free treatment, that correlative negative incentive 
should, of course, be adjusted (i.e., increased by gain recognized to A). See infra note 316 (trans-
feree's basis equals transferor's basis plus gain recognized by transferor). 
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the mismeasurement is merely coincidental, it is also tolerable; where 
the mismeasurement is intended, it should be corrected. To the extent 
that the taxpayer is engaging in tax avoidance, she ought to be denied 
the ability to measure her tax liability by reliance on a substitute refer-
ent, and should instead be entitled to the tax benefits in question only 
to the extent that she would be entitled to them under a system which 
directly measured the ideal referent. 
Examples of how this approach might work are numerous. If K 
invests $1,000,000 in an annuity that produces $100,000 of tax de-
ferred income, without actually saving more than he otherwise would · 
have, he might be denied the benefit of all of that deferral. If this 
investment results in K saving, say, $200,000 more than he would have 
absent the tax benefit, and the tax benefit he received was based upon 
the substitution of the purchase of the $1,000,000 annuity for a 
$1,000,000 increase in savings, he might be entitled to retain 20% of 
the benefit of that deferral. 
Similarly, if a taxpayer's refusal to sell an appreciated asset was 
motivated both by tax avoidance and by other considerations, she 
might be disallowed part of the deferral of previously accrued gains 
that generally accompanies a refusal to realize those gains. Thus, if A, 
B, and C each has property with a basis of zero and a value of 
$1,000,000, and each is offered $1,001,000 for the property, then if A's 
refusal is based purely on economic grounds, A would be entitled to 
complete deferral, if B's decision was solely tax motivated (e.g., be-
cause she wanted to avoid or defer tax on her previously accrued 
gains), she would be required to recognize her gain in full, and if C's 
decision took into account both factors equally, he would be required 
to recognize half of his accrued gains. 
In the corporate area, if D transferred a highly appreciated asset to 
newly formed X Co. partly in ord~r to take advantage of the substitu-
tion of X stock as a referent for the asset, then to that extent D ought 
to be denied the benefit of nonrecognition (i.e., freedom from taxation 
of previously accrued gains) that generally accompanies corporate for-
mations. For example, if D incorporated solely to be able to defer 
recognition of gain while actually changing his ownership rights from 
direct asset ownership to stock ownership, he should receive no con-
tinued deferral of accrued gains. If, on the other hand, the change in 
his relationship to the transferred asset was only a byproduct of some 
other goal of D's, such as limiting his potential liability with respect to 
the asset, and the fact that such change was accomplished without 
incurring a tax was only incidental, then the use of stock ownership to 
substitute for asset ownership is not being abused, and D should re-
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ceive complete deferral. If D's motives were mixed, partial deferral 
would be appropriate. m 
Of course, relying in the first instance on establishing tax avoid-
ance presents several problems. First of all, this approach presents a 
workable remedy only if the existence and extent of tax avoidance can 
be identified. Because the presence of tax avoidance is in part a func-
tion of the taxpayer's state of mind, proving avoidance requires prov-
ing that state of mind; and even accepting that any person's motive is a 
matter of degree does not explain how that degree can be 
determined. 312 
Unfortunately, the proposed approach does little to make proof of 
tax avoidance any easier. Indeed, proof of tax avoidance might often 
bear substantial resemblance to the kinds of proof currently offered. If 
D incorporates, a tax-free reorganization in which D trades her Newco 
stock for Publicly Held stock following right on the heels of that initial 
incorporation would be strong evidence that D's initial incorporation 
was motivated by a desire to change her ownership from that of a 
tangible asset to stock (because the stock had the attribute of being 
able to be exchanged tax free in the reorganization). If A acquires 
offsetting positions in a straddle, so that any nontax gain from contin-
ued retention of the "gain" leg is impossible, there is strong proof that 
A's refusal to sell is motivated by tax avoidance. If K purchases an 
annuity with borrowed funds, there is strong evidence that the annuity 
investment was made to avoid taxes rather than to increase savings. If 
311. For the use of compromise in other areas, see, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (Plaintiff could not 
identify which of several companies manufactured the particular pills that injured the plaintill'. 
Each defendant had the burden of demonstrating that it did not make the pills. If a defendant 
could not meet that burden, its percentage of liability would be equivalent to its share of the 
market for the drug.). Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (en bane) (Two hunters 
negligently fired in plaintiff's direction and were held jointly liable because it was impossible to 
determine which hunter's bullet had hit plaintiff.); see also Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic 
Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under 
S.E.C Rule JOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1277 (1981); Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation 
of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 891 (1982) ("Ameri-
can case and statutory law has not yet changed to accommodate injuries to classes the identity of 
whose members is unknown."); King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts 
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1354 (1981) ("the 
loss of a chance of achieving a favorable outcome or of avoiding an adverse consequence should 
be compensable and be valued appropriately, rather than treated as an all-or-nothing 
proposition"). 
312. Motives other than tax avoidance are also often relevant in determining tax liability. 
See generally Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose in Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
Nonetheless, motive has never been easy to establish. Id. at 505-20; see also Note, State of Mind 
Analysis in Corporate Taxation, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1224, 1225-26 (1969) (Even when applying 
tax statutes that specifically refer to the taxpayer's state of mind, courts "have by and large come 
to de-emphasize subjectivity and have either substituted more objective criteria or have relied on 
the wholly mechanical requirements often provided as alternatives by the statutes."). 
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C retains title to appreciated property but.subjects the property to a 
long-term lease and an option to buy in the future at a price below the 
asset's predicted value, C's motive to avoid realization becomes evi-
dent. Essentially, an action that tends to counteract the economic im-
pact that the first action might otherwise have made, without 
counteracting the tax consequences of that first action, evidences a 
likely tax-avoidance motive. 
Although there would be substantial similarities in the proof of-
fered under the suggested approach and the proof offered in current 
tax-avoidance cases, the approaches nonetheless differ .significantly. 
First of all, while actions such as borrowing money and engaging in 
straddles and so called step transactions may be strong evidence of tax 
avoidance, these actions are not themselves the tax avoidance. If D 
incorporates low basis assets in Newco in order to be able to exchange 
her Newco stock for stock in some other, publicly held, company at 
some later date, the existence of tax avoidance does not depend on 
whether D now knows which publicly held company she will sell to, or 
on whether she has completed or even begun negotiations with any 
company. Similarly, the existence of tax avoidance does not depend 
on whether a taxpayer borrows money (e.g., in sale-leaseback cases) or 
sells property that has declined in value (e.g., in straddles): a taxpayer 
may be engaging in tax avoidance even absent any particular kind of 
proof. Those factors are all only evidence of D's motive, but it is the 
motive, and not the kinds of evidence, that the system ought to be 
seeking to deter. 
Among other things, confusing evidence of tax avoidance with the 
tax avoidance itself serves to insulate tax avoidance from administra-
tive and judicial scrutiny as long as the taxpayer engages in tax avoid-
ance in a way that is evidenced differently. The person who holds 
appreciated property until death in order to avoid tax may be said to 
be engaging in tax "planning" rather than tax "avoidance," but her 
behavior is no less wrong and no less economically unsound (and no 
less immoral), than that of the person who engages in tax straddle. 
The difference is only that her motive is less provable. Along the same 
lines, the person who borrows from B to pay A is not less guilty of tax 
avoidance.than is the person who borrows from A to pay A; 313 the 
313. According to the proposed definition, neither person is guilty of tax avoidance because 
neither deducting business interest paid nor excluding borrowed funds from income mismeasures 
economic income in any event. Nonetheless, many cases deny the deduction where the money 
used to pay the otherwise deductible interest is borrowed from the ultimate payee. See, e.g., 
Cleaver v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 849 (1947); Battel-
stein v. Commissioner, 631F.2d1182 (5th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981). Courts 
may grant the deduction, however, where the money used to pay the deduction is borrowed from 
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only difference is that it may be easier to prove the second taxpayer's 
state of mind. While it is only proper to limit judicial intervention to 
cases that are proved, it is the trier of fact that should determine when 
the evidence is adequate to prove the facts in question. What facts are 
actually in question should not, in tum, depend upon the evidence that 
might prove them. Statements to the effect that tax avoidance is gen-
erally acceptable, except in step transaction cases, only tum adminis-
trative ease (i.e., of proving avoidance) into a moral construct, 
resulting in decreased confidence in the system, decreased revenue (be-
cause some non-step transaction cases of tax avoidance that are prova-
ble are not pursued), and decreased equity.314 
Where the only remedy for tax avoidance is a restructuring of the 
entire transaction, the confusion of tax avoidance itself with the evi-
dence of that tax avoidance is of little concern. Unless the facts indi-
cate that the taxpayer could have achieved the same economic results 
by some other means, there is, under current law, no remedy for tax 
avoidance. In such cases, it may do little harm to suggest that there 
simply is no tax avoidance at all. On the other hand, the proposed 
approach does not condition its remedy on a court's ability to suggest 
a third party. See, e.g., Crain v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1935); McAdams v. Com-
missioner, 15 T.C. 231, 235 (1950), ajfd., 198 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1952). 
314. Arguably, to the extent that a particular kind of tax avoidance is difficult to prove, it 
may actually increase taxpayer confidence to assert that that kind of avoidance is not "bad." In 
that case, the system makes arbitrary distinctions between "good" and "bad," but at least it 
appears basically able to enforce its prohibition against what it does label "bad." This may be 
preferable to a system that makes logical laws and distinctions, but that is unable to enforce those 
laws uniformly. If perceived ability to enforce the law is important, however, it would seem 
more reasonable to acknowledge that many kinds of tax avoidance are "bad,'' but that only those 
more readily subject to proof are "actionable." That would at least provide an understandable 
basis for drawing distinctions. 
In addition, it is not at all clear that the present position of the courts and Internal Revenue 
Service does result in any kind of increased confidence in the tax laws. Many people have a 
strongly held belief that other taxpayers (mainly the wealthier and more well-advised) are able to 
avoid their fair share of taxes. It is doubtful that these people feel more confident in the system 
because they are told that the others are avoiding their taxes legally. Indeed, most of these 
people would likely think more highly of a system that at least shared their outrage at tax avoid-
ance, even if the system was frustrated in its attempt to prosecute its case. 
It is true that difficulty of enforcement of specific cases of tax avoidance might result in a 
relatively small percentage of these avoiders being caught, and one might suggest that enforce-
ment against those who happen to be caught would be unfair when compared to the similarly 
situated taxpayers who avoid detection as well as taxation. However, if it is admitted that tax 
avoidance is worthy of deterrence (and punishment), then the truth is that if there is unfairness, 
it lies not in unfair prosecution of the few who are caught, but in unfair escape for the many who 
are not caught. To refrain from exacting taxes from those who can be detected would merely 
increase the number of people given an undeserved bonus. 
In any event, it is clear that some instances of tax avoidance outside of step transaction cases 
could be proved even now. In addition, if all taxpayers were told that more kinds of tax avoid-
ance would be punishable when detected, many of them would avoid engaging in those tax moti-
vated transactions in the first place, and the revenues would thereby be increased without the 
need to prove anything to anyone. 
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that what happened did not happen. Instead, the remedy for tax 
avoidance is the full or partial withdrawal of the tax benefit that would 
otherwise be improperly granted. As a result, the approach is fully 
compatible with the possibility that the evidence may be either contra-
dictory or incomplete: mixed motives can result in partial withdrawal 
of tax benefits, and the fact that the net economic effect of the tax-
payer's conduct could not be replicated by some other, less-favored, 
actions may mean only that achieving the particular net economic 
consequences was one of several motivating factors. It does not mean, 
and ought not to be taken to mean, that the taxpayer was wholly lack-
ing any tax avoidance motive. Indeed, the truth is that a taxpayer may 
take a particular action not because she wants to achieve some eco-
nomic end result, but only because she wants to avoid tax without 
detection. Under current law, she may do so by taking some economi-
cally unproductive or counterproductive steps, so long as those steps 
cannot be recharacterized as some other transaction. Under the pro-
posed approach, such attempts by a taxpayer to cover her footprints 
will be seen as nothing more than that. 
By choosing to remedy tax avoidance, in the first instance,315 by 
removing an incentive to the extent it is being abused, the suggested 
approach also does away with the transactional consistency problems 
that surround current doctrines. If a purchaser is engaging in tax 
avoidance, the remedy need not be to conclude that the seller did not 
make a sale, or that it sold something different; if a borrower attempts 
to avoid tax, the conclusion need not be that the lender did not make a 
loan. One party's tax avoidance ought to affect only that party, and it 
need no longer be inextricably intertwined with redefining what some 
other party to a transaction actually did.316 
As with the suggested approach to gross measurement cases, one 
arguable problem with this approach to substituted referents is the po-
tential uncertainty it may cause. If tax avoidance can be proved 
315. As suggested earlier with regard to gross measurement problems, additional penalties 
could also be imposed. These penalties ought to relate to the degree of abuse rather than to the 
arbitrary amount of extra tax that might be due if the transaction were recharacterized as some 
different transaction. 
316. When tax avoidance is found to have motivated one party to a corporate reorganization 
or formation, that finding might still affect at least one other party to the transaction. Because 
the transferee's basis in these exchanges is generally the basis of the transferor increased by the 
transferor's gain recognized, if the transferor loses some deferral as a result of tax avoidance, it 
will recognize additional gain which will in turn increase the transferee's basis. Nonetheless, 
unlike McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982), the transferee 
could not go to court alone and increase its basis by establishing the transferor's tax avoidance. 
Unless the transferor actually recognized the extra gain (i.e., because it was forced to, in the same 
or a different judicial proceeding), the transferor's actions would be irrelevant to the transferee's 
basis. 
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outside of traditional cases, taxpayers may not know exactly what to 
do to avoid a finding of tax avoidance. While most of the previous 
discussion regarding uncertainty as it relates to gross measurement 
problems is equally applicable to substituted referent problems,317 
there are some aspects of substitute referent problems that merit addi-
tional attention. Substitute referent cases will often involve some in-
tended incentive (e.g., increased savings), and when Congress does 
want to encourage a certain activity, any incentive will be more effec-
tive in motivating action when availability of the incentive is certain. 
As a result, certainty may be of more significance in these cases than in 
gross measurement cases. 
Perhaps a more serious problem in substitute referent cases is that 
the degree of uncertainty present will be greater than it might be in 
pure gross measurement cases. Because tax avoidance depends on mo-
tive, determination. of the extent of that motive presents an initial gross 
measurement problem. In addition, at issue in these cases will be the 
extent to which the measurement of the substitute referent accurately 
measures the correct referent. Thus, any problem in determining what 
that correct referent is can exaggerate any other uncertainty. As un-
certainty is increased, the taxpayer who does exactly what Congress 
intended becomes less certain that he can prove that motive, and in-
centives may become less effective. 
While these complicating factors do exist in substitute referent 
cases, they are not without solution. In fact, the suggested approach 
may lead to less uncertainty than does the current approach to tax 
avoidance. Under the current regime, a difference between a court's 
finding the presence of a 49% tax-avoidance motive and a 51 % tax-
avoidance motive may change the characterization of an exchange by 
100%. Especially in a world where conclusions are based on a semi-
intuitive application of a long list of generally relevant criteria, the 
outcome will often be more or less a "crapshoot." While imposing a 
remedy based on the extent of tax avoidance will not necessarily make 
proof more precise, at least a 2 % difference in the degree of bad mo-
tive found would count for a 2%, rather than a 100%, difference in the 
outcome. Reducing the amount at stake in the judicial "crapshoot" 
317. It may appear that some of that discussion might be inapplicable because tax avoidance 
here relates to only one party while gross measurement problems can often involve two parties. 
However, if one party to an exchange considers that his participation in that exchange may be 
found to be motivated at least partially by tax avoidance, he may see the potential removal of a 
benefit that would otherwise attach to his participation in the transaction, such as nonrecogni· 
tion, as an added cost of his participation. Presumably, he will take this possibility into account 
when negotiating the exchange, and may pass some of this cost on to the other party. The result 
will be that, like debt-equity problems, both parties may be affected, although the effect in substi-
tute referent problems is admittedly less direct. 
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provides much greater certainty as to the overall result. Clearly there 
will still be both imprecision and inaccuracy. No court could really 
tell that a person is motivated by tax avoidance to say, 67%, rather 
than to 69%. But compromise in remedy will insure that both the 
extent and the effect of these problems are minimized. 
Indeed, the suggested approach would be likely to limit uncer-
tainty in many cases by removing those cases entirely from the judicial 
arena. When settlements are likely to mirror the actual results of 
court decisions rather than to reflect some considered possibility of the 
chances of complete success, justifying the costs of litigation will be 
more and more difficult. This suggested outcome is supported by ac-
tual results in those states which have adopted comparative negligence 
principles. 318 
Of course, while the results of any particular case might be more 
predictable, predictability would be lost in the determination of when 
cases might be brought. Because the Internal Revenue Service would 
no longer be required to prove "complete" tax avoidance motive in 
order to deny any part of an abused tax benefit, the Internal Revenue 
Service would have substantially increased discretion in deciding what 
cases to bring. The bright line that insulates the taxpayer who is only 
half motivated by tax avoidance, or who engages in actions that are 
not readily subject to recharacterization, would be erased. 
This aspect could be especially disheartening to many who engage 
in what are now accepted methods of tax planning. For example, the 
person who holds significant amounts of low-basis property until 
death in order to allow her heirs to take that property with a stepped-
up basis may be surprised to learn that she may be denied deferral of 
some or all of her accrued gains. There are several responses to this, 
and the first is that the taxpayer's surprise simply may not be a prob-
lem at all. Other than the fact that we have permitted taxpayers to 
engage in this type of abuse in the past, there is little to suggest that we 
ought to allow them to do so in the future. To the extent that the 
system encouraged taxpayers to engage in actions that were economi-
318. Some might suggest that because the risks might be lessened (no one will suffer a total 
loss), taxpayers will be more inclined to take those risks. Many taxpayers who would be assured 
defeat under current law might be able to win something, if less than 100% of what they seek. 
On the other hand, while the risks ofloss are lessened, the benefits of victory are correspondingly 
decreased. As to the party who might be tempted to choose litigation, and the corresponding 
guarantee of some success, over what people would agree ought to be a holding of pure tax 
avoidance, the suggested approach need not be carried to extremes. When it is determined that 
one party's nontax-avoidance motive is sufficiently minimal, that position could simply be denied 
in toto. Indeed, similar ideas are currently reflected in the Internal Revenue Service's own posi-
tions with respect to settlement and compromise, in that settlement will not be "made based 
upon nuisance value of the case to either party." (Statement of Procedural Rules) Treas. Reg. 
§ 601.106(f)(2) (as amended in 1987). 
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cally productive, rather than in behavior that was productive only of 
tax benefits, there would be little harm done. In addition, if adminis-
trators (or Congress) decided to preserve some of these tax benefits 
despite their lack of utility, it would be simple to exempt those actions 
specifically from administrative or judicial scrutiny. 
In any event, the assurance with which most taxpayers generally 
act would not be substantially changed. Even assuming that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service could prove all its positions in court, it would be 
unrealistic to assume that it would assess deficiencies against all tax-
payers. Instead, it would be likely to pursue only those who were most 
abusive. While taxpayers who engaged in minimal abuse would have 
little to fear, the taxpayer who engaged in substantial tax avoidance 
would stand a significantly greater likelihood of having to pay for her 
sins. 
If the Internal Revenue Service were no longer required to limit its 
attacks to those who step over a bright line, and to refrain from pursu-
ing those who are sufficiently well advised that they constantly stay 
just one step behind the line, the result would be that the Internal 
Revenue Service could attack tax avoiders rather than just those who 
had not been so cleverly advised. The well-advised would be well ad-
vised to expect attacks, and the less well advised would also need to be 
less well defended. Again, the determination of which taxpayers to 
pursue could be based on reasoned analysis of the extent of avoidance 
and the potential impact of that type of avoidance, rather than on the 
arbitrary factors currently in place. If certain transactions were espe-
cially bad (i.e., marketed tax shelters), the Internal Revenue Service 
could go after all participants ("horizontal equity"). If one taxpayer 
were more abusive, the Internal Revenue Service could go after him 
alone on a broader range of transactions ("vertical equity"). 
Of course, the lack of certainty in the proposed approach may still 
have some drawbacks. Taxpayers not motivated by tax avoidance at 
all may fear that the Internal Revenue Service and a court may none-
. theless mischaracterize their motives and withdraw tax benefits to 
which they are entitled. Unfortunately, this is a possibility in any situ-
ation where motive is at issue: motive is ultimately knowable, if at all, 
only by the actor; where it is in the actor's economic interest to dis-
guise that motive, the actor's testimony may be wrongly disregarded. 
In truth, this same problem exists in current law. The difference in the 
proposed approach is only that, where the truth is unclear or motives 
are mixed, the end result can accurately reflect that uncertainty. 
The greater flexibility provided to the Internal Revenue Service by 
the suggested approach would, of course, carry with it a greater re-
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sponsibility in areas in addition to that of choosing which taxpayers to 
pursue. Taxpayers would have to be made aware of when transactions 
set forth in the Code are in fact substitute referents for some other 
behavior. While sometimes the use of a substitute referent, and what 
it substitutes for, will be clear, other times that will not be the case. 
Guidance would have to be provided by the Internal Revenue Service 
(and by the courts) ,to supplement the legislative history that now ex-
ists. Often, providing that guidance would be simple. Other times it 
would not. As suggested earlier, provisions such as deferral of taxa-
tion until realization can substitute for several very different ideal 
referents. 
Requiring the Internal Revenue Service and courts to analyze the 
presence of substitute referents coherently may also have significant 
side benefits. By determining the underlying objectives of any provi-
sion, these agencies may come to recognize those provisions with re-
spect to which current judicial and administrative interpretations are 
misguided. For example, neither the courts nor the Internal Revenue 
Service allow the tax benefits of accelerated depreciation to go to the 
legal owner of property unless that titleholder also has certain other 
rights in the asset. This necessarily implies that legal "ownership" of 
an asset actually substitutes for some other relationship to the asset 
which more accurately describes the person to receive the deduction. 
By examining this other relationship, such as use, for which ownership 
substitutes, rather than by focusing on some extra legal definition of 
what "ownership" is, the Internal Revenue Service might make a more 
properly focused inquiry into who ought to receive the benefit to 
which the owner otherwise would appear to be entitled.319 
319. In fact, an attempt to make this inquiry may lead to the conclusion that legal ownership 
is not a substitute referent for anything else at all, but is a perfectly reasonable description of the 
status that ought to be rewarded. If, as appears to be the case, Congress' objective in allowing 
accelerated depreciation was to lower the after-tax cost of certain assets, then there is actually no 
relationship to the asset that can describe who should get the deduction. Essentially, the incen-
tive is intended to be asset-specific rather than person-specific. The system attempts to attach a 
benefit to an asset through a system that applies only to persons. If the incentive is successful, 
then any person who holds title, sells, purchases, uses, or manufactures the asset may benefit 
from the incentive. Regardless of which taxpayer actually takes the accelerated deduction, the 
lower cost of the asset will be shared by all those involved and the way in which the benefit is 
shared will be determined by market forces regardless of who takes the actual income tax deduc-
tion. 
The only substantial impact that limiting the benefit to someone other than the legal title-
holders can have is to limit the amount of the benefit, because those who bear the "correct" 
relationship to the asset and who are in lower brackets will get less benefit from the same deduc-
tion. If the incentive is intended to lower the cost of the asset, then restriction of the amount of 
benefit based on some person's relationship to that asset would appear counterproductive. If the 
incentive is intended to be smaller when some low bracket taxpayer bears a certain relationship, 
one ought to identify what that relationship is. If it is "user,'' then no matter how strictly the 
Internal Revenue Service focuses on defining "owner,'' it will always be defining the wrong thing. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Because of fundamental problems with our tax system, even a de-
tailed and extensive body of law such as the Internal Revenue Code 
cannot guarantee accuracy in the measurement of economic income or 
other tax-significant factors. The need to implement a system that 
both raises revenue from and distributes tax benefits to over 100 mil-
lion taxpayers justifies a system whereby taxpayers are not asked to 
measure some unarguably relevant factors simply because those fac-
tors are too hard to measure; instead, they may be asked to measure 
other factors which are more readily subject to measurement and 
which often, but not always, tend to reflect the factor actually sought 
to be measured. The same need may also justify asking taxpayers to 
make gross "all or nothing" appraisals of factors that usually lie be-
tween the two extremes. 
Not surprisingly, in a system where economic income and factors 
that result in the allocation of tax benefits are not always measured 
either accurately or directly, some persons will pay more, and others 
less, than their intended fair share of tax. Because the provisions 
which result in this mismeasurement are all public knowledge, it is 
also not surprising that the well-advised will plan their actions in order 
to take advantage of this mismeasurement, and will thereby minimize 
their own tax liability. Indeed, if allowed to proceed without restric-
tion, many wealthy persons might well be able to eliminate tax liability 
completely while accruing substantial amounts of economic income 
and failing to engage in the actual behaviors at which tax incentives 
and tax benefits have been aimed. 
In order to deter abuse of the system's inadequacies, the Internal 
Revenue Service and courts have held that tax avoidance will not be 
tolerated. This article has attempted, for the first time, to set forth a 
workable definition of what tax avoidance is. Rather than look to the 
presence of a remedy to determine the presence of tax avoidance, as 
courts have done in the past, this article has set forth a definition of 
tax avoidance and suggests that the remedy ought to follow, rather 
than precede, a determination of whether that tax avoidance exists. 
Essentially, a person is engaging in tax avoidance if, and to the 
extent that, she is acting in order to exaggerate the system's mis-
measurement of economic income or any other tax-significant factor. 
Tax avoidance can be best remedied in at least two ways: (1) where 
the mismeasurement is the result of inaccurate measurement of the 
relevant factor (gross measure:r_n.ent problems), then, to the extent pos-
sible, ask taxpayers to report accurate rather ~han inaccurate measure-
ments of that factor; and (2) where the mismeasurement is the result 
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of accurate measurement of some factor other than the one that is ac-
tually relevant (substitute reference problems), then, to the extent that 
taxpayers attempt to abuse the mismeasurement caused by reference 
to that substituted referent they ought to be denied whatever benefits 
might otherwise stem from the resultant mismeasurement. In either 
case, more abuse ought to result in additional penalties. 
The suggested approach has several advantages over current ap-
proaches to tax avoidance: (1) unlike current approaches, it is both 
intellectually honest and internally consistent; (2) it would replace ar-
bitrary results with predictability; (3) it would provide guidance where 
there now is none; and ( 4) it would provide remedies to fit the abuse, 
rather than vice versa. While this approach differs substantially from 
current law, it does so only to the extent that reasoned logic always 
differs from random chance. It is hoped that difference will lead to 
rethinking of current law rather than rejection of more reasoned 
alternatives. 
V. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES (AN AFrERTHOUGHT) 
While this article has' focused on judicial approaches to tax avoid-
ance, the ideas are equally applicable to legislative attempts to address 
the problem. This "afterthought" seeks to analyze legislative attempts 
to combat tax avoidance from the same perspective. 
When tax avoidance is the result of a substitute referent problem, it 
must be because the real referent, although known, is. unworkable. 320 
Measuring things like accrued gains, net worth, or a person's decision 
to increase savings is simply beyond the system's capability. The legis-
lative response can only be to employ a series of substitute referents, 
either for accurate status measurement or for tax avoidance. 
With some success, legislative responses have used one taxpayer's 
tax liability with respect to some payment or asset as a substitute refer-
ent for that of another taxpayer whose income or deduction may be 
less readily determinable. One example of this approach is deferral of 
an accrual method taxpayer's deduction until the accrued amount is 
paid, and therefore taxable, to the cash method recipient,321 which 
substitutes the acceleration of the payor's income for accrual taxation 
of the payee. It is simply much more manageable to ask an accrual 
method taxpayer to use the cash method with respect to some pay-
320. Compare cases involving accrued but unpaid interest, where Congress has determined 
that the real referent of accrued income rather than paid interest is a determinable and workable 
referent and has been adopted. See I.R.C. §§ 1272-1278 (1982) (requires current inclusion of 
accrued interest income regardless of payment). 
321. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267(a)(2), 4-04(a) (1982). 
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ments than vice versa, and substitution of the payor's liability for that 
of the payee will often result in accurate taxation. Similarly, use of a 
transferred basis in certain tax deferred exchanges, such as gifts and 
corporate reorganizations, substitutes the transferee's tax liability with 
respect to the previously accrued gain on the asset for that of the 
transferor. Because only the transferee will know the time and 
amount of such gain, substitution of that taxpayer avoids administra-
tive and reporting nightmares. 
As with all substitute referents, the above approaches are necessar-
ily less than 100% effective. If the substituted taxpayer is in a lower 
bracket than the real referent taxpayer, the tax collected will be too 
low; and, in the case of transferred basis provisions, if the substituted 
taxpayer recognizes the gain at a later time than the transferor realizes 
her profit, tax liability will be deferred. 
Where Congress is not able to adopt a true referent and is unwill-
ing or unable to use a different taxpayer's liability as a substitute refer-
ent, the problem becomes more difficult. The amount of tax benefits 
available to any taxpayer depends only on his ability to make and re-
tain certain investments. Because investment assets can be created at 
will322 and taxpayers can make and retain investments almost at will 
(assuming the availability of borrowed funds), the potential for the 
tax-avoiding taxpayer is almost unlimited. 
Because Congress cannot limit the amount or value of intangible 
assets that can be created, any legislative limitation on tax avoidance 
must restrict the amount of tax-favored investments that any particu-
lar taxpayer can make. Essentially, there are three kinds of such limi-
tations: (1) each taxpayer's potential benefit may be limited to a 
specified dollar amount;323 (2) each taxpayer's potential benefit may be 
limited to a certain percentage of income;324 and (3) each taxpayer's 
potential benefit may be limited to some percentage of his net 
worth.325 
322. See Rosenberg, Hannon & Lipton, Taxation of New Financial Instruments, XIX 
N.Y.U. Graduate Tax Workshop (Summer, 1988) (forthcoming). This is generally true except 
when benefits are limited to the value of tangible property (assuming that the benefit is limited to 
the value of such property and is not based on the cost, which is sometimes used as a substitute 
referent for value and which is potentially limitless). 
323. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 408 (1982). 
324. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(b) (1982) (limiting charitable contribution deductions). The al· 
ternative minimum tax, §§ 55-59 (1982), is, essentially, this kind of limitation. It applies only 
when certain selected tax benefits exceed a given percentage of taxable income. I.R.C. § 469 
(Supp. IV 1986), the passive activity loss restriction, is also this kind of limit, but limits certain 
combinations of benefits to a percentage (i.e., 100%) of a certain type (i.e., passive) of income. 
325. In this last category fall a wide variety of seemingly inconsistent limits, including former 
I.R.C. § 453C (Supp. IV 1986), which limited deferral for certain installment sales, and I.R.C. 
§ 163(h) (Supp. IV 1986), which limited the interest deduction for personal interest. What 
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While the first two of these limitations are straightforward, the last 
is not. If the system were capable of actually measuring net worth, it 
could simply do so each year and be rid of all the problems at which 
the article is aimed, so that any limitation based on net worth must use 
some substitute referent to measure that net worth. The most direct 
substitute referent for net worth is generally absence of borrowing. To 
the extent investments are made or retained without the use of bor-
rowed funds, the taxpayer's total investments, and therefore her total 
tax benefits, cannot exceed her net worth. While Congress has not 
characterized its actions as legislatively limiting any person's tax bene-
fits to a percentage of her net worth, it actually has done so in several 
different, roundabout ways. One example is section 453C. 326 Simply 
put, that section strips away the deferral granted to certain installment 
sales to the extent that a taxpayer's assets consist of borrowed funds. 
In these cases, if, for example, 20% of A's assets consist of borrowed 
funds, A must sacrifice 20% of the deferral he would otherwise be 
entitled to. Indeed, if this approach were applied across the board, 
one could simply limit a person's total deferral (or some other tax ben-
efit such as deduction or exclusion)327 to the extent that his assets had 
been acquired with borrowed funds, so that allowable deferral could 
not exceed the taxpayer's real net worth. The significant problem with 
extension of this approach is that the actual amount of deferral which 
a taxpayer is taking advantage of depends on each asset's appreciation, 
and outside of certain specific instances such as installment sales, that 
value may be too difficult to discover. One appropriate solution to this 
problem, however, may be to substitute the accrued interest on bor-
rowed funds for the "unmeasurable" appreciation on assets, and to 
then disallow any deduction for that interest. 328 Rather than viewing 
legislative responses as a series of arbitrary reactions to unrelated 
problems, the above approach might allow one to view the problems in 
a more reasoned way and then to formulate responses that generally 
work consistently toward a single real referent. 
makes these limits appear inconsistent is, in fact, nothing more than the substitute referents 
chosen in each case. 
326. This section, enacted in 1986, was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
100-203, § 10202(a)(l), 101 Stat. 1330-383 (1987). 
327. Cf I.R.C. § 265 (1982) (denying interest and expense deductions relating to obligations 
that produce tax-exempt income). 
328. To date there have been many different kinds of limitations on the interest deduction, all 
of which have differing rationales and applications. Compare I.R.C. § 265 (1982) and Rev. Proc. 
72-18 (1972) with Treas. Reg. § l.163-8T (1987). 
